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First of all, it's recommended to have some **USB** with **good known binaries and libraries on it** (you can just get a ubuntu and copy the folders _/bin_, _/sbin_, _/lib,_ and _/lib64_), then mount the USN, and modify the env variables to use those binaries:
In other cases you need to download [**LiME**](https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME) from github can compile it with correct kernel headers. In order to **obtain the exact kernel headers** of the victim machine, you can just **copy the directory**`/lib/modules/<kernel version>` to your machine, and then **compile** LiME using them:
First of all you will need to **shutdown the system**. This isn't always an option as some times system will be a production server that the company cannot afford to shutdown.\
There are **2 ways** of shutting down the system, a **normal shutdown** and a **"plug the plug" shutdown**. The first one will allow the **processes to terminate as usual** and the **filesystem** to be **synchronized**, but I will also allow the possible **malware** to **destroy evidences**. The "pull the plug" approach may carry **some information loss** (as we have already took an image of the memory not much info is going to be lost) and the **malware won't have any opportunity** to do anything about it. Therefore, if you **suspect** that there may be a **malware**, just execute the **`sync`** **command** on the system and pull the plug.
It's important to note that **before connecting to your computer anything related to the case**, you need to be sure that it's going to be **mounted as read only** to avoid modifying the any information.
Some Linux systems have a feature to **verify the integrity of many installed components**, providing an effective way to identify unusual or out of place files. For instance, `rpm -Va` on Linux is designed to verify all packages that were installed using RedHat Package Manager.
On Debian-based systems, the _**/var/ lib/dpkg/status**_ file contains details about installed packages and the _**/var/log/dpkg.log**_ file records information when a package is installed.\
On RedHat and related Linux distributions the **`rpm -qa --root=/ mntpath/var/lib/rpm`** command will list the contents of an RPM database on a subject systems.
**Not all installed programs will be listed by the above commands** because some applications are not available as packages for certain systems and must be installed from source. Therefore, a review of locations such as _**/usr/local**_ and _**/opt**_ may reveal other applications that have been compiled and installed from source code.
It is extremely common for malware to entrench itself as a new, unauthorized service. Linux has a number of scripts that are used to start services as the computer boots. The initialization startup script _**/etc/inittab**_ calls other scripts such as rc.sysinit and various startup scripts under the _**/etc/rc.d/**_ directory, or _**/etc/rc.boot/**_ in some older versions. On other versions of Linux, such as Debian, startup scripts are stored in the _**/etc/init.d/**_ directory. In addition, some common services are enabled in _**/etc/inetd.conf**_ or _**/etc/xinetd/**_ depending on the version of Linux. Digital investigators should inspect each of these startup scripts for anomalous entries.
On Linux systems, kernel modules are commonly used as rootkit components to malware packages. Kernel modules are loaded when the system boots up based on the configuration information in the `/lib/modules/'uname -r'` and `/etc/modprobe.d` directories, and the `/etc/modprobe` or `/etc/modprobe.conf` file. These areas should be inspected for items that are related to malware.
There are several configuration files that Linux uses to automatically launch an executable when a user logs into the system that may contain traces of malware.
* _**/etc/profile.d/\***_ , _**/etc/profile**_ , _**/etc/bash.bashrc**_ are executed when any user account logs in.
* _**/etc/rc.local**_ It is traditionally executed after all the normal system services are started, at the end of the process of switching to a multiuser runlevel.
Look in all available log files on the compromised system for traces of malicious execution and associated activities such as creation of a new service.
**Logon** events recorded in the system and security logs, including logons via the network, can reveal that **malware** or an **intruder gained access** to a compromised system via a given account at a specific time. Other events around the time of a malware infection can be captured in system logs, including the **creation** of a **new****service** or new accounts around the time of an incident.\
* **/var/log/maillog** or **var/log/mail.log:** is for mail server logs, handy for postfix, smtpd, or email-related services info running on your server.
* **/var/log/kern.log**: keeps in Kernel logs and warning info. Kernel activity logs (e.g., dmesg, kern.log, klog) can show that a particular service crashed repeatedly, potentially indicating that an unstable trojanized version was installed.
* **/var/log/dmesg**: a repository for device driver messages. Use **dmesg** to see messages in this file.
* **/var/log/faillog:** records info on failed logins. Hence, handy for examining potential security breaches like login credential hacks and brute-force attacks.
* **/var/log/httpd/**: a directory containing error\_log and access\_log files of the Apache httpd daemon. Every error that httpd comes across is kept in the **error\_log** file. Think of memory problems and other system-related errors. **access\_log** logs all requests which come in via HTTP.
* **/var/log/mysqld.log** or **/var/log/mysql.log** : MySQL log file that records every debug, failure and success message, including starting, stopping and restarting of MySQL daemon mysqld. The system decides on the directory. RedHat, CentOS, Fedora, and other RedHat-based systems use /var/log/mariadb/mariadb.log. However, Debian/Ubuntu use /var/log/mysql/error.log directory.
* **/var/log/xferlog**: keeps FTP file transfer sessions. Includes info like file names and user-initiated FTP transfers.
* **/var/log/\*** : You should always check for unexpected logs in this directory
{% hint style="info" %}
Linux system logs and audit subsystems may be disabled or deleted in an intrusion or malware incident. In fact, because logs on Linux systems generally contain some of the most useful information about malicious activities, intruders routinely delete them. Therefore, when examining available log files, it is important to look for gaps or out of order entries that might be an indication of deletion or tampering.
* **SSH**: Connections to systems made using SSH to and from a compromised system result in entries being made in files for each user account (_**∼/.ssh/authorized\_keys**_ and _**∼/.ssh/known\_keys**_). These entries can reveal the hostname or IP address of the remote hosts.
* **Gnome Desktop**: User accounts may have a _**∼/.recently-used.xbel**_ file that contains information about files that were recently accessed using applications running in the Gnome desktop.
* **VIM**: User accounts may have a _**∼/.viminfo**_ file that contains details about the use of VIM, including search string history and paths to files that were opened using vim.
* **Less**: User accounts may have a _**∼/.lesshst**_ file that contains details about the use of less, including search string history and shell commands executed via less
[**usbrip**](https://github.com/snovvcrash/usbrip) is a small piece of software written in pure Python 3 which parses Linux log files (`/var/log/syslog*` or `/var/log/messages*` depending on the distro) for constructing USB event history tables.
It is interesting to **know all the USBs that have been used** and it will be more useful if you have an authorized list of USB to find "violation events" (the use of USBs that aren't inside that list).
Examine the _**/etc/passwd**_, _**/etc/shadow**_ and **security logs** for unusual names or accounts created and/or used in close proximity to known unauthorized events. Also check possible sudo brute-force attacks.\
File system data structures can provide substantial amounts of **information** related to a **malware** incident, including the **timing** of events and the actual **content** of **malware**.\
**Malware** is increasingly being designed to **thwart file system analysis**. Some malware alter date-time stamps on malicious files to make it more difficult to find them with time line analysis. Other malicious code is designed to only store certain information in memory to minimize the amount of data stored in the file system.\
To deal with such anti-forensic techniques, it is necessary to pay **careful attention to time line analysis** of file system date-time stamps and to files stored in common locations where malware might be found.
* Using **autopsy** you can see the timeline of events that may be useful to discover suspicions activity. You can also use the `mactime` feature from **Sleuth Kit** directly.
* Check for **unexpected scripts** inside **$PATH** (maybe some sh or php scripts?)
* setuid copies of /bin/bash on the system `find / -user root -perm -04000 –print`
* Review date-time stamps of deleted **inodes for large numbers of files being deleted around the same time**, which might indicate malicious activity such as installation of a rootkit or trojanized service.
* Because inodes are allocated on a next available basis, **malicious files placed on the system at around the same time may be assigned consecutive inodes**. Therefore, after one component of malware is located, it can be productive to inspect neighbouring inodes.
* Also check directories like _/bin_ or _/sbin_ as the **modified and/or changed time** of new or modified files me be interesting.
* It's interesting to see the files and folders of a directory **sorted by creation date** instead alphabetically to see which files/folders are more recent (last ones usually).
Note that an **attacker** can **modify** the **time** to make **files appear****legitimate**, but he **cannot** modify the **inode**. If you find that a **file** indicates that it was created and modify at the **same time** of the rest of the files in the same folder, but the **inode** is **unexpectedly bigger**, then the **timestamps of that file were modified**.
Select only files that are Added (`A`), Copied (`C`), Deleted (`D`), Modified (`M`), Renamed (`R`), have their type (i.e. regular file, symlink, submodule, …) changed (`T`), are Unmerged (`U`), are Unknown (`X`), or have had their pairing Broken (`B`). Any combination of the filter characters (including none) can be used. When `*` (All-or-none) is added to the combination, all paths are selected if there is any file that matches other criteria in the comparison; if there is no file that matches other criteria, nothing is selected.
Note that not all diffs can feature all types. For instance, diffs from the index to the working tree can never have Added entries (because the set of paths included in the diff is limited by what is in the index). Similarly, copied and renamed entries cannot appear if detection for those types is disabled.
<summary><strong>Support HackTricks and get benefits!</strong></summary>
Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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**Share your hacking tricks submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks github repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)**.**
