GITBOOK-4128: change request with no subject merged in GitBook
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* [macOS Kernel & System Extensions](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/README.md)
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* [macOS IOKit](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-iokit.md)
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* [macOS Kernel Extensions](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-kernel-extensions.md)
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* [macOS Kernel Vulnerabilities](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-kernel-vulnerabilities.md)
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* [macOS System Extensions](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-system-extensions.md)
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* [macOS Network Services & Protocols](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-protocols.md)
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* [macOS File Extension & URL scheme app handlers](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-file-extension-apps.md)
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@ -12,43 +12,37 @@
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</details>
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## Información básica
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## Basic Information
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Las extensiones de kernel (Kexts) son **paquetes** con extensión **`.kext`** que se **cargan directamente en el espacio del kernel** de macOS, proporcionando funcionalidades adicionales al sistema operativo principal.
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Kernel extensions (Kexts) are **packages** with a **`.kext`** extension that are **loaded directly into the macOS kernel space**, providing additional functionality to the main operating system.
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### Requisitos
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### Requirements
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Obviamente, esto es tan poderoso que es complicado cargar una extensión de kernel. Estos son los requisitos que debe cumplir una extensión de kernel para ser cargada:
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Obviously, this is so powerful that it is **complicated to load a kernel extension**. These are the **requirements** that a kernel extension must meet to be loaded:
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* Al entrar en **modo de recuperación**, las extensiones de kernel deben estar **permitidas para ser cargadas**:
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* When **entering recovery mode**, kernel **extensions must be allowed** to be loaded:
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<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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* La extensión de kernel debe estar **firmada con un certificado de firma de código de kernel**, que solo puede ser otorgado por **Apple**. Quien revisará en detalle la **empresa** y las **razones** por las que se necesita.
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* La extensión de kernel también debe estar **notarizada**, Apple podrá verificarla en busca de malware.
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* Luego, el **usuario root** es el que puede cargar la extensión de kernel y los archivos dentro del paquete deben pertenecer a root.
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* Durante el proceso de carga, el paquete debe ser preparado en una ubicación protegida sin raíz: `/Library/StagedExtensions` (requiere la concesión `com.apple.rootless.storage.KernelExtensionManagement`)
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* Finalmente, al intentar cargarlo, el [**usuario recibirá una solicitud de confirmación**](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2459/\_index.html) y, si se acepta, la computadora debe **reiniciarse** para cargarlo.
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* The kernel extension must be **signed with a kernel code signing certificate**, which can only be **granted by Apple**. Who will review in detail the company and the reasons why it is needed.
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* The kernel extension must also be **notarized**, Apple will be able to check it for malware.
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* Then, the **root** user is the one who can **load the kernel extension** and the files inside the package must **belong to root**.
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* During the upload process, the package must be prepared in a **protected non-root location**: `/Library/StagedExtensions` (requires the `com.apple.rootless.storage.KernelExtensionManagement` grant).
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* Finally, when attempting to load it, the user will [**receive a confirmation request**](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2459/\_index.html) and, if accepted, the computer must be **restarted** to load it.
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### Proceso de carga
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### Loading process
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En Catalina era así: Es interesante destacar que el proceso de **verificación** ocurre en **userland**. Sin embargo, solo las aplicaciones con la concesión **`com.apple.private.security.kext-management`** pueden **solicitar al kernel** que **cargue una extensión:** kextcache, kextload, kextutil, kextd, syspolicyd
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In Catalina it was like this: It is interesting to note that the **verification** process occurs in **userland**. However, only applications with the **`com.apple.private.security.kext-management`** grant can **request the kernel to load an extension**: `kextcache`, `kextload`, `kextutil`, `kextd`, `syspolicyd`
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1. **`kextutil`** cli **inicia** el proceso de verificación para cargar una extensión
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1. **`kextutil`** cli **starts** the **verification** process for loading an extension
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* It will talk to **`kextd`** by sending using a **Mach service**.
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2. **`kextd`** will check several things, such as the **signature**
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* It will talk to **`syspolicyd`** to **check** if the extension can be **loaded**.
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3. **`syspolicyd`** will **prompt** the **user** if the extension has not been previously loaded.
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* **`syspolicyd`** will report the result to **`kextd`**
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4. **`kextd`** will finally be able to **tell the kernel to load** the extension
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* Hablará con **`kextd`** enviando usando un servicio Mach
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2. **`kextd`** comprobará varias cosas, como la firma
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* Hablará con **`syspolicyd`** para comprobar si se puede cargar la extensión
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3. **`syspolicyd`** **preguntará** al **usuario** si la extensión no se ha cargado previamente
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* **`syspolicyd`** indicará el resultado a **`kextd`**
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4. **`kextd`** finalmente podrá indicar al **kernel que cargue la extensión**
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Si kextd no está disponible, kextutil puede realizar las mismas comprobaciones.
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If **`kextd`** is not available, **`kextutil`** can perform the same checks.
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## Referencias
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
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# macOS Kernel Vulnerabilities
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* ¿Trabajas en una **empresa de ciberseguridad**? ¿Quieres ver tu **empresa anunciada en HackTricks**? ¿O quieres tener acceso a la **última versión de PEASS o descargar HackTricks en PDF**? ¡Consulta los [**PLANES DE SUSCRIPCIÓN**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Descubre [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), nuestra colección exclusiva de [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
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* Obtén el [**swag oficial de PEASS y HackTricks**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Únete al** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) **grupo de Discord** o al [**grupo de telegram**](https://t.me/peass) o **sígueme** en **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live).
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* **Comparte tus trucos de hacking enviando PR a** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **y** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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## [Pwning OTA](https://jhftss.github.io/The-Nightmare-of-Apple-OTA-Update/)
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[**In this report**](https://jhftss.github.io/The-Nightmare-of-Apple-OTA-Update/) are explained several vulnerabilities that allowed to compromised the kernel compromising the software updater.\
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[**PoC**](https://github.com/jhftss/POC/tree/main/CVE-2022-46722).
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* ¿Trabajas en una **empresa de ciberseguridad**? ¿Quieres ver tu **empresa anunciada en HackTricks**? ¿O quieres tener acceso a la **última versión de PEASS o descargar HackTricks en PDF**? ¡Consulta los [**PLANES DE SUSCRIPCIÓN**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Descubre [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), nuestra colección exclusiva de [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
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* Obtén el [**swag oficial de PEASS y HackTricks**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Únete al** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) **grupo de Discord** o al [**grupo de telegram**](https://t.me/peass) o **sígueme** en **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live).
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* **Comparte tus trucos de hacking enviando PR a** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **y** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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@ -84,6 +84,32 @@ The MRT application is located in **`/Library/Apple/System/Library/CoreServices/
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**macOS** now **alerts** every time a tool uses a well known **technique to persist code execution** (such as Login Items, Daemons...), so the user knows better **which software is persisting**.
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<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (711).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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This runs with a **daemon** located in `/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Versions/A/Resources/backgroundtaskmanagementd` and the **agent** in `/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Support/BackgroundTaskManagementAgent.app`
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The way **`backgroundtaskmanagementd`** knows something is installed in a persistent folder is by **getting the FSEvents** and creating some **handlers** for those.
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Moreover, there is a plist file that contains **well known applications** that frequently persists maintained by apple located in: `/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/BackgroundTaskManagement.framework/Versions/A/Resources/attributions.plist`
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```json
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[...]
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"us.zoom.ZoomDaemon" => {
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"AssociatedBundleIdentifiers" => [
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0 => "us.zoom.xos"
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]
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"Attribution" => "Zoom"
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"Program" => "/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
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"ProgramArguments" => [
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0 => "/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/us.zoom.ZoomDaemon"
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]
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"TeamIdentifier" => "BJ4HAAB9B3"
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}
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[...]
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```
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### Enumeration
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It's possible to **enumerate all** the configured background items running the Apple cli tool:
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```bash
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@ -102,8 +128,38 @@ xattr -rc dumpBTM # Remove quarantine attr
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This information is being stored in **`/private/var/db/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagement/BackgroundItems-v4.btm`** and the Terminal needs FDA.
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You can find more information:
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### Messing with BTM
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When a new persistence is found an event of type **`ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_BTM_LAUNCH_ITEM_ADD`**. So, any way to **prevent** this **event** from being sent or the **agent from alerting** the user will help an attacker to _**bypass**_ BTM.
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* **Reseting the database**: Running the following command will reset the database (should rebuild it from the ground), however, for some reason, after running this, **no new persistence will be alerted until the system is rebooted**.
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* **root** is required.
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```bash
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# Reset the database
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sfltool resettbtm
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```
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* **Stop the Agent**: It's possible to send a stop signal to the agent so it **won't be alerting the user** when new detections are found.
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```bash
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# Get PID
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pgrep BackgroundTaskManagementAgent
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1011
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# Stop it
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kill -SIGSTOP 1011
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# Check it's stopped (a T means it's stopped)
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ps -o state 1011
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T
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```
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* **Bug**: If the **process that created the persistence exists fast right after it**, the daemon will try to **get information** about it, **fail**, and **won't be able to send the event** indicating that a new thing is persisting.
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References and **more information about BTM**:
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* [https://youtu.be/9hjUmT031tc?t=26481](https://youtu.be/9hjUmT031tc?t=26481)
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* [https://www.patreon.com/posts/new-developer-77420730?l=fr](https://www.patreon.com/posts/new-developer-77420730?l=fr)
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* [https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/deployment/depdca572563/web](https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/deployment/depdca572563/web)
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@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ Note that entitlements starting with **`com.apple`** are not available to third-
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## High
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### com.apple.rootless.install.heritable
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The entitlement **`com.apple.rootless.install.heritable`** allows to **bypass SIP**. Check [this for more info](macos-sip.md#com.apple.rootless.install.heritable).
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### **com.apple.rootless.install**
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The entitlement **`com.apple.rootless.install`** allows to **bypass SIP**. Check[ this for more info](macos-sip.md#com.apple.rootless.install).
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### `com.apple.security.get-task-allow`
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This entitlement allows to get the task port of the process run by the binary with this entitlement and **inject code on it**. Check [**this for more info**](../mac-os-architecture/macos-ipc-inter-process-communication/).
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@ -38,6 +46,14 @@ This entitlement allows to **load frameworks, plug-ins, or libraries without bei
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This entitlement allows to **use DYLD environment variables** that could be used to inject libraries and code. Check [**this for more info**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/entitlements/com\_apple\_security\_cs\_allow-dyld-environment-variables).
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### com.apple.private.apfs.revert-to-snapshot
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TODO: In [**this report**](https://jhftss.github.io/The-Nightmare-of-Apple-OTA-Update/) **is mentioned that this could be used to** update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!
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### com.apple.private.apfs.create-sealed-snapshot
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TODO: In [**this report**](https://jhftss.github.io/The-Nightmare-of-Apple-OTA-Update/) **is mentioned that this could be used to** update the SSV-protected contents after a reboot. If you know how it send a PR please!
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### **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles`**
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Gives **Full Disk Access** permissions, one of the TCC highest permissions you can have.
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