GitBook: [master] 504 pages and 3 assets modified

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@ -67,3 +67,18 @@ sudo ./rkhunter --check -r / -l /tmp/rkhunter.log [--report-warnings-only] [--sk
[PEpper ](https://github.com/Th3Hurrican3/PEpper)checks some basic stuff inside the executable \(binary data, entropy, URLs and IPs, some yara rules\).
### Apple Binary Signatures
When checking some **malware sample** you should always **check the signature** of the binary as the **developer** that signed it may be already **related** with **malware.**
```bash
#Get signer
codesign -vv -d /bin/ls 2>&1 | grep -E "Authority|TeamIdentifier"
#Check if the apps contents have been modified
codesign --verify --verbose /Applications/Safari.app
#Check if the signature is valid
spctl --assess --verbose /Applications/Safari.app
```

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@ -763,6 +763,21 @@ and tin this case the content cannot be decompiled even with `osadecompile`
However, there are still some tools that can be used to understand this kind of executables, [**read this research for more info**](https://labs.sentinelone.com/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/)\). The tool [**applescript-disassembler**](https://github.com/Jinmo/applescript-disassembler) with [**aevt\_decompile**](https://github.com/SentineLabs/aevt_decompile) will be very useful to understand how the script works.
## Apple Binary Signatures
When checking some **malware sample** you should always **check the signature** of the binary as the **developer** that signed it may be already **related** with **malware.**
```bash
#Get signer
codesign -vv -d /bin/ls 2>&1 | grep -E "Authority|TeamIdentifier"
#Check if the apps contents have been modified
codesign --verify --verbose /Applications/Safari.app
#Check if the signature is valid
spctl --assess --verbose /Applications/Safari.app
```
## Specific MacOS Enumeration
```bash
@ -773,7 +788,6 @@ mdfind password #Show all the files that contains the word password
mfind -name password #List all the files containing the word password in the name
sysctl -a #List kernel configuration
diskutil list #List connected hard drives
codesign -vv -d /bin/ls #Check the signature of a binary
nettop #Monitor network usage of processes in top style
#networksetup - set or view network options: Proxies, FW options and more

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@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ As you may be thinking usually a universal binary compiled for 2 architectures *
### Mach-o Format
* **Header**
![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28557%29.png)
#### **Header**
The header contains basic information about the file, such as magic bytes to identify it as a Mach-O file and information about the target architecture. You can find it in: `mdfind loader.h | grep -i mach-o | grep -E "loader.h$"`
@ -113,11 +115,81 @@ struct mach_header {
};
```
* **load-commands region**
Filetypes:
This specifies the **layout of the file in memory**. It contains the **location of the symbol table**, the main thread context at the beginning of execution, and which shared libraries are required.
* MH\_EXECUTE \(0x2\): Standard Mach-O executable
* MH\_DYLIB \(0x6\): A Mach-O dynamic linked library \(i.e. .dylib\)
* MH\_BUNDLE \(0x8\): A Mach-O bundle \(i.e. .bundle\)
* **data region**
#### \*\*\*\*
#### **Load commands**
This specifies the **layout of the file in memory**. It contains the **location of the symbol table**, the main thread context at the beginning of execution, and which **shared libraries** are required.
The commands basically instruct the dynamic loader **\(dyld\) how to load the binary in memory.**
Load commands all begin with a **load\_command** structure, defined in mach-o/loader.h:
```objectivec
struct load_command {
uint32_t cmd; /* type of load command */
uint32_t cmdsize; /* total size of command in bytes */
};
```
A **common** type of load command is **LC\_SEGMENT/LC\_SEGMENT\_64**, which **describes** a **segment:**
_A segment defines a **range of bytes** in a Mach-O file and the **addresses** and **memory** **protection** **attributes** at which those bytes are **mapped into** virtual memory when the dynamic linker loads the application._
![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28554%29.png)
Common segments:
* **`__TEXT`**: Contains **executable** **code** and **data** that is **read-only.** Common sections of this segment:
* `__text`: ****Compiled binary code
* `__const`: Constant data
* `__cstring`: String constants
* **`__DATA`**: Contains data that is **writable.**
* `__data`: Global variables \(that have been initialized\)
* `__bss`: Static variables \(that have not been initialized\)
* `__objc_*` \(\_\_objc\_classlist, \_\_objc\_protolist, etc\): Information used by the Objective-C runtime
* **`__LINKEDIT`**: Contains information for the linker \(dyld\) such as, "symbol, string, and relocation table entries."
* **`__OBJC`**: Contains information used by the Objective-C runtime. Though this information might also be found in the \_\_DATA segment, within various in \_\_objc\_\* sections.
* **`LC_MAIN`**: Contains the entrypoint in the **entryoff attribute.** At load time, **dyld** simply **adds** this value to the \(in-memory\) **base of the binary**, then **jumps** to this instruction to kickoff execution of the binarys code.
* **`LC_LOAD_DYLIB`**: ****This load command describes a **dynamic** **library** dependency which **instructs** the **loader** \(dyld\) to l**oad and link said library**. There is a LC\_LOAD\_DYLIB load command **for each library** that the Mach-O binary requires.
* This load command is a structure of type **`dylib_command`** \(which contains a struct dylib, describing the actual dependent dynamic library\):
```objectivec
struct dylib_command {
uint32_t cmd; /* LC_LOAD_{,WEAK_}DYLIB */
uint32_t cmdsize; /* includes pathname string */
struct dylib dylib; /* the library identification */
};
struct dylib {
union lc_str name; /* library's path name */
uint32_t timestamp; /* library's build time stamp */
uint32_t current_version; /* library's current version number */
uint32_t compatibility_version; /* library's compatibility vers number*/
};
```
![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28558%29.png)
Some potential malware related libraries are:
* **DiskArbitration**: Monitoring USB drives
* **AVFoundation:** Capture audio and video
* **CoreWLAN**: Wifi scans.
{% hint style="info" %}
A Mach-O binary can contain one or **more** **constructors**, that will be **executed** **before** the address specified in **LC\_MAIN**.
The offsets of any constructors are held in the **\_\_mod\_init\_func** section of the **\_\_DATA\_CONST** segment.
{% endhint %}
#### \*\*\*\*
#### **Data**
The heart of the file is the final region, the data, which consists of a number of segments as laid out in the load-commands region. **Each segment can contain a number of data sections**. Each of these sections **contains code or data** of one particular type.
@ -127,10 +199,13 @@ The heart of the file is the final region, the data, which consists of a number
```bash
otool -f /bin/ls #Get universal headers info
otool -h /bin/ls #get the Mach header
otool -hv /bin/ls #Get the Mach header
otool -l /bin/ls #Get Load commands
otool -L /bin/ls #Get libraries used by the binary
```
Or you can use the GUI tool [**machoview**](https://sourceforge.net/projects/machoview/).
### Bundles
Basically, a bundle is a **directory structure** within the file system. Interestingly, by default this directory **looks like a single object in Finder**. The types of resources contained within a bundle may consist of applications, libraries, images, documentation, header files, etc. All these files are inside `<application>.app/Contents/`

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Exploiting a debuggable application
# Exploiting a debuggeable applciation
**Information copied from** [**https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/android-hacking-security-part-6-exploiting-debuggable-android-applications/\#article**](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/android-hacking-security-part-6-exploiting-debuggable-android-applications/#article)\*\*\*\*