Merge branch 'main' into movim
This commit is contained in:
commit
01c262b71d
|
|
@ -10,14 +10,6 @@
|
|||
try_files {{ item.override_try_files | default('$uri $uri/ =404') }};
|
||||
}
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
{% block app_root_location %}
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block extra_locations %}
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block custom_locations %}
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block local_content %}
|
||||
{% if item.manage_local_content is not defined %}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,121 +1,127 @@
|
|||
{% extends "core.j2" %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block app_specific %}
|
||||
# CryptPad serves static assets over these two domains.
|
||||
# `main_domain` is what users will enter in their address bar.
|
||||
# Privileged computation such as key management is handled in this scope
|
||||
# UI content is loaded via the `sandbox_domain`.
|
||||
# "Content Security Policy" headers prevent content loaded via the sandbox
|
||||
# from accessing privileged information.
|
||||
# These variables must be different to take advantage of CryptPad's sandboxing techniques.
|
||||
# In the event of an XSS vulnerability in CryptPad's front-end code
|
||||
# this will limit the amount of information accessible to attackers.
|
||||
set $main_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
set $sandbox_domain "sandbox.{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
# CryptPad serves static assets over these two domains.
|
||||
# `main_domain` is what users will enter in their address bar.
|
||||
# Privileged computation such as key management is handled in this scope
|
||||
# UI content is loaded via the `sandbox_domain`.
|
||||
# "Content Security Policy" headers prevent content loaded via the sandbox
|
||||
# from accessing privileged information.
|
||||
# These variables must be different to take advantage of CryptPad's sandboxing techniques.
|
||||
# In the event of an XSS vulnerability in CryptPad's front-end code
|
||||
# this will limit the amount of information accessible to attackers.
|
||||
set $main_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
set $sandbox_domain "sandbox.{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
|
||||
# By default CryptPad forbids remote domains from embedding CryptPad documents in iframes.
|
||||
# The sandbox domain must always be permitted in order for the platform to function.
|
||||
# If you wish to enable remote embedding you may change the value below to "*"
|
||||
# as per the commented value.
|
||||
set $allowed_origins "https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
#set $allowed_origins "*";
|
||||
# By default CryptPad forbids remote domains from embedding CryptPad documents in iframes.
|
||||
# The sandbox domain must always be permitted in order for the platform to function.
|
||||
# If you wish to enable remote embedding you may change the value below to "*"
|
||||
# as per the commented value.
|
||||
set $allowed_origins "https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
#set $allowed_origins "*";
|
||||
|
||||
# CryptPad's dynamic content (websocket traffic and encrypted blobs)
|
||||
# can be served over separate domains. Using dedicated domains (or subdomains)
|
||||
# for these purposes allows you to move them to a separate machine at a later date
|
||||
# if you find that a single machine cannot handle all of your users.
|
||||
# If you don't use dedicated domains, this can be the same as $main_domain
|
||||
# If you do, they can be added as exceptions to any rules which block connections to remote domains.
|
||||
# You can find these variables referenced below in the relevant places.
|
||||
set $api_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
set $files_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
# CryptPad's dynamic content (websocket traffic and encrypted blobs)
|
||||
# can be served over separate domains. Using dedicated domains (or subdomains)
|
||||
# for these purposes allows you to move them to a separate machine at a later date
|
||||
# if you find that a single machine cannot handle all of your users.
|
||||
# If you don't use dedicated domains, this can be the same as $main_domain
|
||||
# If you do, they can be added as exceptions to any rules which block connections to remote domains.
|
||||
# You can find these variables referenced below in the relevant places
|
||||
set $api_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
set $files_domain "{{ item.ssl_name }}";
|
||||
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials true;
|
||||
# add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN";
|
||||
|
||||
#set $coop '';
|
||||
#if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|presentation|doc|convert)\/.*$) { set $coop 'same-origin'; }
|
||||
# Opt out of Google's FLoC Network
|
||||
add_header Permissions-Policy interest-cohort=();
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt out of Google's FLoC Network
|
||||
add_header Permissions-Policy interest-cohort=();
|
||||
# Enable SharedArrayBuffer in Firefox (for .xlsx export)
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable SharedArrayBuffer in Firefox (for .xlsx export)
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
# any static assets loaded with "ver=" in their URL will be cached for a year
|
||||
if ($args ~ ver=) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl max-age=31536000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# This rule overrides the above caching directive and makes things somewhat less efficient.
|
||||
# We had inverted them as an optimization, but Safari 16 introduced a bug that interpreted
|
||||
# some important headers incorrectly when loading these files from cache.
|
||||
# This is why we can't have nice things :(
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^(\/|.*\/|.*\.html)$) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl no-cache;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# This rule overrides the above caching directive and makes things somewhat less efficient.
|
||||
# We had inverted them as an optimization, but Safari 16 introduced a bug that interpreted
|
||||
# some important headers incorrectly when loading these files from cache.
|
||||
# This is why we can't have nice things :(
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^(\/|.*\/|.*\.html)$) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl no-cache;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ($args ~ ver=) {
|
||||
set $cacheControl max-age=31536000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Will not set any header if it is emptystring
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control $cacheControl;
|
||||
|
||||
# Will not set any header if it is emptystring
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control $cacheControl;
|
||||
# CSS can be dynamically set inline, loaded from the same domain, or from $main_domain
|
||||
set $styleSrc "'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# CSS can be dynamically set inline, loaded from the same domain, or from $main_domain
|
||||
set $styleSrc "'unsafe-inline' 'self' https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# connect-src restricts URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces
|
||||
# if you have configured your instance to use a dedicated $files_domain or $api_domain
|
||||
# you will need to add them below as: https://${files_domain} and https://${api_domain}
|
||||
set $connectSrc "'self' https://${main_domain} blob: wss://${api_domain} https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# connect-src restricts URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces
|
||||
# if you have configured your instance to use a dedicated $files_domain or $api_domain
|
||||
# you will need to add them below as: https://${files_domain} and https://${api_domain}
|
||||
set $connectSrc "'self' https://${main_domain} blob: wss://${api_domain} https://${sandbox_domain}";
|
||||
# fonts can be loaded from data-URLs or the main domain
|
||||
set $fontSrc "'self' data: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# fonts can be loaded from data-URLs or the main domain
|
||||
set $fontSrc "'self' data: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# images can be loaded from anywhere, though we'd like to deprecate this as it allows the use of images for tracking
|
||||
set $imgSrc "'self' data: blob: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# images can be loaded from anywhere, though we'd like to deprecate this as it allows the use of images for tracking
|
||||
set $imgSrc "'self' data: blob: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# frame-src specifies valid sources for nested browsing contexts.
|
||||
# this prevents loading any iframes from anywhere other than the sandbox domain
|
||||
set $frameSrc "'self' https://${sandbox_domain} blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-src specifies valid sources for nested browsing contexts.
|
||||
# this prevents loading any iframes from anywhere other than the sandbox domain
|
||||
set $frameSrc "'self' https://${sandbox_domain} blob:";
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for loading media using video or audio
|
||||
set $mediaSrc "blob:";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for loading media using video or audio
|
||||
set $mediaSrc "blob:";
|
||||
# defines valid sources for webworkers and nested browser contexts
|
||||
# deprecated in favour of worker-src and frame-src
|
||||
set $childSrc "https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# defines valid sources for webworkers and nested browser contexts
|
||||
# deprecated in favour of worker-src and frame-src
|
||||
set $childSrc "https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
|
||||
# supercedes child-src but is unfortunately not yet universally supported.
|
||||
set $workerSrc "'self'";
|
||||
|
||||
# specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
|
||||
# supercedes child-src but is unfortunately not yet universally supported.
|
||||
set $workerSrc "'self'";
|
||||
# script-src specifies valid sources for javascript, including inline handlers
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
|
||||
# script-src specifies valid sources for javascript, including inline handlers
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
# frame-ancestors specifies which origins can embed your CryptPad instance
|
||||
# this must include 'self' and your main domain (over HTTPS) in order for CryptPad to work
|
||||
# if you have enabled remote embedding via the admin panel then this must be more permissive.
|
||||
# note: cryptpad.fr permits web pages served via https: and vector: (element desktop app)
|
||||
set $frameAncestors "'self' {{ item.frameancestors | default('https://${main_domain}:') }}";
|
||||
# set $frameAncestors "'self' https: vector:";
|
||||
|
||||
# frame-ancestors specifies which origins can embed your CryptPad instance
|
||||
# this must include 'self' and your main domain (over HTTPS) in order for CryptPad to work
|
||||
# if you have enabled remote embedding via the admin panel then this must be more permissive.
|
||||
# note: cryptpad.fr permits web pages served via https: and vector: (element desktop app)
|
||||
set $frameAncestors "'self' {{ item.frameancestors | default('https://${main_domain}:') }}";
|
||||
# set $frameAncestors "'self' https: vector:";
|
||||
set $unsafe 0;
|
||||
# the following assets are loaded via the sandbox domain
|
||||
# they unfortunately still require exceptions to the sandboxing to work correctly.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|doc|presentation)\/inner.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/common\/onlyoffice\/.*\/.*\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
set $unsafe 0;
|
||||
# the following assets are loaded via the sandbox domain
|
||||
# they unfortunately still require exceptions to the sandboxing to work correctly.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/(sheet|doc|presentation)\/inner.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/common\/onlyoffice\/.*\/.*\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
# everything except the sandbox domain is a privileged scope, as they might be used to handle keys
|
||||
if ($host != $sandbox_domain) { set $unsafe 0; }
|
||||
# this iframe is an exception. Office file formats are converted outside of the sandboxed scope
|
||||
# because of bugs in Chromium-based browsers that incorrectly ignore headers that are supposed to enable
|
||||
# the use of some modern APIs that we require when javascript is run in a cross-origin context.
|
||||
# We've applied other sandboxing techniques to mitigate the risk of running WebAssembly in this privileged scope
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/unsafeiframe\/inner\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
# everything except the sandbox domain is a privileged scope, as they might be used to handle keys
|
||||
if ($host != $sandbox_domain) { set $unsafe 0; }
|
||||
# this iframe is an exception. Office file formats are converted outside of the sandboxed scope
|
||||
# because of bugs in Chromium-based browsers that incorrectly ignore headers that are supposed to enable
|
||||
# the use of some modern APIs that we require when javascript is run in a cross-origin context.
|
||||
# We've applied other sandboxing techniques to mitigate the risk of running WebAssembly in this privileged scope
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/unsafeiframe\/inner\.html.*$) { set $unsafe 1; }
|
||||
# draw.io uses inline script tags in it's index.html. The hashes are added here.
|
||||
if ($uri ~ ^\/components\/drawio\/src\/main\/webapp\/index.html.*$) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'sha256-6zAB96lsBZREqf0sT44BhH1T69sm7HrN34rpMOcWbNo=' 'sha256-6g514VrT/cZFZltSaKxIVNFF46+MFaTSDTPB8WfYK+c=' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# privileged contexts allow a few more rights than unprivileged contexts, though limits are still applied
|
||||
if ($unsafe) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
# privileged contexts allow a few more rights than unprivileged contexts, though limits are still applied
|
||||
if ($unsafe) {
|
||||
set $scriptSrc "'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' resource: https://${main_domain}";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, set all the rules you composed above.
|
||||
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; child-src $childSrc; worker-src $workerSrc; media-src $mediaSrc; style-src $styleSrc; script-src $scriptSrc; connect-src $connectSrc; font-src $fontSrc; img-src $imgSrc; frame-src $frameSrc; frame-ancestors $frameAncestors";
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, set all the rules you composed above.
|
||||
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; child-src $childSrc; worker-src $workerSrc; media-src $mediaSrc; style-src $styleSrc; script-src $scriptSrc; connect-src $connectSrc; font-src $fontSrc; img-src $imgSrc; frame-src $frameSrc; frame-ancestors $frameAncestors";
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block root %}
|
||||
|
|
@ -124,97 +130,88 @@
|
|||
index index.html;
|
||||
error_page 404 /customize.dist/404.html;
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, serve anything the above exceptions don't govern.
|
||||
try_files /customize/www/$uri /customize/www/$uri/index.html /www/$uri /www/$uri/index.html /customize/$uri;
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
{% block location%}
|
||||
# The nodejs process can handle all traffic whether accessed over websocket or as static assets
|
||||
# We prefer to serve static content from nginx directly and to leave the API server to handle
|
||||
# the dynamic content that only it can manage. This is primarily an optimization
|
||||
location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://{{ item.proxy_pass }}:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
location ^~ /cryptpad_websocket {
|
||||
# XXX
|
||||
# static assets like blobs and blocks are served by clustered workers in the API server
|
||||
# Websocket traffic still needs to be handled by the main process, which means it needs
|
||||
# to be hosted on a different port. By default 3003 will be used, though this is configurable
|
||||
# via config.websocketPort
|
||||
proxy_pass http://{{ item.proxy_pass }}:3003;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# WebSocket support (nginx 1.4)
|
||||
proxy_http_version 1.1;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Connection upgrade;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
location ^~ /customize.dist/ {
|
||||
# This is needed in order to prevent infinite recursion between /customize/ and the root
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# try to load customizeable content via /customize/ and fall back to the default content
|
||||
# located at /customize.dist/
|
||||
# This is what allows you to override behaviour.
|
||||
location ^~ /customize/ {
|
||||
rewrite ^/customize/(.*)$ $1 break;
|
||||
try_files /customize/$uri /customize.dist/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# /api/config is loaded once per page load and is used to retrieve
|
||||
# the caching variable which is applied to every other resource
|
||||
# which is loaded during that session.
|
||||
location ~ ^/api/.*$ {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://{{ item.proxy_pass }}:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# These settings prevent both NGINX and the API server
|
||||
# from setting the same headers and creating duplicates
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# encrypted blobs are immutable and are thus cached for a year
|
||||
location ^~ /blob/ {
|
||||
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Type' 'application/octet-stream; charset=utf-8';
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
|
||||
return 204;
|
||||
# WebSocket support (nginx 1.4)
|
||||
proxy_http_version 1.1;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Connection upgrade;
|
||||
}
|
||||
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control max-age=31536000;
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range,Content-Length';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Expose-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range,Content-Length';
|
||||
try_files $uri =404;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# the "block-store" serves encrypted payloads containing users' drive keys
|
||||
# these payloads are unlocked via login credentials. They are mutable
|
||||
# and are thus never cached. They're small enough that it doesn't matter, in any case.
|
||||
location ^~ /block/ {
|
||||
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control max-age=0;
|
||||
try_files $uri =404;
|
||||
}
|
||||
location ^~ /customize.dist/ {
|
||||
# This is needed in order to prevent infinite recursion between /customize/ and the root
|
||||
}
|
||||
# try to load customizeable content via /customize/ and fall back to the default content
|
||||
# located at /customize.dist/
|
||||
# This is what allows you to override behaviour.
|
||||
location ^~ /customize/ {
|
||||
rewrite ^/customize/(.*)$ $1 break;
|
||||
try_files /customize/$uri /customize.dist/$uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{% if item.debug is defined and item.debug == 'true' %}
|
||||
# This block provides an alternative means of loading content
|
||||
# otherwise only served via websocket. This is solely for debugging purposes,
|
||||
# and is thus not allowed by default.
|
||||
location ^~ /datastore/ {
|
||||
add_header Cache-Control max-age=0;
|
||||
try_files $uri =404;
|
||||
}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
# /api/config is loaded once per page load and is used to retrieve
|
||||
# the caching variable which is applied to every other resource
|
||||
# which is loaded during that session.
|
||||
location ~ ^/api/.*$ {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://{{ item.proxy_pass }}:3000;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs server has some built-in forwarding rules to prevent
|
||||
# URLs like /pad from resulting in a 404. This simply adds a trailing slash
|
||||
# to a variety of applications.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(register|login|settings|user|pad|drive|poll|slide|code|whiteboard|file|media|profile|contacts|todo|filepicker|debug|kanban|sheet|support|admin|notifications|teams|calendar|presentation|doc|form|report|convert|checkup)$ {
|
||||
rewrite ^(.*)$ $1/ redirect;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# These settings prevent both NGINX and the API server
|
||||
# from setting the same headers and creating duplicates
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy cross-origin;
|
||||
proxy_hide_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy;
|
||||
add_header Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy require-corp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Requests for blobs and blocks are now proxied to the API server
|
||||
# This simplifies NGINX path configuration in the event they are being hosted in a non-standard location
|
||||
# or with odd unexpected permissions. Serving blobs in this manner also means that it will be possible to
|
||||
# enforce access control for them, though this is not yet implemented.
|
||||
# Access control (via TOTP 2FA) has been added to blocks, so they can be handled with the same directives.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(blob|block)/.*$ {
|
||||
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' "${allowed_origins}";
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials' true;
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,X-CustomHeader,Keep-Alive,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Content-Range,Range';
|
||||
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Type' 'application/octet-stream; charset=utf-8';
|
||||
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
|
||||
return 204;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Since we are proxying to the API server these headers can get duplicated
|
||||
# so we hide them
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-Content-Type-Options';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'Permissions-Policy';
|
||||
proxy_hide_header 'X-XSS-Protection';
|
||||
proxy_pass http://{{ item.proxy_pass }}:3000;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodejs server has some built-in forwarding rules to prevent
|
||||
# URLs like /pad from resulting in a 404. This simply adds a trailing slash
|
||||
# to a variety of applications.
|
||||
location ~ ^/(register|login|recovery|settings|user|pad|drive|poll|slide|code|whiteboard|file|media|profile|contacts|todo|filepicker|debug|kanban|sheet|support|admin|notifications|teams|calendar|presentation|doc|form|report|convert|checkup|diagram)$ {
|
||||
rewrite ^(.*)$ $1/ redirect;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Finally, serve anything the above exceptions don't govern.
|
||||
try_files /customize/www/$uri /customize/www/$uri/index.html /www/$uri /www/$uri/index.html /customize/$uri;
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ location ~ ^/(api|feeds|nodeinfo|.well-known) {
|
|||
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
|
||||
|
||||
# Rate limit
|
||||
limit_req zone={{ item.name }}_ratelimit burst=30 nodelay;
|
||||
#limit_req zone={{ item.name }}_ratelimit burst=30 nodelay;
|
||||
|
||||
# Add IP forwarding headers
|
||||
# Send actual client IP upstream
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
|
||||
proxy_set_header Host $host;
|
||||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||||
|
|
@ -75,11 +75,11 @@ location ~ ^/(api|feeds|nodeinfo|.well-known) {
|
|||
|
||||
# Anonymize IP addresses
|
||||
# https://www.supertechcrew.com/anonymizing-logs-nginx-apache/
|
||||
map $remote_addr $remote_addr_anon {
|
||||
~(?P<ip>\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\. $ip.0;
|
||||
~(?P<ip>[^:]+:[^:]+): $ip::;
|
||||
127.0.0.1 $remote_addr;
|
||||
::1 $remote_addr;
|
||||
default {{ item.upstream_name }};
|
||||
}
|
||||
#map $remote_addr $remote_addr_anon {
|
||||
# ~(?P<ip>\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\. $ip.0;
|
||||
# ~(?P<ip>[^:]+:[^:]+): $ip::;
|
||||
# 127.0.0.1 $remote_addr;
|
||||
# ::1 $remote_addr;
|
||||
# default {{ item.upstream_name }};
|
||||
#}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
|
|||
|
||||
{%block root %}
|
||||
root {{ searx_app_dir }}/searx;
|
||||
{% if item.real_ip_from is defined %}
|
||||
set_real_ip_from {{ item.real_ip_from }};
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% endblock %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% block location %}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue