mirror of git://git.savannah.gnu.org/guix.git
gnu: spice: Update to 0.14.0.
This is a follow-up to commit 9a187b39b7.
* gnu/packages/spice.scm (spice): Update to 0.14.0.
[source]: Remove obsolete patches. Use HTTPS URL.
[inputs]: Add orc.
[home-page]: Update to use https.
* gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
This commit is contained in:
Andy Patterson
Leo Famulari
parent
982caeab6f
commit
b142756d9c
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@ -1071,10 +1071,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/slim-login.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/slurm-configure-remove-nonfree-contribs.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/sooperlooper-build-with-wx-30.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/steghide-fixes.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/superlu-dist-scotchmetis.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/swish-e-search.patch \
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
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Prevent buffer overflow when reading large messages.
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1401603
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https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9577
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9577
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https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9577
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3
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From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000
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Subject: main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client
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diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c
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index 0ecc9df..1fc3915 100644
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--- a/server/main_channel.c
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+++ b/server/main_channel.c
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@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc,
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if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) {
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return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size);
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+ } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) {
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+ /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */
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+ return NULL;
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} else {
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return main_chan->recv_buf;
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}
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--
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cgit v0.10.2
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
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Prevent possible DoS during protocol handshake.
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
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https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
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https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
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From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000
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Subject: Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index f40b65c..86a33d5 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque)
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reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version;
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- if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) {
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+ /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */
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+ if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) {
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reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
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spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size);
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reds_link_free(link);
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--
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cgit v0.10.2
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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
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Fixes a potential buffer overflow in the protocol handling.
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
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https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
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https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
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From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000
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Subject: Prevent integer overflows in capability checks
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index 86a33d5..9150454 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque)
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link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps);
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link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps);
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+ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities,
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+ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */
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+ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) {
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+ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
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+ reds_link_free(link);
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps;
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caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset);
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--
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cgit v0.10.2
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@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-7506:
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1452606
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7506
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Patches copied from Debian spice package version
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'spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz':
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http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/s/spice/spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz
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The patches had to be adapted to apply to the latest spice tarball, and
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are based on these upstream commits:
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=111ab38611cef5012f1565a65fa2d8a8a05cce37
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=571cec91e71c2aae0d5f439ea2d8439d0c3d75eb
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https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=fbbcdad773e2791cfb988f4748faa41943551ca6
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From 257f69d619fed407493156c8a7b952abc8a51314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
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Subject: [spice-server 1/3] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big
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ClientMonitorsConfig
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Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is
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a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig
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message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the
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non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily
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lead to memory exhaustion on the host.
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---
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server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index f439a3668..7be85fdfc 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void)
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static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
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MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
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{
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+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256;
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+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE =
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+ sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
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+
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VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
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VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
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RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
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+ // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
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+ // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
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+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) {
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+ goto overflow;
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+ }
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cmc->buffer_size += size;
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cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size);
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spice_assert(cmc->buffer);
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cmc->mcc = mcc;
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memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size);
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cmc->buffer_pos += size;
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+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) {
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+ spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
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+ return;
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+ }
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msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer;
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- if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size ||
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- msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
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+ if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) {
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+ goto overflow;
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+ }
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+ if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
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spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
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return;
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}
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@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
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spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
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red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
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reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
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+ return;
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+
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+overflow:
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+ spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting");
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+ red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc));
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+ reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
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}
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void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
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--
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2.13.0
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From ff2b4ef70181087d5abd50bad76d026ec5088a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
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Subject: [spice-server 2/3] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor
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configuration
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Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows.
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---
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server/reds.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index 7be85fdfc..e1c8c1086 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
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spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
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return;
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}
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+ if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) {
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+ goto overflow;
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+ }
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monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
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spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
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red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
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--
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2.13.0
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From 8cc3d7df2792751939cc832f4110c57e2addfca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
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Subject: [spice-server 3/3] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor
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configuration
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It was also possible for a malicious client to set
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VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger
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than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors.
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This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to
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read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the
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host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems
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complicated.
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---
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server/reds.c | 7 +++++++
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index e1c8c1086..3a42c3755 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
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VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
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VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
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RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
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+ uint32_t max_monitors;
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// limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
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// memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
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@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
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goto overflow;
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}
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monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
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+ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows
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+ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) /
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+ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
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+ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) {
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+ goto overflow;
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+ }
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spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
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red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
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reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
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--
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2.13.0
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@ -203,20 +203,15 @@ which allows users to view a desktop computing environment.")
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(define-public spice
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(package
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(name "spice")
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(version "0.12.8")
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(version "0.14.0")
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(source (origin
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(method url-fetch)
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(uri (string-append
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"http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/"
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"https://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/"
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"spice-" version ".tar.bz2"))
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(sha256
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(base32
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"0za03i77j8i3g5l2np2j7vy8cqsdbkm9wbv4hjnaqq9xhz2sa0gr"))
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(patches
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(search-patches "spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch"
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"spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch"
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"spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch"
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"spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch"))))
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"0j5q7cp5p95jk8fp48gz76rz96lifimdsx1wnpmfal0nnnar9nrs"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(propagated-inputs
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`(("openssl" ,openssl)
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@ -228,6 +223,7 @@ which allows users to view a desktop computing environment.")
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("libjpeg-turbo" ,libjpeg-turbo)
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("lz4" ,lz4)
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("opus" ,opus)
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("orc" ,orc)
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("zlib" ,zlib)))
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(native-inputs
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`(("pkg-config" ,pkg-config)
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