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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'master' into core-updates

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This commit is contained in:
Mark H Weaver 2015-10-08 10:59:39 -04:00
commit b81378251c
34 changed files with 779 additions and 752 deletions
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26
gnu-system.am
View file

@ -538,9 +538,19 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
gnu/packages/patches/libtheora-config-guess.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libtool-skip-tests2.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libssh-CVE-2014-0017.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2006-3376.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-1364.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/lirc-localstatedir.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/libpthread-glibc-preparation.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/lm-sensors-hwmon-attrs.patch \
@ -644,8 +654,11 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-remove-build-date.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/util-linux-tests.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/upower-builddir.patch \
@ -660,15 +673,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
gnu/packages/patches/wicd-template-instantiation.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wicd-urwid-1.3.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wmctrl-64-fix.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-geode-glibc-2.20.patch \

14
gnu/packages/admin.scm
View file

@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
(define-public wpa-supplicant-minimal
(package
(name "wpa-supplicant-minimal")
(version "2.4")
(version "2.5")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append
@ -716,17 +716,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
".tar.gz"))
(sha256
(base32
"08li21q1wjn5chrv289w666il9ah1w419y3dkq2rl4wnq0rci385"))
(patches
(map search-patch '("wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch"
"wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch")))))
"05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
'(#:phases (alist-replace

13
gnu/packages/image.scm
View file

@ -148,9 +148,18 @@ collection of tools for doing simple manipulations of TIFF images.")
(sha256
(base32 "1y3wba4q8pl7kr51212jwrsz1x6nslsx1gsjml1x0i8549lmqd2v"))
(patches
(map search-patch '("libwmf-CVE-2006-3376.patch"
(map search-patch '("libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2006-3376.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2009-1364.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch")))))
"libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch"
"libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(inputs

5
gnu/packages/libunwind.scm
View file

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
;;; GNU Guix --- Functional package management for GNU
;;; Copyright © 2013, 2014 Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
;;; Copyright © 2015 Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>
;;;
;;; This file is part of GNU Guix.
;;;
@ -18,6 +19,7 @@
(define-module (gnu packages libunwind)
#:use-module (guix packages)
#:use-module (gnu packages)
#:use-module (guix download)
#:use-module (guix build-system gnu)
#:use-module (guix licenses))
@ -32,7 +34,8 @@
version ".tar.gz"))
(sha256
(base32
"16nhx2pahh9d62mvszc88q226q5lwjankij276fxwrm8wb50zzlx"))))
"16nhx2pahh9d62mvszc88q226q5lwjankij276fxwrm8wb50zzlx"))
(patches (list (search-patch "libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
;; FIXME: As of glibc 2.17, we get 3 out of 34 test failures.

3
gnu/packages/ocaml.scm
View file

@ -208,7 +208,8 @@ Git-friendly development workflow.")
"0icdfzhsbgf89925gc8gl3fm8z2xzszzlib0v9dj5wyzkyv3a342"))
(file-name (string-append name "-" version ".tar.gz"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(native-inputs `(("which" ,which)))
(native-inputs `(("ocaml" ,ocaml)
("which" ,which)))
(inputs `(("ocaml" ,ocaml)))
(arguments
'(#:tests? #f ;no documented test target

17
gnu/packages/patches/libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Copied from Fedora.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1232265
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libunwind.git/tree/libunwind-1.1-fix-CVE-2015-3239.patch
diff -up libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h.CVE20153239 libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h
--- libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h.CVE20153239 2015-07-10 13:38:36.404996748 -0400
+++ libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h 2015-07-10 13:39:25.050707613 -0400
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
extern const uint8_t dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH];
/* REG is evaluated multiple times; it better be side-effects free! */
# define dwarf_to_unw_regnum(reg) \
- (((reg) <= DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH) ? dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[reg] : 0)
+ (((reg) < DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH) ? dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[reg] : 0)
#endif
#ifdef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY

21
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CAN-2004-0941.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c 2004-11-11 14:02:37.407589824 -0500
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c 2004-11-11 14:04:29.672522960 -0500
@@ -188,6 +188,14 @@
png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
&interlace_type, NULL, NULL);
+ if (overflow2(sizeof (int), width))
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (overflow2(sizeof (int) * width, height))
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
(color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
{

15
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-0455.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdft.c 2010-12-06 11:18:26.000000000 +0000
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdft.c 2010-12-06 11:21:09.000000000 +0000
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@
{
ch = c & 0xFF; /* don't extend sign */
}
- next++;
+ if (*next) next++;
}
else
{

20
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-2756.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c 1 Apr 2007 20:41:01 -0000 1.21.2.1
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c 16 May 2007 19:06:11 -0000
@@ -78,8 +78,11 @@
gdPngReadData (png_structp png_ptr,
png_bytep data, png_size_t length)
{
- gdGetBuf (data, length, (gdIOCtx *)
- png_get_io_ptr (png_ptr));
+ int check;
+ check = gdGetBuf (data, length, (gdIOCtx *) png_get_io_ptr (png_ptr));
+ if (check != length) {
+ png_error(png_ptr, "Read Error: truncated data");
+ }
}
static void

63
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
Based on a patch from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3472.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
@@ -106,6 +106,18 @@
gdImagePtr im;
unsigned long cpa_size;
+ if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (overflow2(sizeof (int *), sy)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (overflow2(sizeof(int), sx)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
im = (gdImage *) gdMalloc (sizeof (gdImage));
if (im == 0) return 0;
memset (im, 0, sizeof (gdImage));
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.c 2010-12-06 11:47:31.000000000 +0000
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.c 2010-12-06 11:48:04.000000000 +0000
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include "gdhelpers.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
/* TBB: gd_strtok_r is not portable; provide an implementation */
@@ -94,3 +95,18 @@
{
free (ptr);
}
+
+int overflow2(int a, int b)
+{
+ if(a < 0 || b < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "gd warning: one parameter to a memory allocation multiplication is negative, failing operation gracefully\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if(b == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if(a > INT_MAX / b) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "gd warning: product of memory allocation multiplication would exceed INT_MAX, failing operation gracefully\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.h 2010-12-06 11:47:17.000000000 +0000
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.h 2010-12-06 11:48:36.000000000 +0000
@@ -15,4 +15,6 @@
void *gdMalloc(size_t size);
void *gdRealloc(void *ptr, size_t size);
+int overflow2(int a, int b);
+
#endif /* GDHELPERS_H */

17
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3473.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
@@ -2483,6 +2483,10 @@ BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromXbm (FILE * fd)
}
bytes = (w * h / 8) + 1;
im = gdImageCreate (w, h);
+ if (!im) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
gdImageColorAllocate (im, 255, 255, 255);
gdImageColorAllocate (im, 0, 0, 0);
x = 0;

42
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3477.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
@@ -1335,10 +1335,31 @@
int w2, h2;
w2 = w / 2;
h2 = h / 2;
- while (e < s)
- {
- e += 360;
- }
+
+ if ((s % 360) == (e % 360)) {
+ s = 0; e = 360;
+ } else {
+ if (s > 360) {
+ s = s % 360;
+ }
+
+ if (e > 360) {
+ e = e % 360;
+ }
+
+ while (s < 0) {
+ s += 360;
+ }
+
+ while (e < s) {
+ e += 360;
+ }
+
+ if (s == e) {
+ s = 0; e = 360;
+ }
+ }
+
for (i = s; (i <= e); i++)
{
int x, y;

17
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2009-3546.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_gd.c 2010-12-06 14:56:06.000000000 +0000
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_gd.c 2010-12-06 14:57:04.000000000 +0000
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
{
goto fail1;
}
+ if (&im->colorsTotal > gdMaxColors)
+ {
+ goto fail1;
+ }
}
/* Int to accommodate truecolor single-color transparency */
if (!gdGetInt (&im->transparent, in))

189
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch
View file

@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2015-0848, CVE-2015-4588, CVE-2015-4695, and CVE-2015-4696.
Copied from Debian.
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/player/meta.h
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static int meta_rgn_create (wmfAPI* API,
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ static int meta_dib_brush (wmfAPI* API,w
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -2593,9 +2593,10 @@ static int meta_dc_restore (wmfAPI* API,
polyrect.BR = 0;
polyrect.count = 0;
+
+ if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
}
- if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
return (changed);
}
@@ -3067,7 +3068,7 @@ static int meta_pen_create (wmfAPI* API,
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3181,7 +3182,7 @@ static int meta_brush_create (wmfAPI* AP
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3288,7 +3289,7 @@ static int meta_font_create (wmfAPI* API
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3396,7 +3397,7 @@ static int meta_palette_create (wmfAPI*
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/ipa/ipa.h
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int ReadBlobByte (BMPS
static unsigned short ReadBlobLSBShort (BMPSource*);
static unsigned long ReadBlobLSBLong (BMPSource*);
static long TellBlob (BMPSource*);
-static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
+static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
static void ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*);
static int ExtractColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned int,unsigned int);
static void SetColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned char,unsigned int,unsigned int);
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static long TellBlob (BMPSource* src)
%
%
*/
-static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
+static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
{ int byte;
int count;
int i;
@@ -870,12 +870,14 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
U32 u;
unsigned char* q;
+ unsigned char* end;
for (u = 0; u < ((U32) bmp->width * (U32) bmp->height); u++) pixels[u] = 0;
byte = 0;
x = 0;
q = pixels;
+ end = pixels + bmp->width * bmp->height;
for (y = 0; y < bmp->height; )
{ count = ReadBlobByte (src);
@@ -884,7 +886,10 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
{ /* Encoded mode. */
byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- { if (compression == 1)
+ {
+ if (q == end)
+ return 0;
+ if (compression == 1)
{ (*(q++)) = (unsigned char) byte;
}
else
@@ -896,13 +901,15 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
else
{ /* Escape mode. */
count = ReadBlobByte (src);
- if (count == 0x01) return;
+ if (count == 0x01) return 1;
switch (count)
{
case 0x00:
{ /* End of line. */
x = 0;
y++;
+ if (y >= bmp->height)
+ return 0;
q = pixels + y * bmp->width;
break;
}
@@ -910,13 +917,20 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
{ /* Delta mode. */
x += ReadBlobByte (src);
y += ReadBlobByte (src);
+ if (y >= bmp->height)
+ return 0;
+ if (x >= bmp->width)
+ return 0;
q = pixels + y * bmp->width + x;
break;
}
default:
{ /* Absolute mode. */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- { if (compression == 1)
+ {
+ if (q == end)
+ return 0;
+ if (compression == 1)
{ (*(q++)) = ReadBlobByte (src);
}
else
@@ -943,7 +957,7 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
byte = ReadBlobByte (src); /* end of line */
byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
- return;
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -1143,8 +1157,18 @@ static void ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI* API,wm
}
}
else
- { /* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
- DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image);
+ {
+ if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8) /* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
+ {
+ if (!DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image))
+ { WMF_ERROR (API,"corrupt bmp");
+ API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { WMF_ERROR (API,"Unexpected pixel depth");
+ API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
+ }
}
if (ERR (API))

122
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h 2015-06-08 14:46:24.591876404 +0100
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h 2015-06-08 14:46:35.345993247 +0100
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@
%
%
*/
-static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
+static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
{ int byte;
int count;
int i;
@@ -870,12 +870,14 @@
U32 u;
unsigned char* q;
+ unsigned char* end;
for (u = 0; u < ((U32) bmp->width * (U32) bmp->height); u++) pixels[u] = 0;
byte = 0;
x = 0;
q = pixels;
+ end = pixels + bmp->width * bmp->height;
for (y = 0; y < bmp->height; )
{ count = ReadBlobByte (src);
@@ -884,7 +886,10 @@
{ /* Encoded mode. */
byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- { if (compression == 1)
+ {
+ if (q == end)
+ return 0;
+ if (compression == 1)
{ (*(q++)) = (unsigned char) byte;
}
else
@@ -896,13 +901,15 @@
else
{ /* Escape mode. */
count = ReadBlobByte (src);
- if (count == 0x01) return;
+ if (count == 0x01) return 1;
switch (count)
{
case 0x00:
{ /* End of line. */
x = 0;
y++;
+ if (y >= bmp->height)
+ return 0;
q = pixels + y * bmp->width;
break;
}
@@ -910,13 +917,20 @@
{ /* Delta mode. */
x += ReadBlobByte (src);
y += ReadBlobByte (src);
+ if (y >= bmp->height)
+ return 0;
+ if (x >= bmp->width)
+ return 0;
q = pixels + y * bmp->width + x;
break;
}
default:
{ /* Absolute mode. */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- { if (compression == 1)
+ {
+ if (q == end)
+ return 0;
+ if (compression == 1)
{ (*(q++)) = ReadBlobByte (src);
}
else
@@ -943,7 +957,7 @@
byte = ReadBlobByte (src); /* end of line */
byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
- return;
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -1143,8 +1157,18 @@
}
}
else
- { /* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
- DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image);
+ {
+ if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8) /* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
+ {
+ if (!DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image))
+ { WMF_ERROR (API,"corrupt bmp");
+ API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { WMF_ERROR (API,"Unexpected pixel depth");
+ API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
+ }
}
if (ERR (API))
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h 2015-06-08 14:46:24.590876393 +0100
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h 2015-06-08 14:46:35.345993247 +0100
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
static unsigned short ReadBlobLSBShort (BMPSource*);
static unsigned long ReadBlobLSBLong (BMPSource*);
static long TellBlob (BMPSource*);
-static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
+static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
static void ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*);
static int ExtractColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned int,unsigned int);
static void SetColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned char,unsigned int,unsigned int);

60
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-4695.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static int meta_rgn_create (wmfAPI* API,
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ static int meta_dib_brush (wmfAPI* API,w
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3067,7 +3067,7 @@ static int meta_pen_create (wmfAPI* API,
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3181,7 +3181,7 @@ static int meta_brush_create (wmfAPI* AP
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3288,7 +3288,7 @@ static int meta_font_create (wmfAPI* API
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
@@ -3396,7 +3396,7 @@ static int meta_palette_create (wmfAPI*
objects = P->objects;
i = 0;
- while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
+ while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
{ WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");

27
gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-4696.patch
--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
@@ -2585,6 +2585,8 @@
polyrect.BR[i] = clip->rects[i].BR;
}
+ if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
+
wmf_free (API,polyrect.TL);
wmf_free (API,polyrect.BR);
}
@@ -2593,9 +2595,10 @@
polyrect.BR = 0;
polyrect.count = 0;
+
+ if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
}
- if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
return (changed);
}

40
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
View file

@ -1,40 +1,28 @@
Copied from Debian.
Copied from Fedora.
From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014
Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/776589
By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
possibly have other unspecified impact.
This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2228,6 +2228,7 @@
@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
ulg eb_ucsize;
uch *eb_ucptr;
int r;
+ ush eb_compr_method;
+ ush method;
if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */
return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */
@@ -2244,6 +2245,14 @@
((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */
@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */
+ /* 2014-11-03 Michal Zalewski, SMS.
+ * For STORE method, compressed and uncompressed sizes must agree.
+ * http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450
+ */
+ eb_compr_method = makeword( eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+ if ((eb_compr_method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
+ return PK_ERR;
+ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
+ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize))
+ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed
+ * should match in STORED
+ * method */
+
if (
#ifdef INT_16BIT

16
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
diff -up unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow unzip60/zipinfo.c
--- unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow 2009-11-30 09:55:39.000000000 +0100
+++ unzip60/zipinfo.c 2009-11-30 09:56:42.844263244 +0100
@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int zi_short(__G) /* return PK-
#endif
int k, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
unsigned hostnum, hostver, methid, methnum, xattr;
- char *p, workspace[12], attribs[16];
+ char *p, workspace[12], attribs[17];
char methbuf[5];
static ZCONST char dtype[5]="NXFS"; /* normal, maximum, fast, superfast */
static ZCONST char Far os[NUM_HOSTS+1][4] = {

108
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e
From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
---
crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
--- a/crypt.c
+++ b/crypt.c
@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
defer_leftover_input(__G);
for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
- b = NEXTBYTE;
+ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
+ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
+ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
+ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
+ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
+ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
+ */
+ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
+ {
+ return PK_ERR;
+ }
h[n] = (uch)b;
Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
}
--
2.4.6
From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
---
extract.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
int repeated_buf_err;
bz_stream bstrm;
+ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
+ /* avoid an infinite loop */
+ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
+ return 2;
+ }
+
#if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
if (G.redirect_slide)
wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
--
2.4.6
From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
---
extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
+ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
+ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
+ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
+ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
+ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
+ return PK_ERR;
+ }
csiz_decrypted -= 12;
+ }
if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
--
2.5.2

94
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-format-secure.patch?id=d18f821e
diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
index eeb2f57..a0a4929 100644
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
*/
Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j + blknum*DIR_BLKSIZ + 1));
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
- LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
error_in_archive = PK_BADERR;
}
reached_end = TRUE; /* ...so no more left to do */
@@ -752,8 +752,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
#ifndef SFX
if (no_endsig_found) { /* just to make sure */
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
if (!error_in_archive) /* don't overwrite stronger error */
error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
}
diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
index 15e0011..f7359c3 100644
--- a/list.c
+++ b/list.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
Info(slide, 0x401,
((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
Info(slide, 0x401,
- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
}
}
@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
&& (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
&& (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
) { /* just to make sure again */
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */
}
@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */
Info(slide, 0x401,
((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
Info(slide, 0x401,
- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
}
}
@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4)) { /* just to make sure again */
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
}
if (*nmember == 0L && error_in_archive <= PK_WARN)
diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c
index 6e22cc8..ac5c61b 100644
--- a/zipinfo.c
+++ b/zipinfo.c
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
Info(slide, 0x401,
((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
Info(slide, 0x401,
- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
break;
}
@@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
&& (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
&& (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
) { /* just to make sure again */
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */
}

18
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
View file

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
Copied from Debian.
From: sms
Subject: Increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/741384
X-Debian-version: 6.0-11
--- a/list.c
+++ b/list.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
{
int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
#ifndef WINDLL
- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
+ char sgn, cfactorstr[12];
int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
#endif
int date_format;

38
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
Copied from Fedora.
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch?id=d18f821e
diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644
--- a/list.c
+++ b/list.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
{
int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
#ifndef WINDLL
- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
+ char sgn, cfactorstr[13];
int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
#endif
int date_format;
@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) {
methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3];
} else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) {
- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ /* 2013-02-26 SMS.
+ * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail
+ * &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786
+ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
+ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format
+ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the
+ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal.
+ */
+ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
+ } else {
+ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
+ }
}
#if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */

51
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch
View file

@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/
From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
larger than the maximum configured body length.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
goto bad;
h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
+ h->chunk_size);
+ goto bad;
+ }
/* throw away chunk header
* so we have only real data
*/
--
1.9.1

43
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch
View file

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/
From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
so, resulting in segmentation fault.
This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
drivers).
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
return;
}
+ if (left < 0)
+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
+
/* extract the tspec info element */
if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--
1.9.1

75
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch
View file

@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
and Confirm
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index f2b0926..a629437 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/*
* first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
* prf
--
1.9.1

68
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch
View file

@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
and Confirm
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
grp = htons(data->group_num);
ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--
1.9.1

54
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch
View file

@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
reassembly
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index a629437..1d2079b 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
"total length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return NULL;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--
1.9.1

52
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch
View file

@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
reassembly
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* the first fragment has a total length
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ return;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
"length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ return;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--
1.9.1

34
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch
View file

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
due to invalid buffer allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
/*
* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
*/
+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--
1.9.1

64
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch
View file

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
Original patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/
and then backported to wpa-supplicant-2.4.
From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
here.
Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
if (size < 6)
return -1;
record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
+ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
+ return -1;
pos += sizeof(u32);
}
@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
pos += record->payload_length;
record->total_length = pos - data;
- if (record->total_length > size)
+ if (record->total_length > size ||
+ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
return -1;
return 0;
}
--
1.9.1

42
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch
View file

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
(CVE-2015-1863)
This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
peer discovery purposes.
This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
and potentially arbitrary code execution.
Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
if (msg.ssid &&
+ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
(msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
!= 0)) {
--
1.9.1

56
gnu/packages/python.scm
View file

@ -631,13 +631,28 @@ and verifies that it matches the intended target hostname.")
(base32
"0q4f9l8grf6pwp64xbv8bmyxx416s7h4522nnxac056ap3savbps"))))
(build-system python-build-system)
(arguments
`(#:tests? #f ; no test target
#:phases
(modify-phases %standard-phases
(add-after 'unpack 'fix-hdf5-paths
(lambda* (#:key inputs #:allow-other-keys)
(let ((prefix (assoc-ref inputs "hdf5")))
(substitute* "setup_build.py"
(("\\['/opt/local/lib', '/usr/local/lib'\\]")
(string-append "['" prefix "/lib" "']"))
(("'/opt/local/include', '/usr/local/include'")
(string-append "'" prefix "/include" "'")))
(substitute* "setup_configure.py"
(("\\['/usr/local/lib', '/opt/local/lib'\\]")
(string-append "['" prefix "/lib" "']")))
#t))))))
(propagated-inputs
`(("python-numpy" ,python-numpy)))
(inputs
`(("python-cython" ,python-cython)
("python-numpy" ,python-numpy)
("hdf5" ,hdf5)))
`(("hdf5" ,hdf5)))
(native-inputs
`(("python-setuptools" ,python-setuptools)))
(arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; no test target
`(("python-cython" ,python-cython)))
(home-page "http://www.h5py.org/")
(synopsis "Read and write HDF5 files from Python")
(description
@ -651,11 +666,11 @@ concepts.")
(define-public python2-h5py
(let ((h5py (package-with-python2 python-h5py)))
(package (inherit h5py)
(inputs
(propagated-inputs
`(("python2-numpy" ,python2-numpy)
,@(alist-delete
"python-numpy"
(package-inputs h5py)))))))
(package-propagated-inputs h5py)))))))
(define-public python-lockfile
(package
@ -2243,6 +2258,33 @@ written in pure Python.")
(define-public python2-jinja2
(package-with-python2 python-jinja2))
(define-public python-joblib
(package
(name "python-joblib")
(version "0.9.0b4")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "https://pypi.python.org/packages/source/"
"j/joblib/joblib-" version ".tar.gz"))
(sha256
(base32
"1dvw3f8jgj6h0fxkghbgyclvdzc7l0ig7n0vis70awb5kczb9bs3"))))
(build-system python-build-system)
(native-inputs
`(("python-setuptools" ,python-setuptools)
("python-nose" ,python-nose)))
(home-page "http://pythonhosted.org/joblib/")
(synopsis "Using Python functions as pipeline jobs")
(description
"Joblib is a set of tools to provide lightweight pipelining in Python.
In particular, joblib offers: transparent disk-caching of the output values
and lazy re-evaluation (memoize pattern), easy simple parallel computing
logging and tracing of the execution.")
(license bsd-3)))
(define-public python2-joblib
(package-with-python2 python-joblib))
(define-public python-docutils
(package
(name "python-docutils")

7
gnu/packages/zip.scm
View file

@ -86,9 +86,12 @@ Compression ratios of 2:1 to 3:1 are common for text files.")
"unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch"
"unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch"
"unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch"
"unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch"
"unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch"
"unzip-remove-build-date.patch")))))
"unzip-remove-build-date.patch"
"unzip-attribs-overflow.patch"
"unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch"
"unzip-format-secure.patch"
"unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
;; no inputs; bzip2 is not supported, since not compiled with BZ_NO_STDIO
(arguments