43 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
43 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
From fc8c6d2786ecba731d77d33fe3b034f581fcbde3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ben Wagner <bungeman@chromium.org>
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Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 13:02:40 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] Validate entry_bytes_remaining in pax_attribute
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The `size` attribute may contain a negative or too large value. Check
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the range of the `entry_bytes_remaining` in `pax_attribute` the same way
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as `header_common`. The test which is added passes both with and without
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this change in a normal debug build. It is necessary to run with
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`-fsanitize=undefined` to see that the undefined behavior is avoided.
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Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=48467
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---
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libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c | 15 ++++++
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1 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
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index bfdad7f8..e31f1cc4 100644
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--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
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+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c
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@@ -2108,6 +2108,21 @@ pax_attribute(struct archive_read *a, struct tar *tar,
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/* "size" is the size of the data in the entry. */
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tar->entry_bytes_remaining
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= tar_atol10(value, strlen(value));
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+ if (tar->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
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+ tar->entry_bytes_remaining = 0;
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
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+ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
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+ "Tar size attribute is negative");
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+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
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+ }
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+ if (tar->entry_bytes_remaining == INT64_MAX) {
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+ /* Note: tar_atol returns INT64_MAX on overflow */
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+ tar->entry_bytes_remaining = 0;
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
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+ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
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+ "Tar size attribute overflow");
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+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
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+ }
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/*
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* The "size" pax header keyword always overrides the
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* "size" field in the tar header.
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