- Fix formatting/topic in 91be81e7-3fea-11e1-afc7-2c4138874f7d

Reviewed by:	wxs
This commit is contained in:
Ryan Steinmetz 2012-01-21 01:38:36 +00:00
parent 2cfab90aaa
commit 50d0515bae
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=289554

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@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
</vuln>
<vuln vid="91be81e7-3fea-11e1-afc7-2c4138874f7d">
<topic>Multiple implementations denial-of-service via hash algorithm collision</topic>
<topic>Multiple implementations -- DoS via hash algorithm collision</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>jruby</name>
@ -214,11 +214,30 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>oCERT reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2011-003.html">
<p>A variety of programming languages suffer from a denial-of-service (DoS) condition against storage functions of key/value pairs in hash data structures, the condition can be leveraged by exploiting predictable collisions in the underlying hashing algorithms.</p>
<p>The issue finds particular exposure in web server applications and/or frameworks. In particular, the lack of sufficient limits for the number of parameters in POST requests in conjunction with the predictable collision properties in the hashing functions of the underlying languages can render web applications vulnerable to the DoS condition. The attacker, using specially crafted HTTP requests, can lead to a 100% of CPU usage which can last up to several hours depending on the targeted application and server performance, the amplification effect is considerable and requires little bandwidth and time on the attacker side.</p>
<p>The condition for predictable collisions in the hashing functions has been reported for the following language implementations: Java, JRuby, PHP, Python, Rubinius, Ruby. In the case of the Ruby language, the 1.9.x branch is not affected by the predictable collision condition since this version includes a randomization of the hashing function.</p>
<p>The vulnerability outlined in this advisory is practically identical to the one reported in 2003 and described in the paper Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks which affected the Perl language.</p>
<p>The reporters own advisory can be found at <a href="http://www.nruns.com/_downloads/advisory28122011.pdf">http://www.nruns.com/_downloads/advisory28122011.pdf</a></p>
<p>A variety of programming languages suffer from a denial-of-service
(DoS) condition against storage functions of key/value pairs in
hash data structures, the condition can be leveraged by exploiting
predictable collisions in the underlying hashing algorithms.</p>
<p>The issue finds particular exposure in web server applications
and/or frameworks. In particular, the lack of sufficient limits
for the number of parameters in POST requests in conjunction with
the predictable collision properties in the hashing functions of
the underlying languages can render web applications vulnerable
to the DoS condition. The attacker, using specially crafted HTTP
requests, can lead to a 100% of CPU usage which can last up to
several hours depending on the targeted application and server
performance, the amplification effect is considerable and
requires little bandwidth and time on the attacker side.</p>
<p>The condition for predictable collisions in the hashing functions
has been reported for the following language implementations:
Java, JRuby, PHP, Python, Rubinius, Ruby. In the case of the
Ruby language, the 1.9.x branch is not affected by the
predictable collision condition since this version includes a
randomization of the hashing function.</p>
<p>The vulnerability outlined in this advisory is practically
identical to the one reported in 2003 and described in the paper
Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks which
affected the Perl language.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>