Document sysutils/tarsnap security announcement

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Mark Felder 2015-08-21 14:23:17 +00:00
parent 797ed95343
commit 828dadf51d
Notes: svn2git 2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=394956

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<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
<vuln vid="2fe40238-480f-11e5-adde-14dae9d210b8">
<topic>tarsnap -- buffer overflow and local DoS</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>tarsnap</name>
<range><lt>1.0.36</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>Colin Percival reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://mail.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-announce/msg00032.html">
<p>1. SECURITY FIX: When constructing paths of objects being archived, a buffer
could overflow by one byte upon encountering 1024, 2048, 4096, etc. byte
paths. Theoretically this could be exploited by an unprivileged user whose
files are being archived; I do not believe it is exploitable in practice,
but I am offering a $1000 bounty for the first person who can prove me wrong:
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2015-08-21-tarsnap-1000-exploit-bounty.html</p>
<p>2. SECURITY FIX: An attacker with a machine's write keys, or with read keys
and control of the tarsnap service, could make tarsnap allocate a large
amount of memory upon listing archives or reading an archive the attacker
created; on 32-bit machines, tarsnap can be caused to crash under the
aforementioned conditions.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<url>http://mail.tarsnap.com/tarsnap-announce/msg00032.html</url>
<url>http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2015-08-21-tarsnap-1000-exploit-bounty.html</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2015-08-21</discovery>
<entry>2015-08-21</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>
<vuln vid="a0a4e24c-4760-11e5-9391-3c970e169bc2">
<topic>vlc -- arbitrary pointer dereference vulnerability</topic>
<affects>