security/vuxml: mark libXpm < 3.5.15 as vulnerable

This commit is contained in:
Jan Beich 2023-03-23 18:00:27 +00:00
parent 98c545ffc3
commit bf4ae9477b

View file

@ -1,3 +1,74 @@
<vuln vid="38f213b6-8f3d-4067-91ef-bf14de7ba518">
<topic>libXpm -- Issues handling XPM files</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>libXpm</name>
<range><lt>3.5.15</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>The X.Org project reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-January/003312.html">
<ol>
<li>CVE-2022-46285: Infinite loop on unclosed comments
<p>When reading XPM images from a file with libXpm 3.5.14 or older, if a
comment in the file is not closed (i.e. a C-style comment starts with
"/*" and is missing the closing "*/"), the ParseComment() function will
loop forever calling getc() to try to read the rest of the comment,
failing to notice that it has returned EOF, which may cause a denial of
service to the calling program.</p>
<p>This issue was found by Marco Ivaldi of the Humanativa Group's HN Security team.</p>
<p>The fix is provided in
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/a3a7c6dcc3b629d7650148</p></li>
<li>CVE-2022-44617: Runaway loop on width of 0 and enormous height
<p>When reading XPM images from a file with libXpm 3.5.14 or older, if a
image has a width of 0 and a very large height, the ParsePixels() function
will loop over the entire height calling getc() and ungetc() repeatedly,
or in some circumstances, may loop seemingly forever, which may cause a denial
of service to the calling program when given a small crafted XPM file to parse.</p>
<p>This issue was found by Martin Ettl.</p>
<p>The fix is provided in
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/f80fa6ae47ad4a5beacb28
and
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/c5ab17bcc34914c0b0707d</p></li>
<li>CVE-2022-4883: compression commands depend on $PATH
<p>By default, on all platforms except MinGW, libXpm will detect if a filename
ends in .Z or .gz, and will when reading such a file fork off an uncompress
or gunzip command to read from via a pipe, and when writing such a file will
fork off a compress or gzip command to write to via a pipe.</p>
<p>In libXpm 3.5.14 or older these are run via execlp(), relying on $PATH
to find the commands. If libXpm is called from a program running with
raised privileges, such as via setuid, then a malicious user could set
$PATH to include programs of their choosing to be run with those privileges.</p>
<p>This issue was found by Alan Coopersmith of the Oracle Solaris team.</p></li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<url>https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-January/003312.html</url>
<cvename>CVE-2022-46285</cvename>
<cvename>CVE-2022-44617</cvename>
<cvename>CVE-2022-4883</cvename>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2023-01-17</discovery>
<entry>2023-03-23</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>
<vuln vid="1b15a554-c981-11ed-bb39-901b0e9408dc">
<topic>tailscale -- security vulnerability in Tailscale SSH</topic>
<affects>