- Add special pkg-message to package to help with installation from package
PR: ports/69476
Submitted by: HAYASHI Yasushi <yasi@yasi.to>,
Gerhard Schmidt <estartu@augusta.de> (maintainer)
2. Maintainer changed to ports@geeksrus.net (alane@freebsd.org) due to
maintainer timeouts on this port.
3. PORTREVISION bumped due to change in pkg-plist and install dirs.
PR: 39687
Submitted by: ports@geeksrus.net
Approved by: will
http://www.zope.org/Products/Zope/Hotfix_2002-03-01/README.txt which
says:
``The issue involves the checking of security for objects with proxy
roles. The context of the owner user that created the object with
proxy roles was not being taken into account when determining access
to the object with proxy roles. This flaw could allow users defined
in subfolders of a site with sufficient privileges to access objects
at higher levels in the site that they would not normally be able to
access.''
PR: 36103
Submitted by: HAYASHI Yasushi <yasi@yasi.to>
the ECHO macro is set to "echo" by default, but it is set to "true" if
make(1) is invoked with the -s option while ECHO_CMD is always set to
the echo command.
``The issue involves an error in the '_check_context' method of the
AccessControl.User.BasicUser class. The bug made it possible to access
Zope objects via acquisition that a user would not otherwise have access
to. This issue could allow users with enough internal knowledge of Zope
to perform actions higher in the object hierarchy than they should be
able to.''
From the Zope site:
The issue involves an error in the 'aq_inContextOf' method of objects that
support acquisition. A recent change to the access validation machinery
made this bug begin to affect security restrictions. The bug, with the
change to validation, made it possible to access Zope objects via
acquisition that a user would not otherwise have access to. This issue
could allow users with enough internal knowledge of Zope to perform actions
higher in the object hierarchy than they should be able to.
* Removed "access" from pkg-plist, it contains password data that
should be preserved (I forgot this last time!).
* In the "do-install" target, leave the "access" file unchanged if it
already exists.
* Remove the pre-deinstall comment: Data.fs is already preserved by
pkg_delete anyway.
* In the "install" target, use temporary file Data.fs.preserve to avoid
overwriting Data.fs. "make deinstall/install" can now be safely used to
perform upgrades.
* Don't leave .o files around anymore.
Approved by: maintainer
* Changed the python15 dependency to USE_PYTHON=yes
* Replaced PYTHON15 with PYTHON_CMD from bsd.python.mk
* Added SAPACHE_CONFDIR, like the other Sxxx variables, to be used in the
PLIST. APACHE_CONFDIR now depends on SAPACHE_CONFDIR
* Added APACHE_CONFDIR and WEBBASEDIR to PLIST_SUB
* Removed temporary file Zope.cgi.orig
* Removed .cvsignore from var/
* Added/removed some files to the PLIST
* Used @unexec rmdir to remove shared directories from PLIST
* Removed the line with "grep". I didn't understand how it was supposed to
work, I guess it should have been something like "cmp -s ...", but
Data.fs cannot be equal to Data.fs.in anyway, because Zope adds some
things to it the first time it's started (automatically imported
packages from filesystem).
* Removed temporary files from var/ at deinstall time (*.tmp, *.lock, *.soc,
*.pid)
* Sometimes the inituser file did not exist at deinstall time, so I
deleted it with @unexec. It won't be included by "make package".
* Added the Hotfix_2001-02-23 directory (@dirrm)
* Used variables from PLIST_SUB instead of www and etc/apache (@dirrm)
Approved by: maintainer
From the Zope hotfix:
This hotfix addresses and important security issue that affects Zope
versions up to and including Zope 2.3.1 b1.
The issue is related to ZClasses in that a user with through-the-web
scripting capabilities on a Zope site can view and assign class
attributes to ZClasses, possibly allowing them to make inappropriate
changes to ZClass instances.
This patch also fixes problems in the ObjectManager, PropertyManager,
and PropertySheet classes related to mutability of method return values
which could be perceived as a security problem.
We *highly* recommend that any Zope site running versions of Zope up to
and including 2.3.1 b1 have this hotfix product installed to mitigate
these issues if the site is accessible by untrusted users who have
through-the-web scripting privileges.
which allows people who may edit DTML to gain higher privilege, and
those who have higher privilege in some areas of the Zope tree to gain
it in other areas.
