--- compat_mit.c.orig	Mon Nov  6 13:48:30 2000
+++ compat_mit.c	Mon Nov  6 13:52:48 2000
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <krb5.h>
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include "pam_krb5.h"
+
+const char *
+compat_princ_component(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ, int n)
+{
+	return krb5_princ_component(context, princ, n)->data;
+}
+
+void
+compat_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
+{
+	krb5_free_data_contents(context, data);
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+compat_cc_next_cred(krb5_context context, const krb5_ccache id, 
+    krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, krb5_creds *creds)
+{
+	return krb5_cc_next_cred(context, id, cursor, creds);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+mit_pam_prompter(krb5_context context, void *data, const char *name,
+	     const char *banner, int num_prompts, krb5_prompt prompts[])
+{
+    int		pam_prompts = num_prompts;
+    int		pamret, i;
+
+    struct pam_message	*msg;
+    struct pam_response	*resp = NULL;
+    struct pam_conv	*conv;
+    pam_handle_t	*pamh = (pam_handle_t *) data;
+
+    if ((pamret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (const void **) &conv)) != 0)
+	return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+
+    if (name)
+	pam_prompts++;
+
+    if (banner)
+	pam_prompts++;
+
+    msg = calloc(sizeof(struct pam_message) * pam_prompts, 1);
+    if (!msg)
+	return ENOMEM;
+
+    /* Now use pam_prompts as an index */
+    pam_prompts = 0;
+
+    /* Sigh. malloc all the prompts. */
+    if (name) {
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg = malloc(strlen(name) + 1);
+	if (!msg[pam_prompts].msg)
+	    goto cleanup;
+	strcpy((char *) msg[pam_prompts].msg, name);
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg_style = PAM_TEXT_INFO;
+	pam_prompts++;
+    }
+
+    if (banner) {
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg = malloc(strlen(banner) + 1);
+	if (!msg[pam_prompts].msg)
+	    goto cleanup;
+	strcpy((char *) msg[pam_prompts].msg, banner);
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg_style = PAM_TEXT_INFO;
+	pam_prompts++;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg = malloc(strlen(prompts[i].prompt) + 3);
+	if (!msg[pam_prompts].msg)
+	    goto cleanup;
+	sprintf((char *) msg[pam_prompts].msg, "%s: ", prompts[i].prompt);
+	msg[pam_prompts].msg_style = prompts[i].hidden ? PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF
+						       : PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON;
+	pam_prompts++;
+    }
+
+    if ((pamret = conv->conv(pam_prompts, (const struct pam_message **) &msg, 
+      &resp, conv->appdata_ptr)) != 0)
+	goto cleanup;
+
+    if (!resp)
+	goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Reuse pam_prompts as a starting index */
+    pam_prompts = 0;
+    if (name)
+	pam_prompts++;
+    if (banner)
+	pam_prompts++;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++, pam_prompts++) {
+	register int len;
+	if (!resp[pam_prompts].resp) {
+	    pamret = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	    goto cleanup;
+	}
+	len = strlen(resp[pam_prompts].resp); /* Help out the compiler */
+	if (len > prompts[i].reply->length) {
+	    pamret = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	    goto cleanup;
+	}
+	memcpy(prompts[i].reply->data, resp[pam_prompts].resp, len);
+	prompts[i].reply->length = len;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    /* pam_prompts is correct at this point */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < pam_prompts; i++) {
+	if (msg[i].msg)
+	    free((char *) msg[i].msg);
+    }
+    free(msg);
+
+    if (resp) {
+	for (i = 0; i < pam_prompts; i++) {
+	    /*
+	     * Note that PAM is underspecified wrt free()'ing resp[i].resp.
+	     * It's not clear if I should free it, or if the application
+	     * has to. Therefore most (all?) apps won't free() it, and I
+	     * can't either, as I am not sure it was malloc()'d. All PAM
+	     * implementations I've seen leak memory here. Not so bad, IFF
+	     * you fork/exec for each PAM authentication (as is typical).
+	     */
+#if 0
+	    if (resp[i].resp)
+		free(resp[i].resp);
+#endif /* 0 */
+	}
+	/* This does not lose resp[i].resp if the application saved a copy. */
+	free(resp);
+    }
+
+    return (pamret ? KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC : 0);
+}
+
+krb5_prompter_fct pam_prompter = mit_pam_prompter;