With some patching [1], Erlang 19.x supports OpenSSL 1.1.x (lang/erlang, lang/erlang-runtime19). However, previous versions are now marked as broken with OpenSSL 1.1.x. PR: 225898 Submitted by: brnrd [1] Obtained from: Upstream
293 lines
11 KiB
Text
293 lines
11 KiB
Text
From 4dddb3c0b286e13f2cbccb0cdaa4bffcfee60033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Yuki Ito <yuki@gnnk.net>
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Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 17:45:51 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH] crypto: Support chacha20_poly1305
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This commit reactivates chacha20_poly1305 and fixes the imprementation
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for the released OpenSSL 1.1.0 or later.
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---
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lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c | 152 ++++++++++++-------------------
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lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl | 49 ++++++++--
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2 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c
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index 0031f9b9620..68784cd24c9 100644
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--- lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c
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+++ lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c
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@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
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# endif
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#endif
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-#if defined(NID_chacha20) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
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+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= PACKED_OPENSSL_VERSION_PLAIN(1,1,0)
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# define HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305
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#endif
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@@ -131,20 +131,6 @@
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
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#endif
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-#if defined(HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
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-#include <openssl/chacha.h>
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-#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
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-
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-#if !defined(CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN)
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-# define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN 8
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-#endif
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-#if !defined(POLY1305_TAG_LEN)
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-# define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
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-#endif
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-
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-#endif
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-
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-
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#ifdef VALGRIND
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# include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
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@@ -2038,71 +2024,61 @@
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}
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#endif /* HAVE_GCM_EVP_DECRYPT_BUG */
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-#if defined(HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
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-static void
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-poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
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- const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
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-{
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- size_t j = data_len;
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- unsigned char length_bytes[8];
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- unsigned i;
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- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
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- length_bytes[i] = j;
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- j >>= 8;
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- }
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-
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
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-}
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-#endif
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-
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static ERL_NIF_TERM chacha20_poly1305_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[])
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{/* (Key,Iv,AAD,In) */
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#if defined(HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
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+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
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ErlNifBinary key, iv, aad, in;
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- unsigned char *outp;
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+ unsigned char *outp, *tagp;
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ERL_NIF_TERM out, out_tag;
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- ErlNifUInt64 in_len_64;
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- unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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- poly1305_state poly1305;
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+ int len;
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if (!enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[0], &key) || key.size != 32
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- || !enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &iv) || iv.size != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN
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+ || !enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &iv) || iv.size == 0 || iv.size > 16
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|| !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[2], &aad)
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|| !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[3], &in)) {
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return enif_make_badarg(env);
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}
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- /* Take from OpenSSL patch set/LibreSSL:
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- *
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- * The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
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- * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
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- * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
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- * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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- * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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- * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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- * the warning. */
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- in_len_64 = in.size;
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- if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64)
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- return enif_make_badarg(env);
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+ cipher = EVP_chacha20_poly1305();
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- memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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- CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key), key.data, iv.data, 0);
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+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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+
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+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+
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outp = enif_make_new_binary(env, in.size, &out);
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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- poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, aad.data, aad.size);
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- CRYPTO_chacha_20(outp, in.data, in.size, key.data, iv.data, 1);
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- poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, outp, in.size);
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+ if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, enif_make_new_binary(env, POLY1305_TAG_LEN, &out_tag));
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+ tagp = enif_make_new_binary(env, 16, &out_tag);
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+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, tagp) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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+
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CONSUME_REDS(env, in);
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return enif_make_tuple2(env, out, out_tag);
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+out_err:
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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+ return atom_error;
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#else
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return enif_raise_exception(env, atom_notsup);
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#endif
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@@ -2111,53 +2087,52 @@
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static ERL_NIF_TERM chacha20_poly1305_decrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[])
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{/* (Key,Iv,AAD,In,Tag) */
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#if defined(HAVE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
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+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
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ErlNifBinary key, iv, aad, in, tag;
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unsigned char *outp;
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ERL_NIF_TERM out;
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- ErlNifUInt64 in_len_64;
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- unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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- unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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- poly1305_state poly1305;
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+ int len;
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if (!enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[0], &key) || key.size != 32
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- || !enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &iv) || iv.size != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN
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+ || !enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &iv) || iv.size == 0 || iv.size > 16
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|| !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[2], &aad)
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|| !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[3], &in)
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- || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[4], &tag) || tag.size != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
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+ || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[4], &tag) || tag.size != 16) {
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return enif_make_badarg(env);
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}
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- /* Take from OpenSSL patch set/LibreSSL:
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- *
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- * The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
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- * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
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- * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
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- * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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- * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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- * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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- * the warning. */
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- in_len_64 = in.size;
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- if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64)
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- return enif_make_badarg(env);
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+ cipher = EVP_chacha20_poly1305();
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- memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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- CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key), key.data, iv.data, 0);
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+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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- poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, aad.data, aad.size);
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- poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in.data, in.size);
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- CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
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+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, iv.size, NULL) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key.data, iv.data) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, aad.data, aad.size) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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- if (memcmp(mac, tag.data, POLY1305_TAG_LEN) != 0)
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- return atom_error;
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-
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outp = enif_make_new_binary(env, in.size, &out);
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- CRYPTO_chacha_20(outp, in.data, in.size, key.data, iv.data, 1);
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+ if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outp, &len, in.data, in.size) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag.size, tag.data) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outp+len, &len) != 1)
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+ goto out_err;
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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+
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CONSUME_REDS(env, in);
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return out;
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+
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+out_err:
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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+ return atom_error;
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#else
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return enif_raise_exception(env, atom_notsup);
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#endif
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diff --git a/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl b/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl
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index 0c3b7a0445d..31f4e89ffe1 100644
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--- lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl
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+++ lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl
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@@ -2249,16 +2249,49 @@ aes_gcm() ->
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1} %% TagLength
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].
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-%% http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
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+%% https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#appendix-A.5
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chacha20_poly1305() ->
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[
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- {chacha20_poly1305, hexstr2bin("4290bcb154173531f314af57f3be3b500" %% Key
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- "6da371ece272afa1b5dbdd1100a1007"),
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- hexstr2bin("86d09974840bded2a5ca"), %% PlainText
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- hexstr2bin("cd7cf67be39c794a"), %% Nonce
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- hexstr2bin("87e229d4500845a079c0"), %% AAD
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- hexstr2bin("e3e446f7ede9a19b62a4"), %% CipherText
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- hexstr2bin("677dabf4e3d24b876bb284753896e1d6")} %% CipherTag
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+ {chacha20_poly1305,
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+ hexstr2bin("1c9240a5eb55d38af333888604f6b5f0" %% Key
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+ "473917c1402b80099dca5cbc207075c0"),
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+ hexstr2bin("496e7465726e65742d44726166747320" %% PlainText
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+ "61726520647261667420646f63756d65"
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+ "6e74732076616c696420666f72206120"
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+ "6d6178696d756d206f6620736978206d"
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+ "6f6e74687320616e64206d6179206265"
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+ "20757064617465642c207265706c6163"
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+ "65642c206f72206f62736f6c65746564"
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+ "206279206f7468657220646f63756d65"
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+ "6e747320617420616e792074696d652e"
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+ "20497420697320696e617070726f7072"
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+ "6961746520746f2075736520496e7465"
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+ "726e65742d4472616674732061732072"
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+ "65666572656e6365206d617465726961"
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+ "6c206f7220746f206369746520746865"
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+ "6d206f74686572207468616e20617320"
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+ "2fe2809c776f726b20696e2070726f67"
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+ "726573732e2fe2809d"),
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+ hexstr2bin("000000000102030405060708"), %% Nonce
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+ hexstr2bin("f33388860000000000004e91"), %% AAD
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+ hexstr2bin("64a0861575861af460f062c79be643bd" %% CipherText
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+ "5e805cfd345cf389f108670ac76c8cb2"
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+ "4c6cfc18755d43eea09ee94e382d26b0"
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+ "bdb7b73c321b0100d4f03b7f355894cf"
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+ "332f830e710b97ce98c8a84abd0b9481"
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+ "14ad176e008d33bd60f982b1ff37c855"
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+ "9797a06ef4f0ef61c186324e2b350638"
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+ "3606907b6a7c02b0f9f6157b53c867e4"
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+ "b9166c767b804d46a59b5216cde7a4e9"
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+ "9040c5a40433225ee282a1b0a06c523e"
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+ "af4534d7f83fa1155b0047718cbc546a"
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+ "0d072b04b3564eea1b422273f548271a"
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+ "0bb2316053fa76991955ebd63159434e"
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+ "cebb4e466dae5a1073a6727627097a10"
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+ "49e617d91d361094fa68f0ff77987130"
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+ "305beaba2eda04df997b714d6c6f2c29"
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+ "a6ad5cb4022b02709b"),
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+ hexstr2bin("eead9d67890cbb22392336fea1851f38")} %% CipherTag
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].
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rsa_plain() ->
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