f36fcd52f2
- Sanitize install script. - Bump PORTREVISION. Submitted by: MAINTAINER
34 lines
1.6 KiB
Text
34 lines
1.6 KiB
Text
# To configure sfsrwsd (part of the SFS server subsystem), copy this file
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# (sfsrwsd_config.sample) to sfsrwsd_config and edit as necessary.
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#
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# Normally, it should not be necessary for you to specify Hostname
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# or Keyfile options, only Export statements.
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#
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# Configuration reference:
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#
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# Hostname name
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# Set the Location part of the server's self-certifying pathname. The
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# default is the current host's fully-qualified hostname.
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#
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# Keyfile path
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# Tells sfsrwsd to look for its private key in file path. The default
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# is sfs_host_key. SFS looks for file names that do not start with /
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# in /etc/sfs, or whatever directory you specified if you used the
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# --with-etcdir option to configure (see configure).
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#
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# Export local-directory sfs-name [R|W]
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# Tells sfsrwsd to export local-directory, giving it the name sfs-name
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# with respect to the server's self-certifying pathname. Appending R
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# to an export directive gives anonymous users read-only access to
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# the file system (under user ID -2 and group ID -2). Appending W
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# gives anonymous users both read and write access. See Quick server
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# setup, for an example of the Export directive. There is almost no
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# reason to use the W flag. The R flag lets anyone on the Internet
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# issue NFS calls to your kernel as user -2. SFS filters these calls;
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# it makes sure that they operate on files covered by the export
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# directive, and it blocks any calls that would modify the file system.
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# This approach is safe given a perfect NFS3 implementation. If,
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# however, there are bugs in your NFS code, attackers may exploit
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# them if you have the R option--probably just crashing your server
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# but possibly doing worse
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