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nilfs2: potential integer overflow in nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments()

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There is a potential integer overflow in nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments().
When a large argv[n].v_nmembs is passed from the userspace, the subsequent
call to vmalloc() will allocate a buffer smaller than expected, which
leads to out-of-bound access in nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks() and
lfs_clean_segments().

The following check does not prevent the overflow because nsegs is also
controlled by the userspace and could be very large.

		if (argv[n].v_nmembs > nsegs * nilfs->ns_blocks_per_segment)
			goto out_free;

This patch clamps argv[n].v_nmembs to UINT_MAX / argv[n].v_size, and
returns -EINVAL when overflow.

Signed-off-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Haogang Chen 2011-12-19 17:11:56 -08:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 695c60f21c
commit 481fe17e97
1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
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3
fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
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@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
if (argv[n].v_nmembs > nsegs * nilfs->ns_blocks_per_segment)
goto out_free;
if (argv[n].v_nmembs >= UINT_MAX / argv[n].v_size)
goto out_free;
len = argv[n].v_size * argv[n].v_nmembs;
base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)argv[n].v_base;
if (len == 0) {