Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull key handling fixes from James Morris: "Quoting David Howells: Here are three miscellaneous fixes: (1) Fix a panic in some debugging code in PKCS#7. This can only happen by explicitly inserting a #define DEBUG into the code. (2) Fix the calculation of the digest length in the PE file parser. This causes a failure where there should be a success. (3) Fix the case where an X.509 cert can be added as an asymmetric key to a trusted keyring with no trust restriction if no AKID is supplied. Bugs (1) and (2) aren't particularly problematic, but (3) allows a security check to be bypassed. Happily, this is a recent regression and never made it into a released kernel" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: KEYS: Fix for erroneous trust of incorrectly signed X.509 certs pefile: Fix the failure of calculation for digest PKCS#7: Fix panic when referring to the empty AKID when DEBUG defined
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commit
897473fc04
3 changed files with 8 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -124,5 +124,10 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
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ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
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return ctx->digest ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
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if (!ctx->digest)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ctx->digest_len = vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
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goto found_issuer_check_skid;
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}
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} else {
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} else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
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auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
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pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
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for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
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@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
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sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
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if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
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return 0;
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
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return -EPERM;
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