ecryptfs: avoid ctx initialization race
It might be possible for two callers to race the mutex lock after the NULL ctx check. Instead, move the lock above the check so there isn't the possibility of leaking a crypto ctx. Additionally, report the full algo name when failing. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [tyhicks: remove out label, which is no longer used] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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1 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -614,30 +614,30 @@ int ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
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"key_size_bits = [%zd]\n",
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crypt_stat->cipher, (int)strlen(crypt_stat->cipher),
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crypt_stat->key_size << 3);
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mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
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if (crypt_stat->tfm) {
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rc = 0;
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goto out;
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goto out_unlock;
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}
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mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
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rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name,
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crypt_stat->cipher, "cbc");
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if (rc)
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goto out_unlock;
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crypt_stat->tfm = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, 0);
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kfree(full_alg_name);
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if (IS_ERR(crypt_stat->tfm)) {
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rc = PTR_ERR(crypt_stat->tfm);
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crypt_stat->tfm = NULL;
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ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "cryptfs: init_crypt_ctx(): "
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"Error initializing cipher [%s]\n",
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crypt_stat->cipher);
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goto out_unlock;
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full_alg_name);
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goto out_free;
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}
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crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(crypt_stat->tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
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rc = 0;
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out_free:
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kfree(full_alg_name);
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out_unlock:
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mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
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out:
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return rc;
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}
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