netfilter: ipset: Check IPSET_ATTR_ETHER netlink attribute length
Julia Lawall pointed out that IPSET_ATTR_ETHER netlink attribute length was not checked explicitly, just for the maximum possible size. Malicious netlink clients could send shorter attribute and thus resulting a kernel read after the buffer. The patch adds the explicit length checkings. Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
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2 changed files with 4 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ bitmap_ipmac_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[],
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e.id = ip_to_id(map, ip);
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if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) {
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if (nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN)
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return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL;
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memcpy(e.ether, nla_data(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]), ETH_ALEN);
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e.add_mac = 1;
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}
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@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ hash_mac4_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[],
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if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO])
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*lineno = nla_get_u32(tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO]);
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if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]))
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if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER] ||
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nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN))
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return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL;
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ret = ip_set_get_extensions(set, tb, &ext);
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