sctp: fix to check the source address of COOKIE-ECHO chunk
SCTP does not check whether the source address of COOKIE-ECHO chunk is the original address of INIT chunk or part of the any address parameters saved in COOKIE in CLOSED state. So even if the COOKIE-ECHO chunk is from any address but with correct COOKIE, the COOKIE-ECHO chunk still be accepted. If the COOKIE is not from a valid address, the assoc should not be established. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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85c5ed4e44
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de6becdc08
4 changed files with 28 additions and 17 deletions
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@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ int sctp_has_association(const union sctp_addr *laddr,
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int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t,
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sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
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struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk);
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int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *, sctp_cid_t cid,
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int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
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const union sctp_addr *peer,
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sctp_init_chunk_t *init, gfp_t gfp);
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__u32 sctp_generate_tag(const struct sctp_endpoint *);
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@ -2242,14 +2242,17 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
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* Returns 0 on failure, else success.
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* FIXME: This is an association method.
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*/
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int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid,
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int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
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const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
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sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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union sctp_params param;
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struct sctp_transport *transport;
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struct list_head *pos, *temp;
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struct sctp_af *af;
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union sctp_addr addr;
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char *cookie;
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int src_match = 0;
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/* We must include the address that the INIT packet came from.
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* This is the only address that matters for an INIT packet.
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@ -2261,18 +2264,31 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid,
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* added as the primary transport. The source address seems to
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* be a a better choice than any of the embedded addresses.
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*/
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if (peer_addr) {
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if(!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE))
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goto nomem;
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}
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if(!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE))
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goto nomem;
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if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), peer_addr))
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src_match = 1;
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/* Process the initialization parameters. */
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sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
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if (!src_match && (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
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param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)) {
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af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
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af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr,
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chunk->sctp_hdr->source, 0);
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if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), &addr))
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src_match = 1;
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}
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if (!sctp_process_param(asoc, param, peer_addr, gfp))
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goto clean_up;
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}
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/* source address of chunk may not match any valid address */
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if (!src_match)
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goto clean_up;
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/* AUTH: After processing the parameters, make sure that we
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* have all the required info to potentially do authentications.
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*/
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@ -595,8 +595,7 @@ static int sctp_cmd_process_init(sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands,
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* fail during INIT processing (due to malloc problems),
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* just return the error and stop processing the stack.
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*/
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if (!sctp_process_init(asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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sctp_source(chunk), peer_init, gfp))
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if (!sctp_process_init(asoc, chunk, sctp_source(chunk), peer_init, gfp))
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error = -ENOMEM;
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else
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error = 0;
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@ -393,8 +393,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
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goto nomem_init;
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/* The call, sctp_process_init(), can fail on memory allocation. */
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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sctp_source(chunk),
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk, sctp_source(chunk),
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(sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr,
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GFP_ATOMIC))
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goto nomem_init;
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@ -725,7 +724,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
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*/
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peer_init = &chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_init[0];
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk,
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&chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_addr,
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peer_init, GFP_ATOMIC))
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goto nomem_init;
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@ -1464,8 +1463,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
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* Verification Tag and Peers Verification tag into a reserved
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* place (local tie-tag and per tie-tag) within the state cookie.
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*/
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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sctp_source(chunk),
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk, sctp_source(chunk),
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(sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr,
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GFP_ATOMIC))
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goto nomem;
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@ -1694,8 +1692,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
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*/
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peer_init = &chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_init[0];
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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sctp_source(chunk), peer_init,
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk, sctp_source(chunk), peer_init,
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GFP_ATOMIC))
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goto nomem;
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@ -1780,8 +1777,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
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* side effects--it is safe to run them here.
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*/
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peer_init = &chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_init[0];
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
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sctp_source(chunk), peer_init,
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if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk, sctp_source(chunk), peer_init,
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GFP_ATOMIC))
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goto nomem;
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