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2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Brown
11bf9b8658 ARM/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init
Although the ARM vDSO is cleanly separated by code/data with the code
being read-only in userspace mappings, the code page is still writable
from the kernel.

There have been exploits (such as http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21) that
take advantage of this on x86 to go from a bad kernel write to full
root.

Prevent this specific exploit class on ARM as well by putting the vDSO
code page in post-init read-only memory as well.

Before:
	vdso: 1 text pages at base 80927000
	root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
	---[ Modules ]---
	---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
	0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
	0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
	0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
	0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

After:
	vdso: 1 text pages at base 8072b000
	root@Vexpress:/ cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
	---[ Modules ]---
	---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
	0x80000000-0x80100000           1M     RW NX SHD
	0x80100000-0x80600000           5M     ro x  SHD
	0x80600000-0x80800000           2M     ro NX SHD
	0x80800000-0xbe000000         984M     RW NX SHD

Inspired by https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/19/494 based on work by the
PaX Team, Brad Spengler, and Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Lynch <nathan_lynch@mentor.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22 08:51:39 +01:00
Nathan Lynch
8512287a81 ARM: 8330/1: add VDSO user-space code
Place VDSO-related user-space code in arch/arm/kernel/vdso/.

It is almost completely written in C with some assembly helpers to
load the data page address, sample the counter, and fall back to
system calls when necessary.

The VDSO can service gettimeofday and clock_gettime when
CONFIG_ARM_ARCH_TIMER is enabled and the architected timer is present
(and correctly configured).  It reads the CP15-based virtual counter
to compute high-resolution timestamps.

Of particular note is that a post-processing step ("vdsomunge") is
necessary to produce a shared object which is architecturally allowed
to be used by both soft- and hard-float EABI programs.

The 2012 edition of the ARM ABI defines Tag_ABI_VFP_args = 3 "Code is
compatible with both the base and VFP variants; the user did not
permit non-variadic functions to pass FP parameters/results."
Unfortunately current toolchains do not support this tag, which is
ideally what we would use.

The best available option is to ensure that both EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_SOFT
and EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_HARD are unset in the ELF header's e_flags,
indicating that the shared object is "old" and should be accepted for
backward compatibility's sake.  While binutils < 2.24 appear to
produce a vdso.so with both flags clear, 2.24 always sets
EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_SOFT, with no way to inhibit this behavior.  So we
have to fix things up with a custom post-processing step.

In fact, the VDSO code in glibc does much less validation (including
checking these flags) than the code for handling conventional
file-backed shared libraries, so this is a bit moot unless glibc's
VDSO code becomes more strict.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathan_lynch@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-27 22:20:45 +00:00