linux-hardened/kernel/seccomp.c
Linus Torvalds 0b747172dc Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
  AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
  audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
  audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
  AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
  audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
  kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
  sched: declare pid_alive as inline
  audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
  syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
  audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
  audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
  audit: include subject in login records
  audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
  audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
  audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
  audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
  pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
  audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
  audit: Add generic compat syscall support
  audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
  ...
2014-04-12 12:38:53 -07:00

510 lines
14 KiB
C

/*
* linux/kernel/seccomp.c
*
* Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
* Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
*
* This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
*
* Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
* Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
* of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
*/
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/**
* struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
*
* @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
* get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
* outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this
* is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
* @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
* @len: the number of instructions in the program
* @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
*
* seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
* pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
* with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
* However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
* results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to
* how namespaces work.
*
* seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
* to a task_struct (other than @usage).
*/
struct seccomp_filter {
atomic_t usage;
struct seccomp_filter *prev;
unsigned short len; /* Instruction count */
struct sock_filter_int insnsi[];
};
/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
/*
* Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
* as per the specific architecture.
*/
static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
sd->arch = syscall_get_arch();
/* Unroll syscall_get_args to help gcc on arm. */
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[0]);
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 1, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[1]);
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 2, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[2]);
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 3, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[3]);
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 4, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[4]);
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 5, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[5]);
sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
}
/**
* seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
* @filter: filter to verify
* @flen: length of filter
*
* Takes a previously checked filter (by sk_chk_filter) and
* redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
* and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also
* enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
*
* Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
*/
static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
{
int pc;
for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
u16 code = ftest->code;
u32 k = ftest->k;
switch (code) {
case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS;
/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
return -EINVAL;
continue;
case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM;
ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
continue;
case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN:
ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM;
ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
continue;
/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
case BPF_S_RET_K:
case BPF_S_RET_A:
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K:
case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X:
case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
case BPF_S_LDX_IMM:
case BPF_S_MISC_TAX:
case BPF_S_MISC_TXA:
case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K:
case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
case BPF_S_LDX_MEM:
case BPF_S_ST:
case BPF_S_STX:
case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
sk_decode_filter(ftest, ftest);
continue;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
* @syscall: number of the current system call
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
{
struct seccomp_filter *f;
struct seccomp_data sd;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter_int_seccomp(&sd, f->insnsi);
if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
ret = cur_ret;
}
return ret;
}
/**
* seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
* @fprog: BPF program to install
*
* Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
*/
static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
{
struct seccomp_filter *filter;
unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len;
struct sock_filter *fp;
int new_len;
long ret;
if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
return -EINVAL;
for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
total_insns += filter->len + 4; /* include a 4 instr penalty */
if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
* This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
if (!current->no_new_privs &&
security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
return -EACCES;
fp = kzalloc(fp_size, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
if (!fp)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(fp, fprog->filter, fp_size))
goto free_prog;
/* Check and rewrite the fprog via the skb checker */
ret = sk_chk_filter(fp, fprog->len);
if (ret)
goto free_prog;
/* Check and rewrite the fprog for seccomp use */
ret = seccomp_check_filter(fp, fprog->len);
if (ret)
goto free_prog;
/* Convert 'sock_filter' insns to 'sock_filter_int' insns */
ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, NULL, &new_len);
if (ret)
goto free_prog;
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) +
sizeof(struct sock_filter_int) * new_len,
GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
if (!filter)
goto free_prog;
ret = sk_convert_filter(fp, fprog->len, filter->insnsi, &new_len);
if (ret)
goto free_filter;
atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
filter->len = new_len;
/*
* If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
* task reference.
*/
filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
current->seccomp.filter = filter;
return 0;
free_filter:
kfree(filter);
free_prog:
kfree(fp);
return ret;
}
/**
* seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog
* @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
*
* Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
*/
static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
{
struct sock_fprog fprog;
long ret = -EFAULT;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task()) {
struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
goto out;
fprog.len = fprog32.len;
fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
} else /* falls through to the if below. */
#endif
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
goto out;
ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
out:
return ret;
}
/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
if (!orig)
return;
/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
}
/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
orig = orig->prev;
kfree(freeme);
}
}
/**
* seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
* @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
* @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
*
* Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
*/
static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
{
struct siginfo info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
info.si_errno = reason;
info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
info.si_syscall = syscall;
force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
/*
* Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
* To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
* to limit the stack allocations too.
*/
static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
0, /* null terminated */
};
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
__NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32,
0, /* null terminated */
};
#endif
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task())
syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
#endif
do {
if (*syscall == this_syscall)
return 0;
} while (*++syscall);
exit_sig = SIGKILL;
ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
int data;
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
switch (ret) {
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
-data, 0);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
/* Show the handler the original registers. */
syscall_rollback(current, regs);
/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
-ENOSYS, 0);
goto skip;
}
/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
/*
* The delivery of a fatal signal during event
* notification may silently skip tracer notification.
* Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
* call that may not be intended.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
break;
if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
goto skip; /* Explicit request to skip. */
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
default:
break;
}
exit_sig = SIGSYS;
break;
}
#endif
default:
BUG();
}
#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
dump_stack();
#endif
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
do_exit(exit_sig);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
skip:
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
#endif
return -1;
}
long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
return current->seccomp.mode;
}
/**
* prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
* @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
* @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
*
* This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
* SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter
* successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
* call the task makes.
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
{
long ret = -EINVAL;
if (current->seccomp.mode &&
current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
goto out;
switch (seccomp_mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
ret = 0;
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
if (ret)
goto out;
break;
#endif
default:
goto out;
}
current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
out:
return ret;
}