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don't define test target directly, use do-test instead
2003-07-12 15:23:43 +02:00
# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.74 2003/07/12 13:25:23 dillo Exp $
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
Update to 0.9.6g. The most significant change is this proof against a stunning DoS vulnerability, fixed in 0.9.6f: *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller] Regenerate the netbsd patch. This is now a clean diff against the vendor tag, with version-number-only changes elided. Partially revert "crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c", version 1.4 (via additional pkgsrc patch), to give this a shot to compile on NetBSD-1.4.2 and earlier, which had no strlcpy() or strlcat(). Assemble the shared library without "-Bsymbolic", mainly to give this a shot at linking on NetBSD-a.out (untested).
2002-08-10 06:50:31 +02:00
DISTNAME= openssl-0.9.6g
* Add patch from http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt: Researchers have discovered a timing attack on RSA keys, to which OpenSSL is generally vulnerable, unless RSA blinding has been turned on. Typically, it will not have been, because it is not easily possible to do so when using OpenSSL to provide SSL or TLS. The enclosed patch switches blinding on by default. Applications that wish to can remove the blinding with RSA_blinding_off(), but this is not generally advised. It is also possible to disable it completely by defining OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING at compile-time. The performance impact of blinding appears to be small (a few percent). This problem affects many applications using OpenSSL, in particular, almost all SSL-enabled Apaches. You should rebuild and reinstall OpenSSL, and all affected applications. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0147 to this issue. * Add patch from http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt: Czech cryptologists Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS connections to the server under attack; the server's behaviour when faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key. Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack. * Bump PKGREVISION.
2003-03-21 19:40:48 +01:00
PKGREVISION= 2
SVR4 packages have a limit of 9 chars for a package name. The automatic truncation in gensolpkg doesn't work for packages which have the same package name for the first 5-6 chars. e.g. amanda-server and amanda-client would be named amanda and amanda. Now, we add a SVR4_PKGNAME and use amacl for amanda-client and amase for amanda-server. All svr4 packages also have a vendor tag, so we have to reserve some chars for this tag, which is normaly 3 or 4 chars. Thats why we can only use 6 or 5 chars for SVR4_PKGNAME. I used 5 for all the packages, to give the vendor tag enough room. All p5-* packages and a few other packages have now a SVR4_PKGNAME.
2001-10-18 17:20:01 +02:00
SVR4_PKGNAME= ossl
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
CATEGORIES= security
G/c references to ftp.uni-trier.de.
2002-05-08 13:44:50 +02:00
MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
Use tech-pkg@ in favor of packages@ as MAINTAINER for orphaned packages. Should anybody feel like they could be the maintainer for any of thewe packages, please adjust.
2003-06-02 03:15:31 +02:00
MAINTAINER= tech-pkg@netbsd.org
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
HOMEPAGE= http://www.openssl.org/
Update to new COMMENT style: COMMENT var in Makefile instead of pkg/COMMENT.
2001-02-17 18:42:09 +01:00
COMMENT= Secure Socket Layer and cryptographic library
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
Change explicit build dependencies on perl into "USE_PERL5=build". This makes these packages build correctly on Darwin where perl>=5.8.0 is required.
2002-07-24 21:45:22 +02:00
USE_PERL5= build
Make an explicit BUILD_DEPENDS on perl5, rather than the run-time DEPENDS that USE_PERL implies, as the core functionality of this package does not depend on perl. The user can always install perl later, to format the "pod" docs or to run the installed scripts.
2001-04-09 04:36:47 +02:00
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
CONFLICTS= SSLeay-[0-9]* ssleay-[0-9]* base64-[0-9]* \
Add conflict between "glimpse" and "openssl" package. They both install "bin/cast" in "${LOCALBASE}".
2001-10-18 06:51:04 +02:00
glimpse-[0-9]
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
Reorganize crypto handling, as discussed on tech-pkg. Remove all RESTRICTED= variables that were predicated on former U.S. export regulations. Add CRYPTO=, as necessary, so it's still possible to exclude all crypto packages from a build by setting MKCRYPTO=no (but "lintpkgsrc -R" will no longer catch them). Specifically, - - All packages which set USE_SSL just lose their RESTRICTED variable, since MKCRYPTO responds to USE_SSL directly. - - realplayer7 and ns-flash keep their RESTRICTED, which is based on license terms, but also gain the CRYPTO variable. - - srp-client is now marked broken, since the distfile is evidently no longer available. On this, we're no worse off than before. [We haven't been mirroring the distfile, or testing the build!] - - isakmpd gets CRYPTO for RESTRICTED, but remains broken. - - crack loses all restrictions, as it does not evidently empower a user to utilize strong encryption (working definition: ability to encode a message that requires a secret key plus big number arithmetic to decode).
2000-09-09 21:40:14 +02:00
CRYPTO= YES
Replace MIRROR_DISTFILES and NO_CDROM with the more descriptive and more fine-grained NO_{BIN,SRC}_ON_{FTP,CDROM} definitions. MIRROR_DISTFILES and NO_CDROM are now dead.
2000-08-19 00:46:29 +02:00
clarify comment on LICENSE line.
2001-04-18 01:32:34 +02:00
# openssl supplies IDEA/RC5. IDEA/RC5 need license for commercial use.
add LICENCE=fee-based-commercial-use, for use of IDEA/RC5 logic. (per discussion on packages@netbsd.org)
2000-10-10 13:42:15 +02:00
LICENCE= fee-based-commercial-use
Use buildlink2 and pass an extra flag to the configure script so that if RSAref is used, then the library may be found.
2002-09-07 09:17:00 +02:00
USE_BUILDLINK2= YES
Instead of including bsd.pkg.install.mk directly in a package Makefile, have it be automatically included by bsd.pkg.mk if USE_PKGINSTALL is set to "YES". This enforces the requirement that bsd.pkg.install.mk be included at the end of a package Makefile. Idea suggested by Julio M. Merino Vidal <jmmv at menta.net>.
2003-01-28 23:03:00 +01:00
USE_PKGINSTALL= YES
Add support for "SPARC_TARGET_ARCH".
2001-07-10 17:08:32 +02:00
CONFIGURE_SCRIPT= config
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
CONFIGURE_ARGS= shared --openssldir=${PKG_SYSCONFDIR} --prefix=${PREFIX}
Explicitly specify the path to Perl5 executable for configure script. Reported by Jonathan Perkin in PR19205.
2002-11-30 06:13:23 +01:00
CONFIGURE_ENV= CC="${CC}" PERL="${PERL5}"
Support to build it on Solaris. It would be easier to make that change if we support patches for one OPSYS but someone removed that from out tree.
2000-05-10 14:28:37 +02:00
Rename PLIST.irix6 to PLIST.irix to match the others and set the PLIST_SRC accordingly after we recently set LOWER_OPSYS on IRIX to what most applications seem to expect (ie irix6.5 rather than irix6).
2003-06-10 20:02:26 +02:00
PLIST_SRC= ${PKGDIR}/PLIST.${LOWER_OPSYS:C/([.0-9]*)$//}
* Change the perl paths in the various build scripts to ${PERL5} and not ${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl. * Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as "${MAKE_PROGRAM}". * Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the user still has the option of overriding its value. * Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf) and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
2002-08-09 16:45:05 +02:00
PLIST_SRC+= ${PLIST_RSAREF}
PLIST_SRC+= ${PKGDIR}/PLIST.common
PKG_SYSCONFSUBDIR= openssl
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
CONF_FILES= ${PREFIX}/share/examples/openssl/openssl.cnf \
${PKG_SYSCONFDIR}/openssl.cnf
* Change the perl paths in the various build scripts to ${PERL5} and not ${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl. * Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as "${MAKE_PROGRAM}". * Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the user still has the option of overriding its value. * Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf) and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
2002-08-09 16:45:05 +02:00
OWN_DIRS= ${PKG_SYSCONFDIR}/certs ${PKG_SYSCONFDIR}/private
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
do-configure:
cd ${WRKSRC} \
* Change the perl paths in the various build scripts to ${PERL5} and not ${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl. * Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as "${MAKE_PROGRAM}". * Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the user still has the option of overriding its value. * Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf) and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
2002-08-09 16:45:05 +02:00
&& ${PERL5} util/perlpath.pl ${PERL5} \
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
&& ${SETENV} ${CONFIGURE_ENV} ./${CONFIGURE_SCRIPT} \
${CONFIGURE_ARGS}
don't define test target directly, use do-test instead
2003-07-12 15:23:43 +02:00
do-test:
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
@cd ${WRKSRC}/test \
* Change the perl paths in the various build scripts to ${PERL5} and not ${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl. * Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as "${MAKE_PROGRAM}". * Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the user still has the option of overriding its value. * Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf) and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
2002-08-09 16:45:05 +02:00
&& ${SETENV} ${LD_PATH_VARNAME}=${WRKSRC} \
${MAKE_PROGRAM} tests \
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
&& ${ECHO} "*** Tests successful. ***"
Support to build it on Solaris. It would be easier to make that change if we support patches for one OPSYS but someone removed that from out tree.
2000-05-10 14:28:37 +02:00
.include "../../mk/bsd.prefs.mk"
.if ${OPSYS} == "NetBSD"
Revert Makefile,v.1.56, as the NetBSD patches were causing intractable problems for Solaris. Instead, handle patch for NetBSD-1.4.2 specially.
2002-08-15 21:22:10 +02:00
PATCH_SITES= ${MASTER_SITE_LOCAL}
PATCHFILES= openssl-0.9.6g-20020810-netbsd.patch.gz
* Change the perl paths in the various build scripts to ${PERL5} and not ${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl. * Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as "${MAKE_PROGRAM}". * Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the user still has the option of overriding its value. * Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf) and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
2002-08-09 16:45:05 +02:00
PKG_SYSCONFDIR.${PKGBASE}?= /etc/openssl
Revert Makefile,v.1.56, as the NetBSD patches were causing intractable problems for Solaris. Instead, handle patch for NetBSD-1.4.2 specially.
2002-08-15 21:22:10 +02:00
style nits, join two .if's.
2003-07-02 15:03:25 +02:00
. if !exists(/usr/libexec/ld.elf_so) && !exists(/usr/libexec/ld.so)
Replace IGNORE with PKG_FAIL_REASON or PKG_SKIP_REASON as appropriate.
2002-12-07 03:38:52 +01:00
PKG_FAIL_REASON= ${PKGNAME} requires shared object support
style nits, join two .if's.
2003-07-02 15:03:25 +02:00
. endif
Revert Makefile,v.1.56, as the NetBSD patches were causing intractable problems for Solaris. Instead, handle patch for NetBSD-1.4.2 specially.
2002-08-15 21:22:10 +02:00
.endif # ${OPSYS} == "NetBSD"
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
.if ${OPSYS} == "Darwin"
LD_PATH_VARNAME= DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH
.else
LD_PATH_VARNAME= LD_LIBRARY_PATH
.endif
Install the RSAglue library if USERSAREF2 if set to YES.
1999-11-26 20:14:56 +01:00
style nits, join two .if's.
2003-07-02 15:03:25 +02:00
.if defined(USE_RSAREF2) && ${USE_RSAREF2} == "YES"
Use buildlink2 and pass an extra flag to the configure script so that if RSAref is used, then the library may be found.
2002-09-07 09:17:00 +02:00
. include "../../security/rsaref/buildlink2.mk"
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= rsaref -L${BUILDLINK_PREFIX.rsaref}/lib
Support to build it on Solaris. It would be easier to make that change if we support patches for one OPSYS but someone removed that from out tree.
2000-05-10 14:28:37 +02:00
PLIST_RSAREF= ${PKGDIR}/PLIST.rsaref
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
.endif
style nits, join two .if's.
2003-07-02 15:03:25 +02:00
.if ${OPSYS} == "SunOS" && ${MACHINE_ARCH} == "sparc"
Add support for "SPARC_TARGET_ARCH".
2001-07-10 17:08:32 +02:00
CONFIGURE_SCRIPT= Configure
more brutally attack the CONFIGURE_ARGS target issue on Solaris. force gcc if *gcc* - Sun's compiler is never going to be installed into a path with 'gcc' in it(!)
2003-07-02 15:00:46 +02:00
. if !empty(CC:M*gcc*)
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= solaris-${SPARC_TARGET_ARCH}-gcc
. else
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= solaris-${SPARC_TARGET_ARCH}-cc
. endif
style nits, join two .if's.
2003-07-02 15:03:25 +02:00
.elif ${OPSYS} == "IRIX" && ${ABI} == "64"
Make this work on IRIX64.
2003-06-27 04:36:36 +02:00
CONFIGURE_SCRIPT= Configure
CONFIGURE_ARGS+= irix64-mips4-cc
.endif
Import OpenSSL 0.9.2b pkg, a package which finally updates and fixes many deficiencies in SSLeay. Intended to be a drop-in replacement for SSLeay (and still provides the command-prompt interface as "ssleay").
1999-04-30 17:19:13 +02:00
.include "../../mk/bsd.pkg.mk"
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