pkgsrc/security/openssl/distinfo

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$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.136 2020/01/02 20:31:05 sevan Exp $
SHA1 (openssl-1.0.2u.tar.gz) = 740916d79ab0d209d2775277b1c6c3ec2f6502b2
RMD160 (openssl-1.0.2u.tar.gz) = b8e7e5df9582e29fdd00bd03d47e980a39ba11ab
SHA512 (openssl-1.0.2u.tar.gz) = c455bb309e20e2c2d47fdc5619c734d107d5c8c38c1409903ce979acc120b0d5fa0312917c0aa0d630e402d092a703d4249643f36078e8528a3cafc9dac6ab32
Size (openssl-1.0.2u.tar.gz) = 5355412 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Configure) = 2d963d781314276a0ee1bc531df6bc50f0f6b32b
Update security/openssl to version 1.0.2f. Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits. [Kurt Roeckx]
2016-01-28 17:30:42 +01:00
SHA1 (patch-Makefile.org) = d2a9295003a8b88718a328b01ff6bcbbc102ec0b
SHA1 (patch-Makefile.shared) = 273154600c6cf0cf4de4ae16d56c5555bca5f9ad
Update security/openssl to version 1.0.2f. Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits. [Kurt Roeckx]
2016-01-28 17:30:42 +01:00
SHA1 (patch-apps_Makefile) = 60113291f2a25f5f1c1dba35e8173087bcd4cc30
SHA1 (patch-config) = 345cadece3bdf0ef0a273a6c9ba6d0cbb1026a31
SHA1 (patch-crypto_bn_bn__prime.pl) = a516f3709a862d85e659d466e895419b1e0a94c8
SHA1 (patch-crypto_des_Makefile) = 7a23f9883ff6c93ec0e5d08e1332cc95de8cdba2
SHA1 (patch-tools_Makefile) = 67f0b9b501969382fd89b678c277d32bf5d294bc