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Update security/openssl to 0.9.7e. Changes from openssl-0.9.6m are too numerous to be listed here, but include adding a new DES API (support for the old one is still present). Changes to the pkgsrc structure include: * Install the shared libraries with a version number that matches the OpenSSL version number * Move some of the less often-used c_* utilities back into the examples directory. * Drop support for using the RSAREF library and always use the built-in RSA code instead.
2004-12-24 23:02:37 +01:00
@comment $NetBSD: PLIST.darwin,v 1.5 2004/12/24 22:02:38 jlam Exp $
lib/libcrypto.${SHLIB_VERSION}.dylib
lib/libcrypto.${SHLIB_MAJOR}.dylib
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
lib/libcrypto.dylib
Update security/openssl to 0.9.7e. Changes from openssl-0.9.6m are too numerous to be listed here, but include adding a new DES API (support for the old one is still present). Changes to the pkgsrc structure include: * Install the shared libraries with a version number that matches the OpenSSL version number * Move some of the less often-used c_* utilities back into the examples directory. * Drop support for using the RSAREF library and always use the built-in RSA code instead.
2004-12-24 23:02:37 +01:00
lib/libssl.${SHLIB_VERSION}.dylib
lib/libssl.${SHLIB_MAJOR}.dylib
Update openssl to 0.9.6e. This update fixes multiple vulnerabilities, and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting. The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's "openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's. [Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is to upgrade your base system *first*. I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible. This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages, but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary. I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below. My comments are marked off with '===>'. ===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>, Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others), Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>: PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] ===> This is our ABI change. *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] ===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions ===> as necessary. *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones.
2002-08-04 17:47:43 +02:00
lib/libssl.dylib
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