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Fix CVE-2012-3481 using Nils Philippsen's patch.

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Bump PKGREVISION.
This commit is contained in:
wiz 2012-08-20 12:54:01 +00:00
parent fbd3491051
commit 90e75453ec
3 changed files with 43 additions and 3 deletions
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4
graphics/gimp/Makefile
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.217 2012/08/14 08:46:57 wiz Exp $
# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.218 2012/08/20 12:54:01 wiz Exp $
DISTNAME= gimp-2.8.0
PKGREVISION= 2
PKGREVISION= 3
CATEGORIES= graphics
MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.gimp.org/pub/gimp/v${PKGVERSION_NOREV:R}/ \
${MASTER_SITE_GNU:=gimp/v${PKGVERSION_NOREV:R}/} \

3
graphics/gimp/distinfo
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.67 2012/05/07 08:40:08 adam Exp $
$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.68 2012/08/20 12:54:01 wiz Exp $
SHA1 (gimp-2.8.0.tar.bz2) = 3b20d3dd10d971acbbc9345eb5cb93378c398ebc
RMD160 (gimp-2.8.0.tar.bz2) = aeff9275461d0171e22b2281aae28ca4fb4bc63f
@ -10,4 +10,5 @@ SHA1 (patch-app_Makefile.in) = efbd9e592cdbc154e5a6402279c7d54f3946c65c
SHA1 (patch-app_base_base-utils.c) = 18dfa09c1d63530ff79cd4c3515d9f1077182d64
SHA1 (patch-app_config_Makefile.in) = a2fcebd994831fbe0f911efb84c1fecdf2e59198
SHA1 (patch-devel-docs_app_Makefile.in) = 1eb97f779d5151b9e89b4ae47afb44d1bb3b6a48
SHA1 (patch-plug-ins_common_file-gif-load.c) = 44a83ad0e2ddc7d4601ee96b0c524121a1b29bf8
SHA1 (patch-plug-ins_script-fu_script-fu-server.c) = 4932d82711c8010cf7b1ff5bfb12031946273c2b

39
graphics/gimp/patches/patch-plug-ins_common_file-gif-load.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
$NetBSD: patch-plug-ins_common_file-gif-load.c,v 1.1 2012/08/20 12:54:01 wiz Exp $
From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2012 12:18:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] file-gif-load: limit len and height (CVE-2012-3481)
Ensure values of len and height can't overflow g_malloc() argument type.
(cherry picked from commit d95c2f0bcb6775bdee2bef35b7d84f6dfd490783)
From: Nils Philippsen <nils@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2012 15:27:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] file-gif-load: fix type overflow (CVE-2012-3481)
Cast variables properly to avoid overflowing when computing how much
memory to allocate.
(cherry picked from commit 43fc9dbd8e2196944c8a71321e525b89b7df9f5c)
--- plug-ins/common/file-gif-load.c.orig 2012-03-12 19:18:10.000000000 +0000
+++ plug-ins/common/file-gif-load.c
@@ -1057,10 +1057,17 @@ ReadImage (FILE *fd,
cur_progress = 0;
max_progress = height;
+ if (len > (G_MAXSIZE / height / (alpha_frame ? (promote_to_rgb ? 4 : 2) : 1)))
+ {
+ g_message ("'%s' has a larger image size than GIMP can handle.",
+ gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (alpha_frame)
- dest = (guchar *) g_malloc (len * height * (promote_to_rgb ? 4 : 2));
+ dest = (guchar *) g_malloc ((gsize)len * (gsize)height * (promote_to_rgb ? 4 : 2));
else
- dest = (guchar *) g_malloc (len * height);
+ dest = (guchar *) g_malloc ((gsize)len * (gsize)height);
#ifdef GIFDEBUG
g_print ("GIF: reading %d by %d%s GIF image, ncols=%d\n",