All checksums have been double-checked against existing RMD160 and
SHA512 hashes
Unfetchable distfiles (fetched conditionally?):
./security/cyrus-sasl/distinfo cyrus-sasl-dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d.patch.v2
Unsorted entries in PLIST files have generated a pkglint warning for at
least 12 years. Somewhat more recently, pkglint has learned to sort
PLIST files automatically. Since pkglint 5.4.23, the sorting is only
done in obvious, simple cases. These have been applied by running:
pkglint -Cnone,PLIST -Wnone,plist-sort -r -F
Problems found locating distfiles:
Package f-prot-antivirus6-fs-bin: missing distfile fp-NetBSD.x86.32-fs-6.2.3.tar.gz
Package f-prot-antivirus6-ws-bin: missing distfile fp-NetBSD.x86.32-ws-6.2.3.tar.gz
Package libidea: missing distfile libidea-0.8.2b.tar.gz
Package openssh: missing distfile openssh-7.1p1-hpn-20150822.diff.bz2
Package uvscan: missing distfile vlp4510e.tar.Z
Otherwise, existing SHA1 digests verified and found to be the same on
the machine holding the existing distfiles (morden). All existing
SHA1 digests retained for now as an audit trail.
Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) is an implementation of a
threshold scheme for sharing a secret between third parties, and
requiring a threshold of those parties to collaborate to reveal the
secret.
Taken from the Wikipedia article about Secret Sharing:
In cryptography, a secret sharing scheme is a method for
distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of
which is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can only
be reconstructed when the shares are combined together;
individual shares are of no use on their own.
Shamir's scheme is provable secure: in a (t,n) scheme one can prove
that it makes no difference whether an attacker has t-1 valid shares
at his disposal or none at all; as long as he has less than t shares,
there is no better option than guessing to find out the secret.
