xl(1) runs the hotplug scripts in parallel. This causes failures when the
next free vnd device is selected.
Locking modeled after the Linux block hotplug script.
Problems found with existing digests:
Package memconf distfile memconf-2.16/memconf.gz
b6f4b736cac388dddc5070670351cf7262aba048 [recorded]
95748686a5ad8144232f4d4abc9bf052721a196f [calculated]
Problems found locating distfiles:
Package dc-tools: missing distfile dc-tools/abs0-dc-burn-netbsd-1.5-0-gae55ec9
Package ipw-firmware: missing distfile ipw2100-fw-1.2.tgz
Package iwi-firmware: missing distfile ipw2200-fw-2.3.tgz
Package nvnet: missing distfile nvnet-netbsd-src-20050620.tgz
Package syslog-ng: missing distfile syslog-ng-3.7.2.tar.gz
Otherwise, existing SHA1 digests verified and found to be the same on
the machine holding the existing distfiles (morden). All existing
SHA1 digests retained for now as an audit trail.
builtin. Fix obvious logic error in libxl. Disable the use of global
register variables for clang. Lesser evil, HVM users should use newer
xentools or GCC.
do a patch refresh in xentools42
rather than split the patches for pass-through.c over 5 files, delete
xentools42/patches/patch-CVE-2015-2756 and assemble all in
xentools42/patches/patch-qemu-xen-traditional_hw_pass-through.c
From b6e327fde6c365086594e2b46edf435aa1671b1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 14:41:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] tools: libxl: Explicitly disable graphics backends on qemu
cmdline
By default qemu will try to create some sort of backend for the
emulated VGA device, either SDL or VNC.
However when the user specifies sdl=0 and vnc=0 in their configuration
libxl was not explicitly disabling either backend, which could lead to
one unexpectedly running.
If either sdl=1 or vnc=1 is configured then both before and after this
change only the backends which are explicitly enabled are configured,
i.e. this issue only occurs when all backends are supposed to have
been disabled.
This affects qemu-xen and qemu-xen-traditional differently.
If qemu-xen was compiled with SDL support then this would result in an
SDL window being opened if $DISPLAY is valid, or a failure to start
the guest if not. Passing "-display none" to qemu before any further
-sdl options disables this default behaviour and ensures that SDL is
only started if the libxl configuration demands it.
If qemu-xen was compiled without SDL support then qemu would instead
start a VNC server listening on ::1 (IPv6 localhost) or 127.0.0.1
(IPv4 localhost) with IPv6 preferred if available. Explicitly pass
"-vnc none" when vnc is not enabled in the libxl configuration to
remove this possibility.
qemu-xen-traditional would never start a vnc backend unless asked.
However by default it will start an SDL backend, the way to disable
this is to pass a -vnc option. In other words passing "-vnc none" will
disable both vnc and sdl by default. sdl can then be reenabled if
configured by subsequent use of the -sdl option.
Tested with both qemu-xen and qemu-xen-traditional built with SDL
support and:
xl cr # defaults
xl cr sdl=0 vnc=0
xl cr sdl=1 vnc=0
xl cr sdl=0 vnc=1
xl cr sdl=0 vnc=0 vga=\"none\"
xl cr sdl=0 vnc=0 nographic=1
with both valid and invalid $DISPLAY.
This is XSA-119.
CVE-2014-2599 / XSA-89 HVMOP_set_mem_access is not preemptible
CVE-2014-3124 / XSA-92 HVMOP_set_mem_type allows invalid P2M entries to be
created
CVE-2014-3967,CVE-2014-3968 / XSA-96 Vulnerabilities in HVM MSI injection
CVE-2014-4021 / XSA-100 Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests
pkgsrc also includes patches from the Xen Security Advisory:
XSA-104 (CVE-2014-7154) - Race condition in HVMOP_track_dirty_vram
XSA-105 (CVE-2014-7155) - Missing privilege level checks in x86 HLT, LGDT,
LIDT, and LMSW emulation
XSA-106 (CVE-2014-7156) - Missing privilege level checks in x86 emulation
of software interrupts
Do it for all packages that
* mention perl, or
* have a directory name starting with p5-*, or
* depend on a package starting with p5-
like last time, for 5.18, where this didn't lead to complaints.
Let me know if you have any this time.
Removed patch-libxc_xc_dom_h: commited as cb08944a
This fixes the following critical vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60 Excessive time to disable caching with HVM guests with
PCI passthrough
- CVE-2013-1442 / XSA-62 Information leak on AVX and/or LWP capable CPUs
- CVE-2013-4355 / XSA-63 Information leaks through I/O instruction emulation
- CVE-2013-4361 / XSA-66 Information leak through fbld instruction emulation
- CVE-2013-4368 / XSA-67 Information leak through outs instruction emulation
- CVE-2013-4369 / XSA-68 possible null dereference when parsing vif ratelimiting
info
- CVE-2013-4370 / XSA-69 misplaced free in ocaml xc_vcpu_getaffinity stub
- CVE-2013-4371 / XSA-70 use-after-free in libxl_list_cpupool under memory press
ure
- CVE-2013-4375 / XSA-71 qemu disk backend (qdisk) resource leak
- CVE-2013-4416 / XSA-72 ocaml xenstored mishandles oversized message replies
- CVE-2013-4494 / XSA-73 Lock order reversal between page allocation and grant t
able locks
- CVE-2013-4553 / XSA-74 Lock order reversal between page_alloc_lock and mm_rwlo
ck
- CVE-2013-4551 / XSA-75 Host crash due to guest VMX instruction execution
- CVE-2013-4554 / XSA-76 Hypercalls exposed to privilege rings 1 and 2 of HVM gu
ests
- CVE-2013-6375 / XSA-78 Insufficient TLB flushing in VT-d (iommu) code
- CVE-2013-6400 / XSA-80 IOMMU TLB flushing may be inadvertently suppressed
- CVE-2013-6885 / XSA-82 Guest triggerable AMD CPU erratum may cause host hang
- CVE-2014-1642 / XSA-83 Out-of-memory condition yielding memory corruption duri
ng IRQ setup
- CVE-2014-1891 / XSA-84 integer overflow in several XSM/Flask hypercalls
- CVE-2014-1895 / XSA-85 Off-by-one error in FLASK_AVC_CACHESTAT hypercall
- CVE-2014-1896 / XSA-86 libvchan failure handling malicious ring indexes
- CVE-2014-1666 / XSA-87 PHYSDEVOP_{prepare,release}_msix exposed to unprivilege
d guests
- CVE-2014-1950 / XSA-88 use-after-free in xc_cpupool_getinfo() under memory pre
ssure
Apart from those there are many further bug fixes and improvements.
