Here is quote from NEWS file and please refer it in detail.
---
NTP 4.2.8p9 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/11/21)
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
Severity: HIGH
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following 1 high- (Windows only), 2 medium-, 2 medium-/low, and
5 low-severity vulnerabilities, and provides 28 other non-security
fixes and improvements:
(4.2.8p8) 2016/06/02 Released by Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>
* [Sec 3042] Broadcast Interleave. HStenn.
* [Sec 3043] Autokey association reset. perlinger@ntp.org, stenn@ntp.org
- validate origin timestamps on bad MACs, too. stenn@ntp.org
* [Sec 3044] Spoofed server packets are partially processed. HStenn.
* [Sec 3045] Bad authentication demobilizes ephemeral associations. JPerlinger.
* [Sec 3046] CRYPTO_NAK crash. stenn@ntp.org
* [Bug 3038] NTP fails to build in VS2015. perlinger@ntp.org
- provide build environment
- 'wint_t' and 'struct timespec' defined by VS2015
- fixed print()/scanf() format issues
* [Bug 3052] Add a .gitignore file. Edmund Wong.
* [Bug 3054] miscopt.html documents the allan intercept in seconds. SWhite.
* [Bug 3058] fetch_timestamp() mishandles 64-bit alignment. Brian Utterback,
JPerlinger, HStenn.
* Update the NEWS file for 4.2.8p8. HStenn.
* Fix typo in ntp-wait and plot_summary. HStenn.
* Make sure we have an "author" file for git imports. HStenn.
* Update the sntp problem tests for MacOS. HStenn.
Upstream changes:
(4.2.8p7) 2016/04/26 Released by Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>
* [Sec 2901] KoD packets must have non-zero transmit timestamps. HStenn.
* [Sec 2936] Skeleton Key: Any system knowing the trusted key can serve
time. Include passive servers in this check. HStenn.
* [Sec 2945] Additional KoD packet checks. HStenn.
* [Sec 2978] Interleave can be partially triggered. HStenn.
* [Sec 3007] Validate crypto-NAKs. Danny Mayer.
* [Sec 3008] Always check the return value of ctl_getitem().
- initial work by HStenn
- Additional cleanup of ctl_getitem by perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 3009] Crafted addpeer with hmode > 7 causes OOB error. perlinger@ntp.org
- added more stringent checks on packet content
* [Sec 3010] remote configuration trustedkey/requestkey values
are not properly validated. perlinger@ntp.org
- sidekick: Ignore keys that have an unsupported MAC algorithm
but are otherwise well-formed
* [Sec 3011] Duplicate IPs on unconfig directives will cause an assertion botch
- graciously accept the same IP multiple times. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 3020] Refclock impersonation. HStenn.
* [Bug 2831] Segmentation Fault in DNS lookup during startup. perlinger@ntp.org
- fixed yet another race condition in the threaded resolver code.
* [Bug 2858] bool support. Use stdbool.h when available. HStenn.
* [Bug 2879] Improve NTP security against timing attacks. perlinger@ntp.org
- integrated patches by Loganaden Velvidron <logan@ntp.org>
with some modifications & unit tests
* [Bug 2952] Symmetric active/passive mode is broken. HStenn.
* [Bug 2960] async name resolution fixes for chroot() environments.
Reinhard Max.
* [Bug 2994] Systems with HAVE_SIGNALED_IO fail to compile. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2995] Fixes to compile on Windows
* [Bug 2999] out-of-bounds access in 'is_safe_filename()'. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 3013] Fix for ssl_init.c SHA1 test. perlinger@ntp.org
- Patch provided by Ch. Weisgerber
* [Bug 3015] ntpq: config-from-file: "request contains an unprintable character"
- A change related to [Bug 2853] forbids trailing white space in
remote config commands. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 3019] NTPD stops processing packets after ERROR_HOST_UNREACHABLE
- report and patch from Aleksandr Kostikov.
- Overhaul of Windows IO completion port handling. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 3022] authkeys.c should be refactored. perlinger@ntp.org
- fixed memory leak in access list (auth[read]keys.c)
- refactored handling of key access lists (auth[read]keys.c)
- reduced number of error branches (authreadkeys.c)
* [Bug 3023] ntpdate cannot correct dates in the future. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 3030] ntpq needs a general way to specify refid output format. HStenn.
* [Bug 3031] ntp broadcastclient unable to synchronize to an server
when the time of server changed. perlinger@ntp.org
- Check the initial delay calculation and reject/unpeer the broadcast
server if the delay exceeds 50ms. Retry again after the next
broadcast packet.
* [Bug 3036] autokey trips an INSIST in authistrustedip(). Harlan Stenn.
* Document ntp.key's optional IP list in authenetic.html. Harlan Stenn.
* Update html/xleave.html documentation. Harlan Stenn.
* Update ntp.conf documentation. Harlan Stenn.
* Fix some Credit: attributions in the NEWS file. Harlan Stenn.
* Fix typo in html/monopt.html. Harlan Stenn.
* Add README.pullrequests. Harlan Stenn.
* Cleanup to include/ntp.h. Harlan Stenn.
---
(4.2.8p6) 2016/01/20 Released by Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>
* [Sec 2935] Deja Vu: Replay attack on authenticated broadcast mode. HStenn.
* [Sec 2936] Skeleton Key: Any trusted key system can serve time. HStenn.
* [Sec 2937] ntpq: nextvar() missing length check. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 2938] ntpq saveconfig command allows dangerous characters
in filenames. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 2939] reslist NULL pointer dereference. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 2940] Stack exhaustion in recursive traversal of restriction
list. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 2942]: Off-path DoS attack on auth broadcast mode. HStenn.
* [Sec 2945] Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Sec 2948] Potential Infinite Loop in ntpq ( and ntpdc) perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2772] adj_systime overflows tv_usec. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2814] msyslog deadlock when signaled. perlinger@ntp.org
- applied patch by shenpeng11@huawei.com with minor adjustments
* [Bug 2882] Look at ntp_request.c:list_peers_sum(). perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2891] Deadlock in deferred DNS lookup framework. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2892] Several test cases assume IPv6 capabilities even when
IPv6 is disabled in the build. perlinger@ntp.org
- Found this already fixed, but validation led to cleanup actions.
* [Bug 2905] DNS lookups broken. perlinger@ntp.org
- added limits to stack consumption, fixed some return code handling
* [Bug 2971] ntpq bails on ^C: select fails: Interrupted system call
- changed stacked/nested handling of CTRL-C. perlinger@ntp.org
- make CTRL-C work for retrieval and printing od MRU list. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2980] reduce number of warnings. perlinger@ntp.org
- integrated several patches from Havard Eidnes (he@uninett.no)
* [Bug 2985] bogus calculation in authkeys.c perlinger@ntp.org
- implement 'auth_log2()' using integer bithack instead of float calculation
* Make leapsec_query debug messages less verbose. Harlan Stenn.
* Disable incomplete t-ntp_signd.c test. Harlan Stenn.
NTP 4.2.8p5
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
Severity: MEDIUM
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following medium-severity vulnerability:
* Small-step/big-step. Close the panic gate earlier.
References: Sec 2956, CVE-2015-5300
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p5, and
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.78
CVSS3: (AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L) Base Score: 4.0, MEDIUM
Summary: If ntpd is always started with the -g option, which is
common and against long-standing recommendation, and if at the
moment ntpd is restarted an attacker can immediately respond to
enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target, which
is difficult and not common, there is a window of opportunity
where the attacker can cause ntpd to set the time to an
arbitrary value. Similarly, if an attacker is able to respond
to enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target,
the attacker can cause ntpd to abort and restart, at which
point it can tell the target to set the time to an arbitrary
value if and only if ntpd was re-started against long-standing
recommendation with the -g flag, or if ntpd was not given the
-g flag, the attacker can move the target system's time by at
most 900 seconds' time per attack.
Mitigation:
Configure ntpd to get time from multiple sources.
Upgrade to 4.2.8p5, or later, from the NTP Project Download
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
As we've long documented, only use the -g option to ntpd in
cold-start situations.
Monitor your ntpd instances.
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra,
Isaac E. Cohen, and Sharon Goldberg at Boston University.
NOTE WELL: The -g flag disables the limit check on the panic_gate
in ntpd, which is 900 seconds by default. The bug identified by
the researchers at Boston University is that the panic_gate
check was only re-enabled after the first change to the system
clock that was greater than 128 milliseconds, by default. The
correct behavior is that the panic_gate check should be
re-enabled after any initial time correction.
If an attacker is able to inject consistent but erroneous time
responses to your systems via the network or "over the air",
perhaps by spoofing radio, cellphone, or navigation satellite
transmissions, they are in a great position to affect your
system's clock. There comes a point where your very best
defenses include:
Configure ntpd to get time from multiple sources.
Monitor your ntpd instances.
Other fixes:
* Coverity submission process updated from Coverity 5 to Coverity 7.
The NTP codebase has been undergoing regular Coverity scans on an
ongoing basis since 2006. As part of our recent upgrade from
Coverity 5 to Coverity 7, Coverity identified 16 nits in some of
the newly-written Unity test programs. These were fixed.
* [Bug 2829] Clean up pipe_fds in ntpd.c perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2887] stratum -1 config results as showing value 99
- fudge stratum should only accept values [0..16]. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2932] Update leapsecond file info in miscopt.html. CWoodbury, HStenn.
* [Bug 2934] tests/ntpd/t-ntp_scanner.c has a magic constant wired in. HMurray
* [Bug 2944] errno is not preserved properly in ntpdate after sendto call.
- applied patch by Christos Zoulas. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2952] Peer associations broken by fix for Bug 2901/CVE-2015-7704.
* [Bug 2954] Version 4.2.8p4 crashes on startup on some OSes.
- fixed data race conditions in threaded DNS worker. perlinger@ntp.org
- limit threading warm-up to linux; FreeBSD bombs on it. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2957] 'unsigned int' vs 'size_t' format clash. perlinger@ntp.org
- accept key file only if there are no parsing errors
- fixed size_t/u_int format clash
- fixed wrong use of 'strlcpy'
* [Bug 2958] ntpq: fatal error messages need a final newline. Craig Leres.
* [Bug 2962] truncation of size_t/ptrdiff_t on 64bit targets. perlinger@ntp.org
- fixed several other warnings (cast-alignment, missing const, missing prototypes)
- promote use of 'size_t' for values that express a size
- use ptr-to-const for read-only arguments
- make sure SOCKET values are not truncated (win32-specific)
- format string fixes
* [Bug 2965] Local clock didn't work since 4.2.8p4. Martin Burnicki.
* [Bug 2967] ntpdate command suffers an assertion failure
- fixed ntp_rfc2553.c to return proper address length. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2969] Seg fault from ntpq/mrulist when looking at server with
lots of clients. perlinger@ntp.org
* [Bug 2971] ntpq bails on ^C: select fails: Interrupted system call
- changed stacked/nested handling of CTRL-C. perlinger@ntp.org
* Unity cleanup for FreeBSD-6.4. Harlan Stenn.
* Unity test cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
* Libevent autoconf pthread fixes for FreeBSD-10. Harlan Stenn.
* Header cleanup in tests/sandbox/uglydate.c. Harlan Stenn.
* Header cleanup in tests/libntp/sfptostr.c. Harlan Stenn.
* Quiet a warning from clang. Harlan Stenn.
pkgsrc change:
* Remove duplicated HTML documents.
* Install some addtional documents.
Changes are too many to write here, please refer NEWS files and this
release fixes security problems.
October 2015 NTP Security Vulnerability Announcement (Medium)
NTF's NTP Project has been notified of the following 13 low- and
medium-severity vulnerabilities that are fixed in ntp-4.2.8p4, released on
Wednesday, 21 October 2015:
* Bug 2941 CVE-2015-7871 NAK to the Future: Symmetric association
authentication bypass via crypto-NAK (Cisco ASIG)
* Bug 2922 CVE-2015-7855 decodenetnum() will ASSERT botch instead of returning
FAIL on some bogus values (IDA)
* Bug 2921 CVE-2015-7854 Password Length Memory Corruption
Vulnerability. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2920 CVE-2015-7853 Invalid length data provided by a custom refclock
driver could cause a buffer overflow. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2919 CVE-2015-7852 ntpq atoascii() Memory Corruption
Vulnerability. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2918 CVE-2015-7851 saveconfig Directory Traversal
Vulnerability. (OpenVMS) (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2917 CVE-2015-7850 remote config logfile-keyfile. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2916 CVE-2015-7849 trusted key use-after-free. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2913 CVE-2015-7848 mode 7 loop counter underrun. (Cisco TALOS)
* Bug 2909 CVE-2015-7701 Slow memory leak in CRYPTO_ASSOC. (Tenable)
* Bug 2902 : CVE-2015-7703 configuration directives "pidfile" and "driftfile"
should only be allowed locally. (RedHat)
* Bug 2901 : CVE-2015-7704, CVE-2015-7705 Clients that receive a KoD should
validate the origin timestamp field. (Boston University)
* Bug 2899 : CVE-2015-7691, CVE-2015-7692, CVE-2015-7702 Incomplete autokey
data packet length checks. (Tenable)
The only generally-exploitable bug in the above list is the crypto-NAK bug,
which has a CVSS2 score of 6.4.
Additionally, three bugs that have already been fixed in ntp-4.2.8 but were
not fixed in ntp-4.2.6 as it was EOL'd have a security component, but are all
below 1.8 CVSS score, so we're reporting them here:
* Bug 2382 : Peer precision < -31 gives division by zero
* Bug 1774 : Segfaults if cryptostats enabled when built without OpenSSL
* Bug 1593 : ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error
Please refer NEWS and ChangeLog for full changes.
NTP 4.2.8p3 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/06/29)
Focus: 1 Security fix. Bug fixes and enhancements. Leap-second improvements.
Severity: MEDIUM
Security Fix:
* [Sec 2853] Crafted remote config packet can crash some versions of
ntpd. Aleksis Kauppinen, Juergen Perlinger, Harlan Stenn.
Under specific circumstances an attacker can send a crafted packet to
cause a vulnerable ntpd instance to crash. This requires each of the
following to be true:
1) ntpd set up to allow remote configuration (not allowed by default), and
2) knowledge of the configuration password, and
3) access to a computer entrusted to perform remote configuration.
This vulnerability is considered low-risk.
New features in this release:
Optional (disabled by default) support to have ntpd provide smeared
leap second time. A specially built and configured ntpd will only
offer smeared time in response to client packets. These response
packets will also contain a "refid" of 254.a.b.c, where the 24 bits
of a, b, and c encode the amount of smear in a 2:22 integer:fraction
format. See README.leapsmear and http://bugs.ntp.org/2855 for more
information.
*IF YOU CHOOSE TO CONFIGURE NTPD TO PROVIDE LEAP SMEAR TIME*
*BE SURE YOU DO NOT OFFER THAT TIME ON PUBLIC TIMESERVERS.*
We've imported the Unity test framework, and have begun converting
the existing google-test items to this new framework. If you want
to write new tests or change old ones, you'll need to have ruby
installed. You don't need ruby to run the test suite.
NTP 4.2.8p2 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/04/xx)
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
Severity: MEDIUM
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following medium-severity vulnerabilities involving private key
authentication:
* [Sec 2779] ntpd accepts unauthenticated packets with symmetric key crypto.
References: Sec 2779 / CVE-2015-1798 / VU#374268
Affects: All NTP4 releases starting with ntp-4.2.5p99 up to but not
including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric keys
to authenticate remote associations.
CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
Summary: When ntpd is configured to use a symmetric key to authenticate
a remote NTP server/peer, it checks if the NTP message
authentication code (MAC) in received packets is valid, but not if
there actually is any MAC included. Packets without a MAC are
accepted as if they had a valid MAC. This allows a MITM attacker to
send false packets that are accepted by the client/peer without
having to know the symmetric key. The attacker needs to know the
transmit timestamp of the client to match it in the forged reply
and the false reply needs to reach the client before the genuine
reply from the server. The attacker doesn't necessarily need to be
relaying the packets between the client and the server.
Authentication using autokey doesn't have this problem as there is
a check that requires the key ID to be larger than NTP_MAXKEY,
which fails for packets without a MAC.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
Configure ntpd with enough time sources and monitor it properly.
Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.
* [Sec 2781] Authentication doesn't protect symmetric associations against
DoS attacks.
References: Sec 2781 / CVE-2015-1799 / VU#374268
Affects: All NTP releases starting with at least xntp3.3wy up to but
not including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric
key authentication.
CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
Note: the CVSS base Score for this issue could be 4.3 or lower, and
it could be higher than 5.4.
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
Summary: An attacker knowing that NTP hosts A and B are peering with
each other (symmetric association) can send a packet to host A
with source address of B which will set the NTP state variables
on A to the values sent by the attacker. Host A will then send
on its next poll to B a packet with originate timestamp that
doesn't match the transmit timestamp of B and the packet will
be dropped. If the attacker does this periodically for both
hosts, they won't be able to synchronize to each other. This is
a known denial-of-service attack, described at
https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/onwire.html .
According to the document the NTP authentication is supposed to
protect symmetric associations against this attack, but that
doesn't seem to be the case. The state variables are updated even
when authentication fails and the peers are sending packets with
originate timestamps that don't match the transmit timestamps on
the receiving side.
This seems to be a very old problem, dating back to at least
xntp3.3wy. It's also in the NTPv3 (RFC 1305) and NTPv4 (RFC 5905)
specifications, so other NTP implementations with support for
symmetric associations and authentication may be vulnerable too.
An update to the NTP RFC to correct this error is in-process.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
Note that for users of autokey, this specific style of MITM attack
is simply a long-known potential problem.
Configure ntpd with appropriate time sources and monitor ntpd.
Alert your staff if problems are detected.
Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.
* New script: update-leap
The update-leap script will verify and if necessary, update the
leap-second definition file.
It requires the following commands in order to work:
wget logger tr sed shasum
Some may choose to run this from cron. It needs more portability testing.
NTP 4.2.8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2014/12/18)
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
Severity: HIGH
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following high-severity vulnerabilities:
* Weak default key in config_auth().
References: [Sec 2665] / CVE-2014-9293 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
Vulnerable Versions: all releases prior to 4.2.7p11
Date Resolved: 28 Jan 2010
Summary: If no 'auth' key is set in the configuration file, ntpd
would generate a random key on the fly. There were two
problems with this: 1) the generated key was 31 bits in size,
and 2) it used the (now weak) ntp_random() function, which was
seeded with a 32-bit value and could only provide 32 bits of
entropy. This was sufficient back in the late 1990s when the
code was written. Not today.
Mitigation: Upgrade to 4.2.7p11 or later.
Credit: This vulnerability was noticed in ntp-4.2.6 by Neel Mehta
of the Google Security Team.
* Non-cryptographic random number generator with weak seed used by
ntp-keygen to generate symmetric keys.
References: [Sec 2666] / CVE-2014-9294 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
Vulnerable Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.7p230
Date Resolved: Dev (4.2.7p230) 01 Nov 2011
Summary: Prior to ntp-4.2.7p230 ntp-keygen used a weak seed to
prepare a random number generator that was of good quality back
in the late 1990s. The random numbers produced was then used to
generate symmetric keys. In ntp-4.2.8 we use a current-technology
cryptographic random number generator, either RAND_bytes from
OpenSSL, or arc4random().
Mitigation: Upgrade to 4.2.7p230 or later.
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered in ntp-4.2.6 by
Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
* Buffer overflow in crypto_recv()
References: Sec 2667 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
Versions: All releases before 4.2.8
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary: When Autokey Authentication is enabled (i.e. the ntp.conf
file contains a 'crypto pw ...' directive) a remote attacker
can send a carefully crafted packet that can overflow a stack
buffer and potentially allow malicious code to be executed
with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
Mitigation: Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later, or
Disable Autokey Authentication by removing, or commenting out,
all configuration directives beginning with the crypto keyword
in your ntp.conf file.
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
Google Security Team.
* Buffer overflow in ctl_putdata()
References: Sec 2668 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary: A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that
can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious
code to be executed with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
Mitigation: Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
Google Security Team.
* Buffer overflow in configure()
References: Sec 2669 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary: A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that
can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious
code to be executed with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
Mitigation: Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
Google Security Team.
* receive(): missing return on error
References: Sec 2670 / CVE-2014-9296 / VU#852879
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 5.0
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
Summary: Code in ntp_proto.c:receive() was missing a 'return;' in
the code path where an error was detected, which meant
processing did not stop when a specific rare error occurred.
We haven't found a way for this bug to affect system integrity.
If there is no way to affect system integrity the base CVSS
score for this bug is 0. If there is one avenue through which
system integrity can be partially affected, the base score
becomes a 5. If system integrity can be partially affected
via all three integrity metrics, the CVSS base score become 7.5.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later,
or Remove or comment out all configuration directives
beginning with the crypto keyword in your ntp.conf file.
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
Google Security Team.
See http://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
Do it for all packages that
* mention perl, or
* have a directory name starting with p5-*, or
* depend on a package starting with p5-
like last time, for 5.18, where this didn't lead to complaints.
Let me know if you have any this time.
are replaced with .include "../../devel/readline/buildlink3.mk", and
USE_GNU_READLINE are removed,
* .include "../../devel/readline/buildlink3.mk" without USE_GNU_READLINE
are replaced with .include "../../mk/readline.buildlink3.mk".
a) refer 'perl' in their Makefile, or
b) have a directory name of p5-*, or
c) have any dependency on any p5-* package
Like last time, where this caused no complaints.
implementation in MirBSD enforces this.
Use ${MKDIR} to create the target directory before running pax.
This does not actually fix the build on MirBSD (it needs some more
work in the configure), it is at least a start.
Focus: Security and Bug Fixes
Severity: HIGH
This release fixes the following high-severity vulnerability:
* [Sec 1151] Remote exploit if autokey is enabled. CVE-2009-1252
See http://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
If autokey is enabled (if ntp.conf contains a "crypto pw whatever"
line) then a carefully crafted packet sent to the machine will cause
a buffer overflow and possible execution of injected code, running
with the privileges of the ntpd process (often root).
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to Chris Ries of CMU.
This release fixes the following low-severity vulnerabilities:
* [Sec 1144] limited (two byte) buffer overflow in ntpq. CVE-2009-0159
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to Geoff Keating of Apple.
* [Sec 1149] use SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE on Windows
Credit for finding this issue goes to Dave Hart.
This release fixes a number of bugs and adds some improvements:
* Improved logging
* Fix many compiler warnings
* Many fixes and improvements for Windows
* Adds support for AIX 6.1
* Resolves some issues under MacOS X and Solaris
