msudir allows enabled users to easily manage 'setuid' scripts and
binaries. A directory containing scripts or other executables is
created inside the basedir for each destination user. Any user is
then able to invoke the script 'bar' in the directory 'fu' via
'msudir fu/bar'. The script will be run under the uid and primary
gid of the destination user. Some effort is taken to sanitise the
arguments and environment, but msudir should not be used without
an understanding of the security implication.
msudir allows enabled users to easily manage 'setuid'
scripts and binaries. A directory containing scripts or
other executables is created inside the basedir for each
destination user. Any user is then able to invoke the script
'bar' in the directory 'fu' via 'msudir fu/bar'. The script
will be run under the uid and primary gid of the destination
user. Some effort is taken to sanitise the arguments and
environment, but msudir should not be used without an
understanding of the security implication.
* An experimental interface to GnuPG's --edit-key functionality is
introduced, see gpgme_op_edit.
* The new gpgme_import_ext function provides a convenient access to
the number of processed keys.
* It is possible to use an outside event loop for the I/O to the
crypto engine by setting the I/O callbacks with gpgme_set_io_cbs.
* GPGME_ATTR_OTRUST is implemented now.
* A first step toward thread safeness has been achieved, see the
documentation for details. Supported thread libraries are pthread
and Pth.
* All error output of the gpgsm backend is send to the bit bucket.
* The signature verification functions are extended. Instead of
always returning GPGME_SIG_STATUS_GOOD, the functions new codes for
expired signatures.
* The current passphrase callback and progress meter callback can be
retrieved with the new functions gpgme_get_passphrase_cb and
gpgme_get_progress_cb respectively.
* gpgme_op_encrypt can be called with RECIPIENTS being 0. In this
case, symmetric encryption is performed. Note that this requires a
passphrase from the user.
* More information is returned for X.509 certificates.
* Interface changes relative to the 0.3.4 release:
* gpgme_op_encrypt does now fail with GPGME_Invalid_Recipients if
some recipients have been invalid, whereas earlier versions
succeeded in this case.
* gpgme_op_verify now allows to pass an uninitialized data object as
its plaintext argument to check for normal and cleartext
signatures. The plaintext is then returned in the data object.
* New interfaces gpgme_set_include_certs and gpgme_get_include_certs
to set and get the number of certifications to include in S/MIME
signed messages.
* New interfaces gpgme_op_encrypt_sign and gpgme_op_encrypt_sign_start
to encrypt and sign a message in a combined operation.
* New interface gpgme_op_keylist_ext_start to search for multiple patterns.
* gpgme_key_get_ulong_attr supports the GPGME_ATTR_EXPIRE attribute.
* Interface changes relative to the 0.3.3 release:
* Fix the Makefile in jnlib.
* Fix the test suite (hopefully). It should clean up all its state
with `make check' now.
* Remove erroneous dependency on libgcrypt in jnlib.
* There is a Texinfo manual documenting the API.
* The gpgme_set_keylist_mode function returns an error, and changed
its meaning. It is no longer usable to select between normal and
fast mode (newer versions of GnuPG will always be fast), but
selects between local keyring, remote keyserver, or both.
For this, two new macros are defined, GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_LOCAL
and GPGME_KEYLIST_MODE_EXTERN. To make it possible to modify the
current setting, a fucntion gpgme_get_keylist_mode was added to
retrieve the current mode.
* gpgme_wait accepts a new argument STATUS to return the error status
of the operation on the context. Its definition is closer to
waitpid() now than before.
* The LENGTH argument to gpgme_data_new_from_filepart changed its
type from off_t to the unsigned size_t.
* The R_HD argument to the GpgmePassphraseCb type changed its type
from void* to void**.
* New interface gpgme_op_trustlist_end() to match
gpgme_op_keylist_end().
* The CryptPlug modules have been renamed to gpgme-openpgp and
gpgme-smime, and they are installed in pkglibdir by `make install'.
* An idle function can be registered with gpgme_register_idle().
* The GpgSM backend supports key generation with gpgme_op_genkey().
buildlink2.mk files back into the main trunk. This provides sufficient
buildlink2 infrastructure to start merging other packages from the
buildlink2 branch that have already been converted to use the buildlink2
framework.
Avcheck is a simple program that allows you to call an antivirus software
in order to check mail messages for viruses before actual delivery from
within a Mail Transfer Agent, or MTA.
/var/run directory, tmpfs is mounted on /var/run by default.
/var/run does not exist by default on Solaris 7, but some daemons
appear to make use of it after it is created (eg. syslogd).
Changes :
- further fixes for Net::SSLeay::Handle from jbowlin@@_linklint.org
- applied minor patch by Mark Veltzer <mark@@veltzer._org> to Makefile.PL
- Added SSL_peek patch to ssl_read_until from
Peter Behroozi <peter@@fhpwireless_.com> --Sampo
- Improved Windows instructions per Marcel Bucher <marcle@bucher._cc>
the in-tree openssl is < 0.9.6f, a previous package build has installed
the openssl-0.9.6g package, but the BUILDLINK_DEPENDS.openssl value is
not initialised, so that the package infrastructure tries to build and
install the openssl-0.9.6g package again.
NetBSD-patched codebase won't apply cleanly (or at all) without the NetBSD
patch. Therefore, remove the `.if ${OS}' condition for applying the patch,
so Solaris and Darwin start with the same codebase. Fix as needed.
a stunning DoS vulnerability, fixed in 0.9.6f:
*) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the
assertions could call abort()).
[Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
Regenerate the netbsd patch. This is now a clean diff against the
vendor tag, with version-number-only changes elided.
Partially revert "crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rand/randfile.c", version
1.4 (via additional pkgsrc patch), to give this a shot to compile on
NetBSD-1.4.2 and earlier, which had no strlcpy() or strlcat().
Assemble the shared library without "-Bsymbolic", mainly to give this
a shot at linking on NetBSD-a.out (untested).
${LOCALBASE}/bin/perl.
* Refer to the make program used to drive the build and installation as
"${MAKE_PROGRAM}".
* Instead of explicitly setting PKG_SYSCONFBASE=/etc, use the pkg-specific
override PKG_SYSCONFDIR.openssl, and optionally set it so that the
user still has the option of overriding its value.
* Use bsd.pkg.install.mk to install the default config file (openssl.cnf)
and to create and remove the extra config directories. This lets us
reemove the extra lines in PLIST that do the same thing.
out-of-date very frequently, and it's sole purpose seems to be to provide
the uvscan package with the update_dat script so that uvscan can keep
up-to-date with the latest virus definitions.
A MESSAGE file has been added to security/uvscan that recommends running
"update_dat" to update the virus definitions database to the most recent
version after installation. The update_dat script has also been rewritten
to allow the new syntax "update -f <DATFILE>" to update from an already-
downloaded DATFILE, so users will still be able to do bulk downloads to
removable media on a machine with a fat connection and be able to compile
and install a usable uvscan package on another machine.
Bump the PKGREVISION on uvscan to 1 and mark the CONFLICT with the obsolete
uvscan-dat packages.
libc functions which use varargs and printf-style formatting
operators. In many situations these can cause security vulnerabilities
in the application if it runs with privileges (setugid, or listening
to a network socket, etc).
An example of the kind of situation pscan looks for is the following:
variable = "%s"; /* or malicious user input */
sprintf(buffer, variable); /* BAD! */
WWW: http://www.striker.ottawa.on.ca/~aland/pscan/
This package provides Secure Shell client and server for V.2 SSH protocol
from SSH Communications Security.
Based on PR 15358 from Greg A. Woods <woods@planix.com>.
and also changes the ABI of "libcrypto" and "libssl". (So the shared
library majors and buildlink requirements are bumped, too.) The code
base is now synced perfectly with NetBSD HEAD and netbsd-1-6 branches
as of 2002-08-04, the optimization levels are reduced to "-O2", but
I've retained some of the processor optimization flags and different code
path #defines in the "Configure" script, just to keep things interesting.
The default "certs" directory on NetBSD is now "/etc/openssl/certs", to
give continuity to those who find themselves using the package system's
"openssl" after upgrading a package that formerly used the base system's.
[Suggested by itojun.] The best way to avoid such problems, however, is
to upgrade your base system *first*.
I'm making use of the new and improved build system as much as possible.
This gives us a cleaner way to make shared libraries and real man pages,
but loses many of the symlinks to the openssl binary.
I've culled items from the "CHANGES" file that appear to have security
implications or are particularly interesting for NetBSD users, below.
My comments are marked off with '===>'.
===> This is from the netbsd-20020804-patch
*) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
and get fix the header length calculation.
[Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others),
Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]
*) New option
SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure
that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.
As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some
broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL.
SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL
implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and
's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many
applications.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Changes in security patch:
Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
F30602-01-2-0537.
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
supplied buffer.
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
happen in practice.
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
*) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found
in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment
before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs
with data potentially chosen by the attacker.
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]
*) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>:
PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
to traverse all of 'state'.
1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred
to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second
measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
further strengthens the PRNG.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against
SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is
around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98
paper.)
Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a
random 'decryption result') did not work properly because
ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would
detect the supposedly ignored error.
Both problems are now fixed.
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]
===> This is our ABI change.
*) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes
with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris
and UnixWare.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid.
New function OPENSSL_issetugid().
[Ulf Moeller]
*) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to
avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side
always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original
result of the server certificate verification.)
[Lutz Jaenicke]
===> package doesn't doesn't do this. We'll bump major versions
===> as necessary.
*) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with
the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the
shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should
be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Rework the system to generate shared libraries:
- Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and
if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0
to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for
that.
- Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible.
- Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries.
- When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the
static ones.
