Changelog since previous version in pkgsrc
crusdesaml-1.8 2017-05-26
Fix crash introduced server side in 1.6 for saml_log()
crusdesaml-1.7 2017-05-22
Only iterate on XML_ELEMENT_NODE nodes
crusdesaml-1.6 2017-05-20
Typos in man pages (Florian Best)
Don't log the password length if it is too small (Florian Best)
Stop if wxmlXPathRegisterNs failed (Florian Best)
autoconf: Remove duplicate $(DESTDIR) (Florian Best)
PAM: Require only one provider (Florian Best)
PAM: No SONAME versioning (Philipp Hahn)
autoconf: Only strictness foreign (Philipp Hahn)
PAM: fix static PAM module build (Philipp Hahn)
Hide internal symbols (Philipp Hahn)
Fix varadic function SIGSEGV (Philipp Hahn)
Fix crash when using saml_log()/saml_error() in SASL client plugin
crusdesaml-1.5 2012-11-13
mod_shib2 compatibility, debug messages (Jan Tomasek)
Problems found locating distfiles:
Package f-prot-antivirus6-fs-bin: missing distfile fp-NetBSD.x86.32-fs-6.2.3.tar.gz
Package f-prot-antivirus6-ws-bin: missing distfile fp-NetBSD.x86.32-ws-6.2.3.tar.gz
Package libidea: missing distfile libidea-0.8.2b.tar.gz
Package openssh: missing distfile openssh-7.1p1-hpn-20150822.diff.bz2
Package uvscan: missing distfile vlp4510e.tar.Z
Otherwise, existing SHA1 digests verified and found to be the same on
the machine holding the existing distfiles (morden). All existing
SHA1 digests retained for now as an audit trail.
protocols. To use SASL, a protocol includes a command for identifying and
authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating protection
of subsequent protocol interactions. If its use is negotiated, a security
layer is inserted between the protocol and the connection.
PAM provides a way to develop programs that are independent of
authentication scheme. These programs need "authentication modules" to be
attached to them at run-time in order to work. Which authentication module
is to be attached is dependent upon the local system setup and is at the
discretion of the local system administrator.
This package contains a SASL plugin and a PAM module that perform a crude
check on a SAML authentication assertion. The assertion signature and date
are verified, and access is granted on behalf ot the user taked for a
onfigurable attribute.
The only protection against replay attacks is the assertion validity dates
checks, this authentication is therefore secure only if the SAML
authentication assertion remains secret. The assertion has the same role
as a web cookie used for authentication.
