1.4.3 (2020-02-02)
------------------
Security Fixes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- In Waitress version 1.4.2 a new regular expression was added to validate the
headers that Waitress receives to make sure that it matches RFC7230.
Unfortunately the regular expression was written in a way that with invalid
input it leads to catastrophic backtracking which allows for a Denial of
Service and CPU usage going to a 100%.
This was reported by Fil Zembowicz to the Pylons Project. Please see
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-73m2-3pwg-5fgc
for more information.
1.4.2 (2020-01-02)
------------------
Security Fixes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- This is a follow-up to the fix introduced in 1.4.1 to tighten up the way
Waitress strips whitespace from header values. This makes sure Waitress won't
accidentally treat non-printable characters as whitespace and lead to a
potental HTTP request smuggling/splitting security issue.
Thanks to ZeddYu Lu for the extra test cases.
Please see the security advisory for more information:
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-m5ff-3wj3-8ph4
CVE-ID: CVE-2019-16789
Bugfixes
~~~~~~~~
- Updated the regex used to validate header-field content to match the errata
that was published for RFC7230.
See: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7230&eid=4189
1.4.1 (2019-12-24)
------------------
Security Fixes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Waitress did not properly validate that the HTTP headers it received were
properly formed, thereby potentially allowing a front-end server to treat a
request different from Waitress. This could lead to HTTP request
smuggling/splitting.
Please see the security advisory for more information:
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-m5ff-3wj3-8ph4
CVE-ID: CVE-2019-16789
1.4.0 (2019-12-20)
------------------
Bugfixes
~~~~~~~~
- Waitress used to slam the door shut on HTTP pipelined requests without
setting the ``Connection: close`` header as appropriate in the response. This
is of course not very friendly. Waitress now explicitly sets the header when
responding with an internally generated error such as 400 Bad Request or 500
Internal Server Error to notify the remote client that it will be closing the
connection after the response is sent.
- Waitress no longer allows any spaces to exist between the header field-name
and the colon. While waitress did not strip the space and thereby was not
vulnerable to any potential header field-name confusion, it should have sent
back a 400 Bad Request. See https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/issues/273
Security Fixes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Waitress implemented a "MAY" part of the RFC7230
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.5) which states:
Although the line terminator for the start-line and header fields is
the sequence CRLF, a recipient MAY recognize a single LF as a line
terminator and ignore any preceding CR.
Unfortunately if a front-end server does not parse header fields with an LF
the same way as it does those with a CRLF it can lead to the front-end and
the back-end server parsing the same HTTP message in two different ways. This
can lead to a potential for HTTP request smuggling/splitting whereby Waitress
may see two requests while the front-end server only sees a single HTTP
message.
For more information I can highly recommend the blog post by ZeddYu Lu
https://blog.zeddyu.info/2019/12/08/HTTP-Smuggling-en/
Please see the security advisory for more information:
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-pg36-wpm5-g57p
CVE-ID: CVE-2019-16785
- Waitress used to treat LF the same as CRLF in ``Transfer-Encoding: chunked``
requests, while the maintainer doesn't believe this could lead to a security
issue, this is no longer supported and all chunks are now validated to be
properly framed with CRLF as required by RFC7230.
- Waitress now validates that the ``Transfer-Encoding`` header contains only
transfer codes that it is able to decode. At the moment that includes the
only valid header value being ``chunked``.
That means that if the following header is sent:
``Transfer-Encoding: gzip, chunked``
Waitress will send back a 501 Not Implemented with an error message stating
as such, as while Waitress supports ``chunked`` encoding it does not support
``gzip`` and it is unable to pass that to the underlying WSGI environment
correctly.
Waitress DOES NOT implement support for ``Transfer-Encoding: identity``
eventhough ``identity`` was valid in RFC2616, it was removed in RFC7230.
Please update your clients to remove the ``Transfer-Encoding`` header if the
only transfer coding is ``identity`` or update your client to use
``Transfer-Encoding: chunked`` instead of ``Transfer-Encoding: identity,
chunked``.
Please see the security advisory for more information:
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-g2xc-35jw-c63p
CVE-ID: CVE-2019-16786
- While validating the ``Transfer-Encoding`` header, Waitress now properly
handles line-folded ``Transfer-Encoding`` headers or those that contain
multiple comma seperated values. This closes a potential issue where a
front-end server may treat the request as being a chunked request (and thus
ignoring the Content-Length) and Waitress using the Content-Length as it was
looking for the single value ``chunked`` and did not support comma seperated
values.
- Waitress used to explicitly set the Content-Length header to 0 if it was
unable to parse it as an integer (for example if the Content-Length header
was sent twice (and thus folded together), or was invalid) thereby allowing
for a potential request to be split and treated as two requests by HTTP
pipelining support in Waitress. If Waitress is now unable to parse the
Content-Length header, a 400 Bad Request is sent back to the client.
Please see the security advisory for more information:
https://github.com/Pylons/waitress/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppp-gpcr-7qf6
37693dc597