pkgsrc/net/wpa_supplicant/distinfo
maya 7ce04bb9d3 wpa_supplicant: apply upstream patch for security advisory
Patches from Juoni Malinen and Mathy Vanhoef.

Fixes:
- CVE-2017-13077
- CVE-2017-13078
- CVE-2017-13079
- CVE-2017-13080
- CVE-2017-13081
- CVE-2017-13082
- CVE-2017-13086
- CVE-2017-13087
- CVE-2017-13088

Tested by leot, thanks!

Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake

Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.

This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.

Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key

Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.


Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
 Mode cases

This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.

Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK

Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.

This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.

Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce

The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.

Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.

Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration

Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.

For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.

As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.

Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
 request

Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.

Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames

The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
2017-10-16 10:26:21 +00:00

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$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.10 2017/10/16 10:26:21 maya Exp $
SHA1 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 8189704e257c3e9f8300c49dc6e49a381b1d6299
RMD160 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2fb26394d22ac3acde2d9d7c6543af8eaac9c55a
SHA512 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 46442cddb6ca043b8b08d143908f149954c238e0f3a57a0df73ca4fab9c1acd91b078f3f26375a1d99cd1d65625986328018c735d8705882c8f91e389cad28a6
Size (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2753524 bytes
SHA1 (patch-aa) = 998ba9cc4ef9ebd0b629a6368957da0f1159dda0
SHA1 (patch-src_ap_ieee802__11.c) = 8edce32847c55e0ac49b395b2aa5f370c6055bd5
SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.c) = 2631770dfe42fba748ab4be4174998fff30e1f24
SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth.h) = 8e44f75449e656a710747a8cd581ff9d05c5eff6
SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__ft.c) = ed4a15b05c46bb88ce9bf597c65088311fa47852
SHA1 (patch-src_ap_wpa__auth__i.h) = f33a5214d0c8071f7eed9dd5fd67b6b32f0e856c
SHA1 (patch-src_common_wpa__common.h) = 853adbcf1749d7ccd80feeb4aa6aa8ba8ac0a7e8
SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_tdls.c) = b695b8096661894e8e473ccb09386c33a8353a45
SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa.c) = 4a4d966e68481eef76e7323e3d69c4c5bf8e6432
SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__ft.c) = c48b83ee5e10289d21ac3310ab92684dc69bdced
SHA1 (patch-src_rsn__supp_wpa__i.h) = f2c9260cf6bdf59493f9870fbedc0d4e0881b641
SHA1 (patch-wpa__supplicant_wnm__sta.c) = 818b9fcabeac9d3c6ced075a5a804b34c0d56774