4bbf6aab1c
These minor releases include 2 security fixes following the security policy: - path/filepath: recognize \??\ as a Root Local Device path prefix. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. The filepath package did not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. It will now convert this path into .\??\b. IsAbs did not report paths beginning with \??\ as absolute. It now does so. VolumeName now reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. Join(`\`, `??`, `b`) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. It will now convert this to \.\??\b. This is CVE-2023-45283 and https://go.dev/issue/63713. - path/filepath: recognize device names with trailing spaces and superscripts The IsLocal function did not correctly detect reserved names in some cases: reserved names followed by spaces, such as "COM1 ". "COM" or "LPT" followed by a superscript 1, 2, or 3. IsLocal now correctly reports these names as non-local. This is CVE-2023-45284 and https://go.dev/issue/63713. |
||
---|---|---|
.. | ||
patches | ||
ALTERNATIVES | ||
DESCR | ||
distinfo | ||
Makefile | ||
PLIST |