1638 lines
50 KiB
JavaScript
1638 lines
50 KiB
JavaScript
import * as TAGS from './tags.js';
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import * as ATTRS from './attrs.js';
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import * as EXPRESSIONS from './regexp.js';
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import {
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addToSet,
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clone,
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entries,
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freeze,
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arrayForEach,
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arrayPop,
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arrayPush,
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stringMatch,
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stringReplace,
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stringToLowerCase,
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stringToString,
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stringIndexOf,
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stringTrim,
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regExpTest,
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typeErrorCreate,
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lookupGetter,
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create,
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} from './utils.js';
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const getGlobal = function () {
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return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
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};
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/**
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* Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
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* Don't export this function outside this module!
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* @param {?TrustedTypePolicyFactory} trustedTypes The policy factory.
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* @param {HTMLScriptElement} purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
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* @return {?TrustedTypePolicy} The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
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* are not supported or creating the policy failed).
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*/
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const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function (trustedTypes, purifyHostElement) {
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if (
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typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' ||
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typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function'
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) {
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return null;
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}
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// Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
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// by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
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// Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
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let suffix = null;
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const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
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if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
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suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
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}
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const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
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try {
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return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
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createHTML(html) {
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return html;
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},
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createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
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return scriptUrl;
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},
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});
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} catch (_) {
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// Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
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// already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
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// if TT are enforced.
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console.warn(
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'TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.'
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);
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return null;
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}
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};
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function createDOMPurify(window = getGlobal()) {
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const DOMPurify = (root) => createDOMPurify(root);
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/**
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* Version label, exposed for easier checks
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* if DOMPurify is up to date or not
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*/
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DOMPurify.version = VERSION;
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/**
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* Array of elements that DOMPurify removed during sanitation.
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* Empty if nothing was removed.
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*/
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DOMPurify.removed = [];
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if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== 9) {
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// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
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// so that you can pass your own Window
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DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
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return DOMPurify;
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}
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let { document } = window;
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const originalDocument = document;
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const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
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const {
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DocumentFragment,
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HTMLTemplateElement,
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Node,
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Element,
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NodeFilter,
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NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap,
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HTMLFormElement,
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DOMParser,
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trustedTypes,
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} = window;
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const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
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const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
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const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
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const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
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const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
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// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
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// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
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// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
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// a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
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// document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
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// is inherited.
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if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
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const template = document.createElement('template');
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if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
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document = template.content.ownerDocument;
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}
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}
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let trustedTypesPolicy;
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let emptyHTML = '';
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const {
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implementation,
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createNodeIterator,
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createDocumentFragment,
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getElementsByTagName,
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} = document;
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const { importNode } = originalDocument;
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let hooks = {};
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/**
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* Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
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*/
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DOMPurify.isSupported =
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typeof entries === 'function' &&
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typeof getParentNode === 'function' &&
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implementation &&
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implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
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const {
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MUSTACHE_EXPR,
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ERB_EXPR,
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TMPLIT_EXPR,
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DATA_ATTR,
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ARIA_ATTR,
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IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
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ATTR_WHITESPACE,
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} = EXPRESSIONS;
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let { IS_ALLOWED_URI } = EXPRESSIONS;
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/**
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* We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
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* don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
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*/
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/* allowed element names */
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let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
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const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
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...TAGS.html,
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...TAGS.svg,
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...TAGS.svgFilters,
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...TAGS.mathMl,
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...TAGS.text,
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]);
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/* Allowed attribute names */
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let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
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const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [
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...ATTRS.html,
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...ATTRS.svg,
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...ATTRS.mathMl,
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...ATTRS.xml,
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]);
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/*
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* Configure how DOMPUrify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
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* @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
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* @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
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* @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
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*/
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let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(
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create(null, {
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tagNameCheck: {
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writable: true,
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configurable: false,
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enumerable: true,
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value: null,
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},
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attributeNameCheck: {
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writable: true,
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configurable: false,
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enumerable: true,
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value: null,
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},
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allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
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writable: true,
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configurable: false,
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enumerable: true,
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value: false,
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},
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})
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);
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/* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
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let FORBID_TAGS = null;
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/* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
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let FORBID_ATTR = null;
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/* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
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let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
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/* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
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let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
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/* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
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let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
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/* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
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* Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
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let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;
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/* Output should be safe for common template engines.
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* This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
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*/
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let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
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/* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
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let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
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/* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
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let SET_CONFIG = false;
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/* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
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* document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
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let FORCE_BODY = false;
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/* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
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* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
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* If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
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*/
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let RETURN_DOM = false;
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/* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
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* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
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let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
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/* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
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* case Trusted Types are not supported */
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let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;
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/* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
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* This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
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*/
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let SANITIZE_DOM = true;
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/* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
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* properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
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*
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* HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
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* - Named Access on Window (§7.3.3)
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* - DOM Tree Accessors (§3.1.5)
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* - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (§4.10.3)
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* - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (§4.8.5)
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* - HTMLCollection (§4.2.10.2)
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*
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* Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
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* with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
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*/
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let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
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const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';
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/* Keep element content when removing element? */
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let KEEP_CONTENT = true;
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/* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
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* of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
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let IN_PLACE = false;
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/* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
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let USE_PROFILES = {};
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/* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
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let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
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const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, [
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'annotation-xml',
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'audio',
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'colgroup',
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'desc',
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'foreignobject',
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'head',
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'iframe',
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'math',
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'mi',
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'mn',
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'mo',
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'ms',
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'mtext',
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'noembed',
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'noframes',
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'noscript',
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'plaintext',
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'script',
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'style',
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'svg',
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'template',
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'thead',
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'title',
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'video',
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'xmp',
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]);
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/* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
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let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
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const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
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'audio',
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'video',
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'img',
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'source',
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'image',
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'track',
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]);
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/* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
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let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
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const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, [
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'alt',
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'class',
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'for',
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'id',
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'label',
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'name',
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'pattern',
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'placeholder',
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'role',
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'summary',
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'title',
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'value',
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'style',
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'xmlns',
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]);
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const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
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const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
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const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
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/* Document namespace */
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let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
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let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;
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/* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
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let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
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const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet(
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{},
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[MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE],
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stringToString
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);
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/* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
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let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = null;
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const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
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const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
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let transformCaseFunc = null;
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/* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
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let CONFIG = null;
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/* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
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/* ______________________________________________ */
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const formElement = document.createElement('form');
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const isRegexOrFunction = function (testValue) {
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return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
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};
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/**
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* _parseConfig
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*
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* @param {Object} cfg optional config literal
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*/
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// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
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const _parseConfig = function (cfg = {}) {
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if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
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return;
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}
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/* Shield configuration object from tampering */
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if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
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cfg = {};
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}
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/* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
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cfg = clone(cfg);
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PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
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// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
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SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1
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? (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE)
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: (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
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// HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
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transformCaseFunc =
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PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml'
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? stringToString
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: stringToLowerCase;
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|
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/* Set configuration parameters */
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ALLOWED_TAGS =
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'ALLOWED_TAGS' in cfg
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? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)
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: DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
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ALLOWED_ATTR =
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'ALLOWED_ATTR' in cfg
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? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)
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: DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
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ALLOWED_NAMESPACES =
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'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES' in cfg
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? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString)
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: DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
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URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES =
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'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR' in cfg
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? addToSet(
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clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), // eslint-disable-line indent
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cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
transformCaseFunc // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
) // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
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|
DATA_URI_TAGS =
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'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS' in cfg
|
|
? addToSet(
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clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
transformCaseFunc // eslint-disable-line indent
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|
) // eslint-disable-line indent
|
|
: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
|
|
FORBID_CONTENTS =
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|
'FORBID_CONTENTS' in cfg
|
|
? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc)
|
|
: DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
|
|
FORBID_TAGS =
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|
'FORBID_TAGS' in cfg
|
|
? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)
|
|
: {};
|
|
FORBID_ATTR =
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|
'FORBID_ATTR' in cfg
|
|
? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)
|
|
: {};
|
|
USE_PROFILES = 'USE_PROFILES' in cfg ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
|
|
ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
|
|
ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
|
|
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
|
|
WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
|
|
RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
|
|
FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
|
|
SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
|
|
SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
|
|
KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
|
|
IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
|
|
IS_ALLOWED_URI = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || EXPRESSIONS.IS_ALLOWED_URI;
|
|
NAMESPACE = cfg.NAMESPACE || HTML_NAMESPACE;
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};
|
|
if (
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|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&
|
|
isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck)
|
|
) {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck =
|
|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
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|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&
|
|
isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck)
|
|
) {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck =
|
|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&
|
|
typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements ===
|
|
'boolean'
|
|
) {
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements =
|
|
cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
RETURN_DOM = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse profile info */
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...TAGS.text]);
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = [];
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.html);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.html);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svgFilters);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.mathMl);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.mathMl);
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Merge configuration parameters */
|
|
if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {
|
|
if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {
|
|
if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {
|
|
addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) {
|
|
if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
|
|
FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
|
|
if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
|
|
if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
|
|
if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
|
|
addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
|
|
delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
|
|
if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate(
|
|
'TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.'
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate(
|
|
'TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.'
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
|
|
|
|
// Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
|
|
emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(
|
|
trustedTypes,
|
|
currentScript
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
|
|
emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
|
|
// Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
|
|
if (freeze) {
|
|
freeze(cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CONFIG = cfg;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, [
|
|
'mi',
|
|
'mo',
|
|
'mn',
|
|
'ms',
|
|
'mtext',
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, [
|
|
'foreignobject',
|
|
'desc',
|
|
'title',
|
|
'annotation-xml',
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
// Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
|
|
// namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
|
|
// so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
|
|
// HTML namespace.
|
|
const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, [
|
|
'title',
|
|
'style',
|
|
'font',
|
|
'a',
|
|
'script',
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
/* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
|
|
* so that we can perform the namespace checks
|
|
* correctly. */
|
|
const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, TAGS.svg);
|
|
addToSet(ALL_SVG_TAGS, TAGS.svgFilters);
|
|
addToSet(ALL_SVG_TAGS, TAGS.svgDisallowed);
|
|
|
|
const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, TAGS.mathMl);
|
|
addToSet(ALL_MATHML_TAGS, TAGS.mathMlDisallowed);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @param {Element} element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
|
|
* @returns {boolean} Return false if the element has a
|
|
* namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
|
|
* return. Return true otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _checkValidNamespace = function (element) {
|
|
let parent = getParentNode(element);
|
|
|
|
// In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
|
|
// can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
|
|
if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
|
|
parent = {
|
|
namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
|
|
tagName: 'template',
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
|
|
const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);
|
|
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
|
|
// is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
|
|
// it should be killed.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'svg';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
|
|
// svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
|
|
// text integration points.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return (
|
|
tagName === 'svg' &&
|
|
(parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' ||
|
|
MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
|
|
// spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
|
|
return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
|
|
// is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
|
|
// it should be killed.
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'math';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
|
|
// <math> and HTML integration points
|
|
if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
|
|
// spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
|
|
return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
|
|
// HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
|
|
// is via MathML text integration points
|
|
if (
|
|
parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE &&
|
|
!HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE &&
|
|
!MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
|
|
// or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
|
|
return (
|
|
!ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] &&
|
|
(COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
|
|
if (
|
|
PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&
|
|
ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]
|
|
) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The code should never reach this place (this means
|
|
// that the element somehow got namespace that is not
|
|
// HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
|
|
// Return false just in case.
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _forceRemove
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} node a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _forceRemove = function (node) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });
|
|
try {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
|
|
node.parentNode.removeChild(node);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
node.remove();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _removeAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} name an Attribute name
|
|
* @param {Node} node a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _removeAttribute = function (name, node) {
|
|
try {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: node.getAttributeNode(name),
|
|
from: node,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: null,
|
|
from: node,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
node.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
|
|
// We void attribute values for unremovable "is"" attributes
|
|
if (name === 'is' && !ALLOWED_ATTR[name]) {
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
try {
|
|
_forceRemove(node);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
} else {
|
|
try {
|
|
node.setAttribute(name, '');
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _initDocument
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} dirty a string of dirty markup
|
|
* @return {Document} a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
|
|
*/
|
|
const _initDocument = function (dirty) {
|
|
/* Create a HTML document */
|
|
let doc = null;
|
|
let leadingWhitespace = null;
|
|
|
|
if (FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
|
|
const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
|
|
leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&
|
|
NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE
|
|
) {
|
|
// Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
|
|
dirty =
|
|
'<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' +
|
|
dirty +
|
|
'</body></html>';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy
|
|
? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty)
|
|
: dirty;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
|
|
* DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
try {
|
|
doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
|
|
if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
|
|
doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
|
|
try {
|
|
doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT
|
|
? emptyHTML
|
|
: dirtyPayload;
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
// Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;
|
|
|
|
if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
|
|
body.insertBefore(
|
|
document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace),
|
|
body.childNodes[0] || null
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Work on whole document or just its body */
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return getElementsByTagName.call(
|
|
doc,
|
|
WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body'
|
|
)[0];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} root The root element or node to start traversing on.
|
|
* @return {NodeIterator} The created NodeIterator
|
|
*/
|
|
const _createNodeIterator = function (root) {
|
|
return createNodeIterator.call(
|
|
root.ownerDocument || root,
|
|
root,
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
|
|
NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT,
|
|
null
|
|
);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isClobbered
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} elm element to check for clobbering attacks
|
|
* @return {Boolean} true if clobbered, false if safe
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isClobbered = function (elm) {
|
|
return (
|
|
elm instanceof HTMLFormElement &&
|
|
(typeof elm.nodeName !== 'string' ||
|
|
typeof elm.textContent !== 'string' ||
|
|
typeof elm.removeChild !== 'function' ||
|
|
!(elm.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) ||
|
|
typeof elm.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||
|
|
typeof elm.setAttribute !== 'function' ||
|
|
typeof elm.namespaceURI !== 'string' ||
|
|
typeof elm.insertBefore !== 'function' ||
|
|
typeof elm.hasChildNodes !== 'function')
|
|
);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Checks whether the given object is a DOM node.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} object object to check whether it's a DOM node
|
|
* @return {Boolean} true is object is a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isNode = function (object) {
|
|
return typeof Node === 'function' && object instanceof Node;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _executeHook
|
|
* Execute user configurable hooks
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} entryPoint Name of the hook's entry point
|
|
* @param {Node} currentNode node to work on with the hook
|
|
* @param {Object} data additional hook parameters
|
|
*/
|
|
const _executeHook = function (entryPoint, currentNode, data) {
|
|
if (!hooks[entryPoint]) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arrayForEach(hooks[entryPoint], (hook) => {
|
|
hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect textContent
|
|
* @protect removeChild
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
* @return {Boolean} true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode) {
|
|
let content = null;
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('beforeSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);
|
|
|
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('uponSanitizeElement', currentNode, {
|
|
tagName,
|
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
|
|
if (
|
|
currentNode.hasChildNodes() &&
|
|
!_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) &&
|
|
regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) &&
|
|
regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.textContent)
|
|
) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
|
|
if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
|
|
if (
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
|
|
regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
|
|
if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
|
|
const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
|
|
|
|
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
|
|
const childCount = childNodes.length;
|
|
|
|
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
parentNode.insertBefore(
|
|
cloneNode(childNodes[i], true),
|
|
getNextSibling(currentNode)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
|
|
if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
|
|
if (
|
|
(tagName === 'noscript' ||
|
|
tagName === 'noembed' ||
|
|
tagName === 'noframes') &&
|
|
regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)
|
|
) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === 3) {
|
|
/* Get the element's text content */
|
|
content = currentNode.textContent;
|
|
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr) => {
|
|
content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: currentNode.cloneNode() });
|
|
currentNode.textContent = content;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('afterSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isValidAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {string} lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
|
|
* @param {string} lcName Lowercase attribute name.
|
|
* @param {string} value Attribute value.
|
|
* @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
const _isValidAttribute = function (lcTag, lcName, value) {
|
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
if (
|
|
SANITIZE_DOM &&
|
|
(lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') &&
|
|
(value in document || value in formElement)
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
|
|
(https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
|
|
XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
|
|
We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
|
|
if (
|
|
ALLOW_DATA_ATTR &&
|
|
!FORBID_ATTR[lcName] &&
|
|
regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)
|
|
) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
} else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
/* Otherwise, check the name is permitted */
|
|
} else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
if (
|
|
// First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
|
|
// b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
// and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck
|
|
(_isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) &&
|
|
((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
|
|
regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag)) ||
|
|
(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag))) &&
|
|
((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
|
|
regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName)) ||
|
|
(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function &&
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName)))) ||
|
|
// Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND
|
|
// the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
(lcName === 'is' &&
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements &&
|
|
((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
|
|
regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)) ||
|
|
(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))))
|
|
) {
|
|
// If user has supplied a regexp or function in CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, we need to also allow derived custom elements using the same tagName test.
|
|
// Additionally, we need to allow attributes passing the CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck user has configured, as custom elements can define these at their own discretion.
|
|
} else {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
|
|
} else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
/* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
|
|
unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
|
|
} else if (
|
|
regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))
|
|
) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
/* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
|
|
/* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
|
|
} else if (
|
|
(lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') &&
|
|
lcTag !== 'script' &&
|
|
stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 &&
|
|
DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]
|
|
) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
/* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
|
|
are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
|
|
time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
|
|
} else if (
|
|
ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS &&
|
|
!regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))
|
|
) {
|
|
// This attribute is safe
|
|
/* Check for binary attributes */
|
|
} else if (value) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Binary attributes are safe at this point
|
|
/* Anything else, presume unsafe, do not add it back */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isBasicCustomElement
|
|
* checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
|
|
* for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {string} tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
|
|
* @returns {boolean} Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isBasicCustomElement = function (tagName) {
|
|
return tagName.indexOf('-') > 0;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeAttributes
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect attributes
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect removeAttribute
|
|
* @protect setAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Node} currentNode to sanitize
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('beforeSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);
|
|
|
|
const { attributes } = currentNode;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
|
|
if (!attributes) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const hookEvent = {
|
|
attrName: '',
|
|
attrValue: '',
|
|
keepAttr: true,
|
|
allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
|
|
};
|
|
let l = attributes.length;
|
|
|
|
/* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
|
|
while (l--) {
|
|
const attr = attributes[l];
|
|
const { name, namespaceURI, value: attrValue } = attr;
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
|
|
|
|
let value = name === 'value' ? attrValue : stringTrim(attrValue);
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
|
|
hookEvent.attrValue = value;
|
|
hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
|
|
hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
|
|
_executeHook('uponSanitizeAttribute', currentNode, hookEvent);
|
|
value = hookEvent.attrValue;
|
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove attribute */
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
|
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr) => {
|
|
value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
|
|
* Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name')) {
|
|
// Remove the attribute with this value
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
|
|
// Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
|
|
value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
|
|
if (
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy &&
|
|
typeof trustedTypes === 'object' &&
|
|
typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function'
|
|
) {
|
|
if (namespaceURI) {
|
|
/* Namespaces are not yet supported, see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293 */
|
|
} else {
|
|
switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
|
|
case 'TrustedHTML': {
|
|
value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case 'TrustedScriptURL': {
|
|
value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default: {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
|
|
try {
|
|
if (namespaceURI) {
|
|
currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
|
|
currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeShadowDOM
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {DocumentFragment} fragment to iterate over recursively
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeShadowDOM = function (fragment) {
|
|
let shadowNode = null;
|
|
const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('beforeSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);
|
|
|
|
while ((shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode())) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('uponSanitizeShadowNode', shadowNode, null);
|
|
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
if (_sanitizeElements(shadowNode)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Deep shadow DOM detected */
|
|
if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHook('afterSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Sanitize
|
|
* Public method providing core sanitation functionality
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String|Node} dirty string or DOM node
|
|
* @param {Object} cfg object
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty, cfg = {}) {
|
|
let body = null;
|
|
let importedNode = null;
|
|
let currentNode = null;
|
|
let returnNode = null;
|
|
/* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
|
|
DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
|
|
the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
|
|
IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
|
|
if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
|
|
dirty = '<!-->';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
|
|
if (typeof dirty.toString === 'function') {
|
|
dirty = dirty.toString();
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('toString is not a function');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
|
|
if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Assign config vars */
|
|
if (!SET_CONFIG) {
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up removed elements */
|
|
DOMPurify.removed = [];
|
|
|
|
/* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */
|
|
if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
|
|
IN_PLACE = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
/* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
|
|
if (dirty.nodeName) {
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(dirty.nodeName);
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate(
|
|
'root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place'
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
|
|
/* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
|
|
elements being stripped by the parser */
|
|
body = _initDocument('<!---->');
|
|
importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
|
|
if (importedNode.nodeType === 1 && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
|
|
/* Node is already a body, use as is */
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
body.appendChild(importedNode);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
|
|
if (
|
|
!RETURN_DOM &&
|
|
!SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES &&
|
|
!WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
|
|
dirty.indexOf('<') === -1
|
|
) {
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE
|
|
? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty)
|
|
: dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the document to work on */
|
|
body = _initDocument(dirty);
|
|
|
|
/* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
|
|
if (!body) {
|
|
return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
|
|
if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
_forceRemove(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get node iterator */
|
|
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
|
|
|
|
/* Now start iterating over the created document */
|
|
while ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
if (_sanitizeElements(currentNode)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
|
|
if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return sanitized string or DOM */
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM) {
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
|
|
|
|
while (body.firstChild) {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
returnNode = body;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
|
|
/*
|
|
AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
|
|
(e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
|
|
in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
|
|
The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
|
|
by the specs.
|
|
*/
|
|
returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return returnNode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
|
|
|
|
/* Serialize doctype if allowed */
|
|
if (
|
|
WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] &&
|
|
body.ownerDocument &&
|
|
body.ownerDocument.doctype &&
|
|
body.ownerDocument.doctype.name &&
|
|
regExpTest(EXPRESSIONS.DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)
|
|
) {
|
|
serializedHTML =
|
|
'<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanitize final string template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr) => {
|
|
serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE
|
|
? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML)
|
|
: serializedHTML;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Public method to set the configuration once
|
|
* setConfig
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {Object} cfg configuration object
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.setConfig = function (cfg = {}) {
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
SET_CONFIG = true;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Public method to remove the configuration
|
|
* clearConfig
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
|
|
CONFIG = null;
|
|
SET_CONFIG = false;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Public method to check if an attribute value is valid.
|
|
* Uses last set config, if any. Otherwise, uses config defaults.
|
|
* isValidAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} tag Tag name of containing element.
|
|
* @param {String} attr Attribute name.
|
|
* @param {String} value Attribute value.
|
|
* @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid. Otherwise, returns false.
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
|
|
/* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
|
|
if (!CONFIG) {
|
|
_parseConfig({});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
|
|
return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* AddHook
|
|
* Public method to add DOMPurify hooks
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
|
|
* @param {Function} hookFunction function to execute
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
|
|
if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hooks[entryPoint] = hooks[entryPoint] || [];
|
|
arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* RemoveHook
|
|
* Public method to remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
|
|
* (pops it from the stack of hooks if more are present)
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
|
|
* @return {Function} removed(popped) hook
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint) {
|
|
if (hooks[entryPoint]) {
|
|
return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* RemoveHooks
|
|
* Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks at a given entryPoint
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hooks to remove
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
|
|
if (hooks[entryPoint]) {
|
|
hooks[entryPoint] = [];
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* RemoveAllHooks
|
|
* Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
|
|
hooks = {};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
return DOMPurify;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export default createDOMPurify();
|