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oxen-core/src/cryptonote_core/service_node_list.cpp

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// Copyright (c) 2018, The Loki Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#include "cryptonote_config.h"
#include "oxen_economy.h"
#include "ringct/rctTypes.h"
#include <functional>
#include <algorithm>
#include <chrono>
#include <fmt/core.h>
#include <fmt/chrono.h>
#include <fmt/color.h>
#include <oxenc/endian.h>
#include <oxenc/hex.h>
extern "C" {
#include <sodium.h>
}
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
#include "epee/net/local_ip.h"
#include "cryptonote_tx_utils.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/tx_extra.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/hardfork.h"
#include "cryptonote_core/uptime_proof.h"
#include "epee/int-util.h"
#include "common/scoped_message_writer.h"
#include "common/i18n.h"
#include "common/util.h"
#include "common/random.h"
#include "common/lock.h"
#include "common/hex.h"
#include "blockchain.h"
#include "service_node_quorum_cop.h"
#include "pulse.h"
#include "service_node_list.h"
#include "uptime_proof.h"
#include "service_node_rules.h"
#include "service_node_swarm.h"
#include "version.h"
using cryptonote::hf;
namespace service_nodes
{
static auto logcat = log::Cat("service_nodes");
size_t constexpr STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL = 10000;
constexpr auto X25519_MAP_PRUNING_INTERVAL = 5min;
constexpr auto X25519_MAP_PRUNING_LAG = 24h;
static_assert(X25519_MAP_PRUNING_LAG > cryptonote::config::UPTIME_PROOF_VALIDITY, "x25519 map pruning lag is too short!");
static uint64_t short_term_state_cull_height(hf hf_version, uint64_t block_height)
{
size_t constexpr DEFAULT_SHORT_TERM_STATE_HISTORY = 6 * STATE_CHANGE_TX_LIFETIME_IN_BLOCKS;
static_assert(DEFAULT_SHORT_TERM_STATE_HISTORY >= 12 * cryptonote::BLOCKS_PER_HOUR, // Arbitrary, but raises a compilation failure if it gets shortened.
"not enough short term state storage for blink quorum retrieval!");
uint64_t result =
(block_height < DEFAULT_SHORT_TERM_STATE_HISTORY) ? 0 : block_height - DEFAULT_SHORT_TERM_STATE_HISTORY;
return result;
}
service_node_list::service_node_list(cryptonote::Blockchain &blockchain)
: m_blockchain(blockchain) // Warning: don't touch `blockchain`, it gets initialized *after* us
, m_service_node_keys(nullptr)
, m_state{this}
{
}
void service_node_list::init()
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
if (m_blockchain.get_network_version() < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
{
reset(true);
return;
}
uint64_t current_height = m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height();
bool loaded = load(current_height);
if (loaded && m_transient.old_quorum_states.size() < std::min(m_store_quorum_history, uint64_t{10})) {
log::warning(logcat, "Full history storage requested, but {} old quorum states found", m_transient.old_quorum_states.size());
loaded = false; // Either we don't have stored history or the history is very short, so recalculation is necessary or cheap.
}
if (!loaded || m_state.height > current_height)
reset(true);
}
template <typename UnaryPredicate>
static std::vector<service_nodes::pubkey_and_sninfo> sort_and_filter(const service_nodes_infos_t &sns_infos, UnaryPredicate p, bool reserve = true) {
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> result;
if (reserve) result.reserve(sns_infos.size());
for (const auto& key_info : sns_infos)
if (p(*key_info.second))
result.push_back(key_info);
std::sort(result.begin(), result.end(),
[](const pubkey_and_sninfo &a, const pubkey_and_sninfo &b) {
return memcmp(reinterpret_cast<const void*>(&a), reinterpret_cast<const void*>(&b), sizeof(a)) < 0;
});
return result;
}
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> service_node_list::state_t::active_service_nodes_infos() const {
return sort_and_filter(service_nodes_infos, [](const service_node_info &info) { return info.is_active(); }, /*reserve=*/ true);
}
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> service_node_list::state_t::decommissioned_service_nodes_infos() const {
return sort_and_filter(service_nodes_infos, [](const service_node_info &info) { return info.is_decommissioned() && info.is_fully_funded(); }, /*reserve=*/ false);
}
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> service_node_list::state_t::payable_service_nodes_infos(uint64_t height, cryptonote::network_type nettype) const {
return sort_and_filter(service_nodes_infos, [height, nettype](const service_node_info &info) { return info.is_payable(height, nettype); }, /*reserve=*/ true);
}
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> service_node_list::get_quorum(quorum_type type, uint64_t height, bool include_old, std::vector<std::shared_ptr<const quorum>> *alt_quorums) const
{
height = offset_testing_quorum_height(type, height);
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
quorum_manager const *quorums = nullptr;
if (height == m_state.height)
quorums = &m_state.quorums;
else // NOTE: Search m_transient.state_history && m_transient.state_archive
{
auto it = m_transient.state_history.find(height);
if (it != m_transient.state_history.end())
quorums = &it->quorums;
if (!quorums)
{
auto it = m_transient.state_archive.find(height);
if (it != m_transient.state_archive.end()) quorums = &it->quorums;
}
}
if (!quorums && include_old) // NOTE: Search m_transient.old_quorum_states
{
auto it =
std::lower_bound(m_transient.old_quorum_states.begin(),
m_transient.old_quorum_states.end(),
height,
[](quorums_by_height const &entry, uint64_t height) { return entry.height < height; });
if (it != m_transient.old_quorum_states.end() && it->height == height)
quorums = &it->quorums;
}
if (alt_quorums)
{
for (const auto& [hash, alt_state] : m_transient.alt_state)
{
if (alt_state.height == height)
{
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> alt_result = alt_state.quorums.get(type);
if (alt_result) alt_quorums->push_back(alt_result);
}
}
}
if (!quorums)
return nullptr;
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> result = quorums->get(type);
return result;
}
static bool get_pubkey_from_quorum(quorum const &quorum, quorum_group group, size_t quorum_index, crypto::public_key &key)
{
std::vector<crypto::public_key> const *array = nullptr;
if (group == quorum_group::validator) array = &quorum.validators;
else if (group == quorum_group::worker) array = &quorum.workers;
else
{
log::error(logcat, "Invalid quorum group specified");
return false;
}
if (quorum_index >= array->size())
{
log::error(logcat, "Quorum indexing out of bounds: {}, quorum_size: {}", quorum_index, array->size());
return false;
}
key = (*array)[quorum_index];
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::get_quorum_pubkey(quorum_type type, quorum_group group, uint64_t height, size_t quorum_index, crypto::public_key &key) const
{
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> quorum = get_quorum(type, height);
if (!quorum)
{
log::info(logcat, "Quorum for height: {}, was not stored by the daemon", height);
return false;
}
bool result = get_pubkey_from_quorum(*quorum, group, quorum_index, key);
return result;
}
size_t service_node_list::get_service_node_count() const
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
return m_state.service_nodes_infos.size();
}
std::vector<service_node_pubkey_info> service_node_list::get_service_node_list_state(const std::vector<crypto::public_key> &service_node_pubkeys) const
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
std::vector<service_node_pubkey_info> result;
if (service_node_pubkeys.empty())
{
result.reserve(m_state.service_nodes_infos.size());
for (const auto &info : m_state.service_nodes_infos)
result.emplace_back(info);
}
else
{
result.reserve(service_node_pubkeys.size());
for (const auto &it : service_node_pubkeys)
{
auto find_it = m_state.service_nodes_infos.find(it);
if (find_it != m_state.service_nodes_infos.end())
result.emplace_back(*find_it);
}
}
return result;
}
void service_node_list::set_my_service_node_keys(const service_node_keys *keys)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
m_service_node_keys = keys;
}
void service_node_list::set_quorum_history_storage(uint64_t hist_size) {
if (hist_size == 1)
hist_size = std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max();
m_store_quorum_history = hist_size;
}
bool service_node_list::is_service_node(const crypto::public_key& pubkey, bool require_active) const
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
auto it = m_state.service_nodes_infos.find(pubkey);
return it != m_state.service_nodes_infos.end() && (!require_active || it->second->is_active());
}
bool service_node_list::is_key_image_locked(crypto::key_image const &check_image, uint64_t *unlock_height, service_node_info::contribution_t *the_locked_contribution) const
{
for (const auto& pubkey_info : m_state.service_nodes_infos)
{
const service_node_info &info = *pubkey_info.second;
for (const service_node_info::contributor_t &contributor : info.contributors)
{
for (const service_node_info::contribution_t &contribution : contributor.locked_contributions)
{
if (check_image == contribution.key_image)
{
if (the_locked_contribution) *the_locked_contribution = contribution;
if (unlock_height) *unlock_height = info.requested_unlock_height;
return true;
}
}
}
}
return false;
}
std::optional<registration_details> reg_tx_extract_fields(const cryptonote::transaction& tx)
{
cryptonote::tx_extra_service_node_register registration;
if (!get_field_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, registration))
return std::nullopt;
if (registration.public_spend_keys.size() != registration.public_view_keys.size() ||
registration.amounts.size() != registration.public_spend_keys.size())
return std::nullopt;
registration_details reg{};
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_pubkey_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, reg.service_node_pubkey))
return std::nullopt;
reg.reserved.reserve(registration.public_spend_keys.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < registration.public_spend_keys.size(); i++) {
auto& [addr, amount] = reg.reserved.emplace_back();
addr.m_spend_public_key = registration.public_spend_keys[i];
addr.m_view_public_key = registration.public_view_keys[i];
amount = registration.amounts[i];
}
reg.hf = registration.hf_or_expiration;
if (registration.hf_or_expiration <= 255)
reg.uses_portions = false;
else
// Unix timestamp, so pre-HF19 and uses portions
reg.uses_portions = true;
reg.fee = registration.fee;
reg.signature = registration.signature;
return reg;
}
uint64_t offset_testing_quorum_height(quorum_type type, uint64_t height)
{
uint64_t result = height;
if (type == quorum_type::checkpointing)
{
if (result < REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12)
return 0;
result -= REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12;
}
return result;
}
void validate_registration(hf hf_version, cryptonote::network_type nettype, uint64_t staking_requirement, uint64_t block_timestamp, const registration_details& reg)
{
if (reg.uses_portions)
{
if (hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching)
throw invalid_registration{"Portion-based registrations are not permitted in HF19+"};
}
else
{
// If not using portions then the hf value must be >= 19 and equal to the current blockchain hf:
if (hf_version < hf::hf19_reward_batching || reg.hf != static_cast<uint8_t>(hf_version))
throw invalid_registration{
"Wrong registration hardfork {}; you likely need to regenerate "
"the registration for compatibility with hardfork {}"_format(
reg.hf, static_cast<uint8_t>(hf_version))};
}
const size_t max_contributors = hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching
? oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_HF19
: oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1;
if (reg.reserved.empty())
throw invalid_registration{"No operator contribution given"};
if (reg.reserved.size() > max_contributors)
throw invalid_registration{"Too many contributors"};
bool valid_stakes, valid_fee;
if (reg.uses_portions) {
// HF18 or earlier registration
valid_stakes = check_service_node_portions(hf_version, reg.reserved);
valid_fee = reg.fee <= cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS;
}
else
{
valid_stakes = check_service_node_stakes(hf_version, nettype, staking_requirement, reg.reserved);
valid_fee = reg.fee <= cryptonote::STAKING_FEE_BASIS;
}
if (!valid_fee)
throw invalid_registration{"Operator fee is too high ({} > {})"_format(reg.fee,
reg.uses_portions ? cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS : cryptonote::STAKING_FEE_BASIS)};
if (!valid_stakes) {
std::string amount_dump;
amount_dump.reserve(22 * reg.reserved.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < reg.reserved.size(); i++)
{
if (i) amount_dump += ", ";
amount_dump += std::to_string(reg.reserved[i].second);
}
throw invalid_registration{"Invalid "s + (reg.uses_portions ? "portions" : "amounts") + ": {" + amount_dump + "}"};
}
// If using portions then `.hf` is actually the registration expiry (HF19+ registrations do not
// expire).
if (reg.uses_portions && reg.hf < block_timestamp)
throw invalid_registration{"Registration expired (" + std::to_string(reg.hf) + " < " + std::to_string(block_timestamp) + ")"};
}
//---------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::hash get_registration_hash(const registration_details& registration)
{
std::string buffer;
size_t size =
sizeof(uint64_t) + // fee
registration.reserved.size() * (
sizeof(cryptonote::account_public_address) + sizeof(uint64_t)) + // addr+amount for each
sizeof(uint64_t); // expiration timestamp
buffer.reserve(size);
buffer += tools::view_guts(oxenc::host_to_little(registration.fee));
for (const auto& [addr, amount] : registration.reserved)
{
buffer += tools::view_guts(addr);
buffer += tools::view_guts(oxenc::host_to_little(amount));
}
buffer += tools::view_guts(oxenc::host_to_little(registration.hf));
assert(buffer.size() == size);
return crypto::cn_fast_hash(buffer.data(), buffer.size());
}
void validate_registration_signature(const registration_details& registration)
{
auto hash = get_registration_hash(registration);
if (!crypto::check_key(registration.service_node_pubkey))
throw invalid_registration{"Service Node Key is not a valid public key (" + tools::type_to_hex(registration.service_node_pubkey) + ")"};
if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, registration.service_node_pubkey, registration.signature))
throw invalid_registration{"Registration signature verification failed for pubkey/hash: " +
tools::type_to_hex(registration.service_node_pubkey) + "/" + tools::type_to_hex(hash)};
}
struct parsed_tx_contribution
{
cryptonote::account_public_address address;
uint64_t transferred;
crypto::secret_key tx_key;
std::vector<service_node_info::contribution_t> locked_contributions;
};
static uint64_t get_staking_output_contribution(const cryptonote::transaction& tx, int i, crypto::key_derivation const &derivation, hw::device& hwdev)
{
if (!std::holds_alternative<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[i].target))
{
return 0;
}
rct::key mask;
uint64_t money_transferred = 0;
crypto::secret_key scalar1;
hwdev.derivation_to_scalar(derivation, i, scalar1);
try
{
switch (tx.rct_signatures.type)
{
case rct::RCTType::Simple:
case rct::RCTType::Bulletproof:
case rct::RCTType::Bulletproof2:
case rct::RCTType::CLSAG:
money_transferred = rct::decodeRctSimple(tx.rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
break;
case rct::RCTType::Full:
money_transferred = rct::decodeRct(tx.rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
break;
default:
log::warning(logcat, "{}: Unsupported rct type: {}", __func__, (int)tx.rct_signatures.type);
return 0;
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
log::warning(logcat, "Failed to decode input {}", i);
return 0;
}
return money_transferred;
}
bool tx_get_staking_components(cryptonote::transaction_prefix const &tx, staking_components *contribution, crypto::hash const &txid)
{
staking_components contribution_unused_ = {};
if (!contribution) contribution = &contribution_unused_;
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_pubkey_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, contribution->service_node_pubkey))
return false; // Is not a contribution TX don't need to check it.
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_contributor_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, contribution->address))
return false;
if (!cryptonote::get_tx_secret_key_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, contribution->tx_key))
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: There was a service node contributor but no secret key in the tx extra for tx: {}", txid);
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool tx_get_staking_components(cryptonote::transaction const &tx, staking_components *contribution)
{
bool result = tx_get_staking_components(tx, contribution, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return result;
}
bool tx_get_staking_components_and_amounts(cryptonote::network_type nettype,
hf hf_version,
cryptonote::transaction const &tx,
uint64_t block_height,
staking_components *contribution)
{
staking_components contribution_unused_ = {};
if (!contribution) contribution = &contribution_unused_;
if (!tx_get_staking_components(tx, contribution))
return false;
// A cryptonote transaction is constructed as follows
// P = Hs(aR)G + B
// P := Stealth Address
// a := Receiver's secret view key
// B := Receiver's public spend key
// R := TX Public Key
// G := Elliptic Curve
// In Loki we pack into the tx extra information to reveal information about the TX
// A := Public View Key (we pack contributor into tx extra, 'parsed_contribution.address')
// r := TX Secret Key (we pack secret key into tx extra, 'parsed_contribution.tx_key`)
// Calulate 'Derivation := Hs(Ar)G'
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
if (!crypto::generate_key_derivation(contribution->address.m_view_public_key, contribution->tx_key, derivation))
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Failed to generate key derivation on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
hw::device &hwdev = hw::get_device("default");
contribution->transferred = 0;
bool stake_decoded = true;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
// In Infinite Staking, we lock the key image that would be generated if
// you tried to send your stake and prevent it from being transacted on
// the network whilst you are a Service Node. To do this, we calculate
// the future key image that would be generated when they user tries to
// spend the staked funds. A key image is derived from the ephemeral, one
// time transaction private key, 'x' in the Cryptonote Whitepaper.
// This is only possible to generate if they are the staking to themselves
// as you need the recipients private keys to generate the key image that
// would be generated, when they want to spend it in the future.
cryptonote::tx_extra_tx_key_image_proofs key_image_proofs;
if (!get_field_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, key_image_proofs))
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Didn't have key image proofs in the tx_extra, rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
stake_decoded = false;
}
for (size_t output_index = 0; stake_decoded && output_index < tx.vout.size(); ++output_index)
{
uint64_t transferred = get_staking_output_contribution(tx, output_index, derivation, hwdev);
if (transferred == 0)
continue;
// So prove that the destination stealth address can be decoded using the
// staker's packed address, which means that the recipient of the
// contribution is themselves (and hence they have the necessary secrets
// to generate the future key image).
// i.e Verify the packed information is valid by computing the stealth
// address P' (which should equal P if matching) using
// 'Derivation := Hs(Ar)G' (we calculated earlier) instead of 'Hs(aR)G'
// P' = Hs(Ar)G + B
// = Hs(aR)G + B
// = Derivation + B
// = P
crypto::public_key ephemeral_pub_key;
{
// P' := Derivation + B
if (!hwdev.derive_public_key(derivation, output_index, contribution->address.m_spend_public_key, ephemeral_pub_key))
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Could not derive TX ephemeral key on height: {} for tx: {} for output: {}", block_height, get_transaction_hash(tx), output_index);
continue;
}
// Stealth address public key should match the public key referenced in the TX only if valid information is given.
const auto& out_to_key = var::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[output_index].target);
if (out_to_key.key != ephemeral_pub_key)
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Derived TX ephemeral key did not match tx stored key on height: {} for tx: {} for output: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx), output_index);
continue;
}
}
// To prevent the staker locking any arbitrary key image, the provided
// key image is included and verified in a ring signature which
// guarantees that 'the staker proves that he knows such 'x' (one time
// ephemeral secret key) and that (the future key image) P = xG'.
// Consequently the key image is not falsified and actually the future
// key image.
// The signer can try falsify the key image, but the equation used to
// construct the key image is re-derived by the verifier, false key
// images will not match the re-derived key image.
for (auto proof = key_image_proofs.proofs.begin(); proof != key_image_proofs.proofs.end(); proof++)
{
if (!crypto::check_key_image_signature(proof->key_image, ephemeral_pub_key, proof->signature))
continue;
contribution->locked_contributions.emplace_back(service_node_info::contribution_t::version_t::v0, ephemeral_pub_key, proof->key_image, transferred);
contribution->transferred += transferred;
key_image_proofs.proofs.erase(proof);
break;
}
}
}
if (hf_version < hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
// Pre Infinite Staking, we only need to prove the amount sent is
// sufficient to become a contributor to the Service Node and that there
// is sufficient lock time on the staking output.
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++)
{
bool has_correct_unlock_time = false;
{
uint64_t unlock_time = tx.unlock_time;
if (tx.version >= cryptonote::txversion::v3_per_output_unlock_times)
unlock_time = tx.output_unlock_times[i];
uint64_t min_height = block_height + staking_num_lock_blocks(nettype);
has_correct_unlock_time = unlock_time < cryptonote::MAX_BLOCK_NUMBER && unlock_time >= min_height;
}
if (has_correct_unlock_time)
{
contribution->transferred += get_staking_output_contribution(tx, i, derivation, hwdev);
stake_decoded = true;
}
}
}
return stake_decoded;
}
/// Makes a copy of the given service_node_info and replaces the shared_ptr with a pointer to the copy.
/// Returns the non-const service_node_info (which is now held by the passed-in shared_ptr lvalue ref).
static service_node_info &duplicate_info(std::shared_ptr<const service_node_info> &info_ptr) {
auto new_ptr = std::make_shared<service_node_info>(*info_ptr);
info_ptr = new_ptr;
return *new_ptr;
}
bool service_node_list::state_t::process_state_change_tx(state_set const &state_history,
state_set const &state_archive,
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, state_t> const &alt_states,
cryptonote::network_type nettype,
const cryptonote::block &block,
const cryptonote::transaction &tx,
const service_node_keys *my_keys)
{
if (tx.type != cryptonote::txtype::state_change)
return false;
const auto hf_version = block.major_version;
cryptonote::tx_extra_service_node_state_change state_change;
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_state_change_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, state_change, hf_version))
{
log::error(logcat, "Transaction: {}, did not have valid state change data in tx extra rejecting malformed tx", cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
auto it = state_history.find(state_change.block_height);
if (it == state_history.end())
{
it = state_archive.find(state_change.block_height);
if (it == state_archive.end())
{
log::error(logcat, "Transaction: {} in block {} {} references quorum height but that height is not stored!", cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx), cryptonote::get_block_height(block), cryptonote::get_block_hash(block), state_change.block_height);
return false;
}
}
quorum_manager const *quorums = &it->quorums;
cryptonote::tx_verification_context tvc = {};
if (!verify_tx_state_change(
state_change, cryptonote::get_block_height(block), tvc, *quorums->obligations, hf_version))
{
quorums = nullptr;
for (const auto& [hash, alt_state] : alt_states)
{
if (alt_state.height != state_change.block_height) continue;
quorums = &alt_state.quorums;
if (!verify_tx_state_change(state_change, cryptonote::get_block_height(block), tvc, *quorums->obligations, hf_version))
{
quorums = nullptr;
continue;
}
}
}
if (!quorums)
{
log::error(logcat, "Could not get a quorum that could completely validate the votes from state change in tx: {}, skipping transaction", get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
crypto::public_key key;
if (!get_pubkey_from_quorum(*quorums->obligations, quorum_group::worker, state_change.service_node_index, key))
{
log::error(logcat, "Retrieving the public key from state change in tx: {} failed", cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
auto iter = service_nodes_infos.find(key);
if (iter == service_nodes_infos.end()) {
log::debug(logcat, "Received state change tx for non-registered service node {} (perhaps a delayed tx?)", key);
return false;
}
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
auto &info = duplicate_info(iter->second);
bool is_me = my_keys && my_keys->pub == key;
switch (state_change.state) {
case new_state::deregister:
if (is_me)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::red), "Deregistration for service node (yours): {}", key);
else
log::info(logcat, "Deregistration for service node: {}", key);
if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
for (const auto &contributor : info.contributors)
{
for (const auto &contribution : contributor.locked_contributions)
{
key_image_blacklist.emplace_back(); // NOTE: Use default value for version in key_image_blacklist_entry
key_image_blacklist_entry &entry = key_image_blacklist.back();
entry.key_image = contribution.key_image;
entry.unlock_height = block_height + staking_num_lock_blocks(nettype);
entry.amount = contribution.amount;
}
}
}
service_nodes_infos.erase(iter);
return true;
case new_state::decommission:
if (hf_version < hf::hf12_checkpointing) {
log::error(logcat, "Invalid decommission transaction seen before network v12");
return false;
}
if (info.is_decommissioned()) {
log::debug(logcat, "Received decommission tx for already-decommissioned service node {}; ignoring", key);
return false;
}
if (is_me)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::red), "Temporary decommission for service node (yours): {}", key);
else
log::info(logcat, "Temporary decommission for service node: {}", key);
info.active_since_height = -info.active_since_height;
info.last_decommission_height = block_height;
info.last_decommission_reason_consensus_all = state_change.reason_consensus_all;
info.last_decommission_reason_consensus_any = state_change.reason_consensus_any;
info.decommission_count++;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf13_enforce_checkpoints) {
// Assigning invalid swarm id effectively kicks the node off
// its current swarm; it will be assigned a new swarm id when it
// gets recommissioned. Prior to HF13 this step was incorrectly
// skipped.
info.swarm_id = UNASSIGNED_SWARM_ID;
}
if (sn_list && !sn_list->m_rescanning)
{
auto &proof = sn_list->proofs[key];
proof.timestamp = proof.effective_timestamp = 0;
proof.store(key, sn_list->m_blockchain);
}
return true;
case new_state::recommission: {
if (hf_version < hf::hf12_checkpointing) {
log::error(logcat, "Invalid recommission transaction seen before network v12");
return false;
}
if (!info.is_decommissioned()) {
log::debug(logcat, "Received recommission tx for already-active service node {}; ignoring", key);
return false;
}
if (is_me)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::green), "Recommission for service node (yours): {}", key);
else
log::info(logcat, "Recommission for service node: {}", key);
// To figure out how much credit the node gets at recommissioned we need to know how much it
// had when it got decommissioned, and how long it's been decommisioned.
int64_t credit_at_decomm = quorum_cop::calculate_decommission_credit(info, info.last_decommission_height);
int64_t decomm_blocks = block_height - info.last_decommission_height;
info.active_since_height = block_height;
info.recommission_credit = RECOMMISSION_CREDIT(credit_at_decomm, decomm_blocks);
// Move the SN at the back of the list as if it had just registered (or just won)
info.last_reward_block_height = block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
// NOTE: Only the quorum deciding on this node agrees that the service
// node has a recent uptime atleast for it to be recommissioned not
// necessarily the entire network. Ensure the entire network agrees
// simultaneously they are online if we are recommissioning by resetting
// the failure conditions. We set only the effective but not *actual*
// timestamp so that we delay obligations checks but don't prevent the
// next actual proof from being sent/relayed.
if (sn_list)
{
auto &proof = sn_list->proofs[key];
proof.effective_timestamp = block.timestamp;
proof.checkpoint_participation.reset();
proof.pulse_participation.reset();
proof.timestamp_participation.reset();
proof.timesync_status.reset();
}
return true;
}
case new_state::ip_change_penalty:
if (hf_version < hf::hf12_checkpointing) {
log::error(logcat, "Invalid ip_change_penalty transaction seen before network v12");
return false;
}
if (info.is_decommissioned()) {
log::debug(logcat, "Received reset position tx for service node {} but it is already decommissioned; ignoring", key);
return false;
}
if (is_me)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::red), "Reward position reset for service node (yours): {}", key);
else
log::info(logcat, "Reward position reset for service node: {}", key);
// Move the SN at the back of the list as if it had just registered (or just won)
info.last_reward_block_height = block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
info.last_ip_change_height = block_height;
return true;
default:
// dev bug!
log::error(logcat, "BUG: Service node state change tx has unknown state {}", static_cast<uint16_t>(state_change.state));
return false;
}
}
bool service_node_list::state_t::process_key_image_unlock_tx(cryptonote::network_type nettype, cryptonote::hf hf_version, uint64_t block_height, const cryptonote::transaction &tx)
{
crypto::public_key snode_key;
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_pubkey_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, snode_key))
return false;
auto it = service_nodes_infos.find(snode_key);
if (it == service_nodes_infos.end())
return false;
const service_node_info &node_info = *it->second;
if (node_info.requested_unlock_height != KEY_IMAGE_AWAITING_UNLOCK_HEIGHT)
{
log::info(logcat, "Unlock TX: Node already requested an unlock at height: {} rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", node_info.requested_unlock_height, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
cryptonote::tx_extra_tx_key_image_unlock unlock;
if (!cryptonote::get_field_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, unlock))
{
log::info(logcat, "Unlock TX: Didn't have key image unlock in the tx_extra, rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
uint64_t unlock_height = get_locked_key_image_unlock_height(nettype, node_info.registration_height, block_height);
uint64_t small_contributor_amount_threshold = mul128_div64(
service_nodes::get_staking_requirement(nettype, unlock_height),
service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_THRESHOLD::num,
service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_THRESHOLD::den);
for (const auto &contributor : node_info.contributors)
{
auto cit = std::find_if(contributor.locked_contributions.begin(),
contributor.locked_contributions.end(),
[&unlock](const service_node_info::contribution_t &contribution) {
return unlock.key_image == contribution.key_image;
});
if (cit != contributor.locked_contributions.end())
{
if (hf_version >= hf::hf20)
{
if (cit->amount < small_contributor_amount_threshold && (block_height - node_info.registration_height) < service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_UNLOCK_TIMER)
{
log::info(logcat, "Unlock TX: small contributor trying to unlock node before {} blocks have passed, rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", std::to_string(service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_UNLOCK_TIMER), block_height, get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
//TODO oxen remove this whole if block after HF20 has occurred
if (hf_version == hf::hf19_reward_batching)
{
if (cit->amount < 3749 && (block_height - node_info.registration_height) < service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_UNLOCK_TIMER)
{
log::info(logcat, "Unlock TX: small contributor trying to unlock node before {} blocks have passed, rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", std::to_string(service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_UNLOCK_TIMER), block_height, get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
// NOTE(oxen): This should be checked in blockchain check_tx_inputs already
if (crypto::check_signature(service_nodes::generate_request_stake_unlock_hash(unlock.nonce),
cit->key_image_pub_key, unlock.signature))
{
duplicate_info(it->second).requested_unlock_height = unlock_height;
return true;
}
else
{
log::info(logcat, "Unlock TX: Couldn't verify key image unlock in the tx_extra, rejected on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
}
return false;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------
//TODO oxen remove this whole function after HF20 has occurred
bool service_node_list::state_t::is_premature_unlock(cryptonote::network_type nettype, cryptonote::hf hf_version, uint64_t block_height, const cryptonote::transaction &tx) const
{
if (hf_version != hf::hf19_reward_batching)
return false;
crypto::public_key snode_key;
if (!cryptonote::get_service_node_pubkey_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, snode_key))
return false;
auto it = service_nodes_infos.find(snode_key);
if (it == service_nodes_infos.end())
return false;
const service_node_info &node_info = *it->second;
cryptonote::tx_extra_tx_key_image_unlock unlock;
if (!cryptonote::get_field_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, unlock))
return false;
uint64_t unlock_height = get_locked_key_image_unlock_height(nettype, node_info.registration_height, block_height);
uint64_t small_contributor_amount_threshold = mul128_div64(
service_nodes::get_staking_requirement(nettype, block_height),
service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_THRESHOLD::num,
service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_THRESHOLD::den);
for (const auto &contributor : node_info.contributors)
{
auto cit = std::find_if(contributor.locked_contributions.begin(),
contributor.locked_contributions.end(),
[&unlock](const service_node_info::contribution_t &contribution) {
return unlock.key_image == contribution.key_image;
});
if (cit != contributor.locked_contributions.end())
return cit->amount < small_contributor_amount_threshold && (block_height - node_info.registration_height) < service_nodes::SMALL_CONTRIBUTOR_UNLOCK_TIMER;
}
return false;
}
bool is_registration_tx(cryptonote::network_type nettype, hf hf_version, const cryptonote::transaction& tx, uint64_t block_timestamp, uint64_t block_height, uint32_t index, crypto::public_key& key, service_node_info& info)
{
auto maybe_reg = reg_tx_extract_fields(tx);
if (!maybe_reg)
return false;
auto& reg = *maybe_reg;
uint64_t staking_requirement = get_staking_requirement(nettype, block_height);
try
{
validate_registration(hf_version, nettype, staking_requirement, block_timestamp, reg);
validate_registration_signature(reg);
}
catch (const invalid_registration &e)
{
log::info(logcat, "Invalid registration ({} @ {}): {}", cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx), block_height, e.what());
return false;
}
// check the operator contribution exists
cryptonote::account_public_address address;
staking_components stake = {};
if (!tx_get_staking_components_and_amounts(nettype, hf_version, tx, block_height, &stake))
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX: Had service node registration fields, but could not decode contribution on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse)
{
// In HF16 we start enforcing three things that were always done but weren't actually enforced:
// 1. the staked amount in the tx must be a single output.
if (stake.locked_contributions.size() != 1)
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX invalid: multi-output registration transactions are not permitted as of HF16");
return false;
}
// 2. the staked amount must be from the operator. (Previously there was a weird edge case where you
// could manually construct a registration tx that stakes for someone *other* than the operator).
if (stake.address != reg.reserved[0].first)
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX invalid: registration stake is not from the operator");
return false;
}
// 3. The operator must be staking at least his reserved amount in the registration details.
// (We check this later, after we calculate reserved atomic currency amounts). In the pre-HF16
// code below it only had to satisfy >= 25% even if the reserved operator stake was higher.
}
else // Pre-HF16
{
const uint64_t min_transfer = get_min_node_contribution(hf_version, staking_requirement, 0, 0);
if (stake.transferred < min_transfer)
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX: Contribution transferred: {} didn't meet the minimum transfer requirement: {} on height: {} for tx: {}", stake.transferred, min_transfer, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
size_t total_num_of_addr = reg.reserved.size();
if (std::find_if(reg.reserved.begin(), reg.reserved.end(),
[&](auto& addr_amt) { return addr_amt.first == stake.address; }) == reg.reserved.end())
total_num_of_addr++;
// Don't need this check for HF16+ because the number of reserved spots is already checked in
// the registration details, and we disallow a non-operator registration.
if (total_num_of_addr > oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1)
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX: Number of participants: {} exceeded the max number of contributions: {} on height: {} for tx: {}", total_num_of_addr, oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
// don't actually process this contribution now, do it when we fall through later.
key = reg.service_node_pubkey;
info.staking_requirement = staking_requirement;
info.operator_address = reg.reserved[0].first;
if (reg.uses_portions)
info.portions_for_operator = reg.fee;
else
info.portions_for_operator = mul128_div64(reg.fee, cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS, cryptonote::STAKING_FEE_BASIS);
info.registration_height = block_height;
info.registration_hf_version = hf_version;
info.last_reward_block_height = block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = index;
info.swarm_id = UNASSIGNED_SWARM_ID;
info.last_ip_change_height = block_height;
for (auto it = reg.reserved.begin(); it != reg.reserved.end(); ++it)
{
auto& [addr, amount] = *it;
bool dupe = false;
for (auto it2 = std::next(it); it2 != reg.reserved.end(); ++it2)
{
if (it2->first == addr)
{
log::info(logcat, "Invalid registration: duplicate reserved address in registration (tx {})", cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
auto& contributor = info.contributors.emplace_back();
if (reg.uses_portions)
contributor.reserved = mul128_div64(amount, info.staking_requirement, cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS);
else
contributor.reserved = amount;
contributor.address = addr;
info.total_reserved += contributor.reserved;
}
// In HF16 we require that the amount staked in the registration tx be at least the amount
// reserved for the operator. Before HF16 it only had to be >= 25%, even if the operator
// reserved amount was higher (though wallets would never actually do this).
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse && stake.transferred < info.contributors[0].reserved)
{
log::info(logcat, "Register TX rejected: TX does not have sufficient operator stake");
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::state_t::process_registration_tx(cryptonote::network_type nettype, const cryptonote::block &block, const cryptonote::transaction& tx, uint32_t index, const service_node_keys *my_keys)
{
const auto hf_version = block.major_version;
uint64_t const block_timestamp = block.timestamp;
uint64_t const block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
crypto::public_key key;
auto info_ptr = std::make_shared<service_node_info>();
service_node_info &info = *info_ptr;
if (!is_registration_tx(nettype, hf_version, tx, block_timestamp, block_height, index, key, info))
return false;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
// NOTE(oxen): Grace period is not used anymore with infinite staking. So, if someone somehow reregisters, we just ignore it
const auto iter = service_nodes_infos.find(key);
if (iter != service_nodes_infos.end())
return false;
// Explicitly reset any stored proof to 0, and store it just in case this is a
// re-registration: we want to wipe out any data from the previous registration.
if (sn_list && !sn_list->m_rescanning)
{
auto &proof = sn_list->proofs[key];
proof = {};
proof.store(key, sn_list->m_blockchain);
}
if (my_keys && my_keys->pub == key)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::green), "Service node registered (yours): {} on height: {}", key, block_height);
else
log::info(logcat, "New service node registered: {} on height: {}", key, block_height);
}
else
{
// NOTE: A node doesn't expire until registration_height + lock blocks excess now which acts as the grace period
// So it is possible to find the node still in our list.
bool registered_during_grace_period = false;
const auto iter = service_nodes_infos.find(key);
if (iter != service_nodes_infos.end())
{
if (hf_version >= hf::hf10_bulletproofs)
{
service_node_info const &old_info = *iter->second;
uint64_t expiry_height = old_info.registration_height + staking_num_lock_blocks(nettype);
if (block_height < expiry_height)
return false;
// NOTE: Node preserves its position in list if it reregisters during grace period.
registered_during_grace_period = true;
info.last_reward_block_height = old_info.last_reward_block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = old_info.last_reward_transaction_index;
}
else
{
return false;
}
}
if (my_keys && my_keys->pub == key)
{
if (registered_during_grace_period)
{
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::green), "Service node re-registered (yours): {} at block height: {}", key, block_height);
}
else
{
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::green), "Service node registered (yours): {} at block height: {}", key, block_height);
}
}
else
{
log::info(logcat, "New service node registered: {} at block height: {}", key, block_height);
}
}
service_nodes_infos[key] = std::move(info_ptr);
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::state_t::process_contribution_tx(cryptonote::network_type nettype, const cryptonote::block &block, const cryptonote::transaction& tx, uint32_t index)
{
uint64_t const block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
const auto hf_version = block.major_version;
staking_components stake = {};
if (!tx_get_staking_components_and_amounts(nettype, hf_version, tx, block_height, &stake))
{
if (stake.service_node_pubkey)
log::info(logcat, "TX: Could not decode contribution for service node: {} on height: {} for tx: {}", stake.service_node_pubkey, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
auto iter = service_nodes_infos.find(stake.service_node_pubkey);
if (iter == service_nodes_infos.end())
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Contribution received for service node: {}, but could not be found in the service node list on height: {} for tx: {}\n This could mean that the service node was deregistered before the contribution was processed.", stake.service_node_pubkey, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
const service_node_info& curinfo = *iter->second;
if (curinfo.is_fully_funded())
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Service node: {} is already fully funded, but contribution received on height: {} for tx: {}", stake.service_node_pubkey, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
if (!cryptonote::get_tx_secret_key_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, stake.tx_key))
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Failed to get tx secret key from contribution received on height: {} for tx: {}", block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
auto &contributors = curinfo.contributors;
const size_t existing_contributions = curinfo.total_num_locked_contributions();
size_t other_reservations = 0; // Number of spots that must be left open, *not* counting this contributor (if they have a reserved spot)
bool new_contributor = true;
size_t contributor_position = 0;
uint64_t contr_unfilled_reserved = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < contributors.size(); i++)
{
const auto& c = contributors[i];
if (c.address == stake.address)
{
contributor_position = i;
new_contributor = false;
if (c.amount < c.reserved)
contr_unfilled_reserved = c.reserved - c.amount;
}
else if (c.amount < c.reserved)
other_reservations++;
}
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse && stake.locked_contributions.size() != 1)
{
// Nothing has ever created stake txes with multiple stake outputs, but we start enforcing
// that in HF16.
log::info(logcat, "Ignoring staking tx: multi-output stakes are not permitted as of HF16");
return false;
}
// Check node contributor counts
{
bool too_many_contributions = false;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching)
// As of HF19 we allow up to 10 stakes total
too_many_contributions = existing_contributions + other_reservations + 1 > oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_HF19;
else if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse)
// Before HF16 we didn't properly take into account unfilled reservation spots
too_many_contributions = existing_contributions + other_reservations + 1 > oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1;
else if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
// As of HF11 we allow up to 4 stakes total (except for the loophole closed above)
too_many_contributions = existing_contributions + stake.locked_contributions.size() > oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1;
else
// Before HF11 we allowed up to 4 contributors, but each can contribute multiple times
too_many_contributions = new_contributor && contributors.size() >= oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1;
if (too_many_contributions)
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Already hit the max number of contributions: {} for contributor: {} on height: {} for tx: {}", (hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching ? oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_HF19 : oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1), cryptonote::get_account_address_as_str(nettype, false, stake.address), block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
}
// Check that the contribution is large enough
uint64_t min_contribution;
if (!new_contributor && hf_version < hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{ // Follow-up contributions from an existing contributor could be any size before HF11
min_contribution = 1;
}
else if (hf_version < hf::hf16_pulse)
{
// The implementation before HF16 was a bit broken w.r.t. properly handling reserved amounts
min_contribution = get_min_node_contribution(hf_version, curinfo.staking_requirement, curinfo.total_reserved, existing_contributions);
}
else // HF16+:
{
if (contr_unfilled_reserved > 0)
// We've got a reserved spot: require that it be filled in one go. (Reservation contribution rules are already enforced in the registration).
min_contribution = contr_unfilled_reserved;
else
min_contribution = get_min_node_contribution(hf_version, curinfo.staking_requirement, curinfo.total_reserved, existing_contributions + other_reservations);
}
if (stake.transferred < min_contribution)
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Amount {} did not meet min {} for service node: {} on height: {} for tx: {}", stake.transferred, min_contribution, stake.service_node_pubkey, block_height, cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx));
return false;
}
// Check that the contribution isn't too large. Subtract contr_unfilled_reserved because we want to
// calculate this using only the total reserved amounts of *other* contributors but not our own.
if (auto max = get_max_node_contribution(hf_version, curinfo.staking_requirement, curinfo.total_reserved - contr_unfilled_reserved);
stake.transferred > max)
{
log::info(logcat, "TX: Amount {} is too large (max {}). This is probably a result of competing stakes.", stake.transferred, max);
return false;
}
//
// Successfully Validated
//
auto &info = duplicate_info(iter->second);
if (new_contributor)
{
contributor_position = info.contributors.size();
info.contributors.emplace_back().address = stake.address;
}
service_node_info::contributor_t& contributor = info.contributors[contributor_position];
// In this action, we cannot
// increase total_reserved so much that it is >= staking_requirement
uint64_t can_increase_reserved_by = info.staking_requirement - info.total_reserved;
uint64_t max_amount = contributor.reserved + can_increase_reserved_by;
stake.transferred = std::min(max_amount - contributor.amount, stake.transferred);
contributor.amount += stake.transferred;
info.total_contributed += stake.transferred;
if (contributor.amount > contributor.reserved)
{
info.total_reserved += contributor.amount - contributor.reserved;
contributor.reserved = contributor.amount;
}
info.last_reward_block_height = block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = index;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
for (const auto &contribution : stake.locked_contributions)
contributor.locked_contributions.push_back(contribution);
log::info(logcat, "Contribution of {} received for service node {}", stake.transferred, stake.service_node_pubkey);
if (info.is_fully_funded()) {
info.active_since_height = block_height;
return true;
}
return false;
}
static std::string dump_pulse_block_data(cryptonote::block const &block, service_nodes::quorum const *quorum)
{
std::bitset<8 * sizeof(block.pulse.validator_bitset)> const validator_bitset = block.pulse.validator_bitset;
std::string s = "Block({}): {}\nLeader: {}\nRound: {:d}\nValidator Bitset: {}\nSignatures:"_format(
cryptonote::get_block_height(block),
cryptonote::get_block_hash(block),
!quorum ? "(invalid quorum)" : quorum->workers.empty() ? "(invalid leader)" :
oxenc::to_hex(tools::view_guts(quorum->workers[0])),
validator_bitset.to_string());
auto append = std::back_inserter(s);
if (block.signatures.empty())
fmt::format_to(append, " (none)");
for (const auto& sig : block.signatures)
{
fmt::format_to(append, "\n [{:d}] validator: {}", sig.voter_index,
!quorum ? "(invalid quorum)" :
sig.voter_index >= quorum->validators.size() ? "(invalid quorum index)" :
"{}: {}"_format(quorum->validators[sig.voter_index], sig.signature));
}
return s;
}
static bool verify_block_components(cryptonote::network_type nettype,
cryptonote::block const &block,
bool miner_block,
bool alt_block,
bool log_errors,
pulse::timings &timings,
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> pulse_quorum,
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<const quorum>> &alt_pulse_quorums)
{
std::string_view block_type = alt_block ? "alt block"sv : "block"sv;
uint64_t height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
crypto::hash hash = cryptonote::get_block_hash(block);
if (miner_block)
{
if (cryptonote::block_has_pulse_components(block))
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Pulse {} received but only miner blocks are permitted\n{}", block_type, dump_pulse_block_data(block, pulse_quorum.get()));
return false;
}
if (block.pulse.round != 0)
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Miner {} given but unexpectedly set round {} on height {}", block_type, block.pulse.round, height);
return false;
}
if (block.pulse.validator_bitset != 0)
{
std::bitset<8 * sizeof(block.pulse.validator_bitset)> const bitset = block.pulse.validator_bitset;
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Miner {} block given but unexpectedly set validator bitset {} on height {}", block_type, bitset.to_string(), height);
return false;
}
if (block.signatures.size())
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Miner {} block given but unexpectedly has {} signatures on height {}", block_type, block.signatures.size(), height);
return false;
}
return true;
}
else
{
if (!cryptonote::block_has_pulse_components(block))
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Miner {} received but only pulse blocks are permitted\n{}", block_type, dump_pulse_block_data(block, pulse_quorum.get()));
return false;
}
// TODO(doyle): Core tests need to generate coherent timestamps with
// Pulse. So we relax the rules here for now.
if (nettype != cryptonote::network_type::FAKECHAIN)
{
auto round_begin_timestamp = timings.r0_timestamp + (block.pulse.round * PULSE_ROUND_TIME);
auto round_end_timestamp = round_begin_timestamp + PULSE_ROUND_TIME;
uint64_t begin_time = tools::to_seconds(round_begin_timestamp.time_since_epoch());
uint64_t end_time = tools::to_seconds(round_end_timestamp.time_since_epoch());
if (!(block.timestamp >= begin_time && block.timestamp <= end_time))
{
std::string time = tools::get_human_readable_timestamp(block.timestamp);
std::string begin = tools::get_human_readable_timestamp(begin_time);
std::string end = tools::get_human_readable_timestamp(end_time);
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Pulse {} with round {} specifies timestamp {} is not within an acceptable range of time [{}, {}]", block_type, +block.pulse.round, time, begin, end);
return false;
}
}
if (block.nonce != 0)
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Pulse {} specified a nonce when quorum block generation is available, nonce: {}", block_type, block.nonce);
return false;
}
bool quorum_verified = false;
if (alt_block)
{
// NOTE: Check main pulse quorum. It might not necessarily exist because
// the alt-block's chain could be in any arbitrary state.
bool failed_quorum_verify = true;
if (pulse_quorum)
{
log::info(logcat, "Verifying alt-block {}:{} against main chain quorum", height, hash);
failed_quorum_verify = service_nodes::verify_quorum_signatures(*pulse_quorum,
quorum_type::pulse,
block.major_version,
height,
hash,
block.signatures,
&block) == false;
}
// NOTE: Check alt pulse quorums
if (failed_quorum_verify)
{
log::info(logcat, "Verifying alt-block {}:{} against alt chain quorum(s)", height, hash);
for (auto const &alt_quorum : alt_pulse_quorums)
{
if (service_nodes::verify_quorum_signatures(*alt_quorum,
quorum_type::pulse,
block.major_version,
height,
hash,
block.signatures,
&block))
{
failed_quorum_verify = false;
break;
}
}
}
quorum_verified = !failed_quorum_verify;
}
else
{
// NOTE: We only accept insufficient node for Pulse if we're on an alt
// block (that chain would be in any arbitrary state, we could be
// completely isolated from the correct network for example).
bool insufficient_nodes_for_pulse = pulse_quorum == nullptr;
if (insufficient_nodes_for_pulse)
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Pulse {} specified but no quorum available {}", block_type, dump_pulse_block_data(block, pulse_quorum.get()));
return false;
}
quorum_verified = service_nodes::verify_quorum_signatures(*pulse_quorum,
quorum_type::pulse,
block.major_version,
cryptonote::get_block_height(block),
cryptonote::get_block_hash(block),
block.signatures,
&block);
}
if (quorum_verified)
{
// NOTE: These invariants are already checked in verify_quorum_signatures
if (alt_block)
log::info(logcat, "Alt-block {}:{} verified successfully", height, hash);
assert(block.pulse.validator_bitset != 0);
assert(block.pulse.validator_bitset < (1 << PULSE_QUORUM_NUM_VALIDATORS));
assert(block.signatures.size() == service_nodes::PULSE_BLOCK_REQUIRED_SIGNATURES);
}
else
{
if (log_errors)
log::info(logcat, "Pulse {} failed quorum verification\n{}", block_type, dump_pulse_block_data(block, pulse_quorum.get()));
}
return quorum_verified;
}
}
static bool find_block_in_db(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db, crypto::hash const &hash, cryptonote::block &block)
{
try
{
block = db.get_block(hash);
}
catch(std::exception const &e)
{
// ignore not found block, try alt db
log::info(logcat, "Block {} not found in main DB, searching alt DB", hash);
cryptonote::alt_block_data_t alt_data;
std::string blob;
if (!db.get_alt_block(hash, &alt_data, &blob, nullptr))
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to find block {}", hash);
return false;
}
if (!cryptonote::parse_and_validate_block_from_blob(blob, block, nullptr))
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to parse alt block blob at {}:{}", alt_data.height, hash);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
void service_node_list::verify_block(const cryptonote::block &block, bool alt_block, cryptonote::checkpoint_t const *checkpoint)
{
if (block.major_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return;
std::string_view block_type = alt_block ? "alt block"sv : "block"sv;
//
// NOTE: Verify the checkpoint given on this height that locks in a block in the past.
//
if (block.major_version >= hf::hf13_enforce_checkpoints && checkpoint)
{
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<const service_nodes::quorum>> alt_quorums;
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> quorum = get_quorum(quorum_type::checkpointing, checkpoint->height, false, alt_block ? &alt_quorums : nullptr);
if (!quorum)
throw std::runtime_error{"Failed to get testing quorum checkpoint for {} {}"_format(block_type, cryptonote::get_block_hash(block))};
bool failed_checkpoint_verify = !service_nodes::verify_checkpoint(block.major_version, *checkpoint, *quorum);
if (alt_block && failed_checkpoint_verify)
{
for (std::shared_ptr<const service_nodes::quorum> alt_quorum : alt_quorums)
{
if (service_nodes::verify_checkpoint(block.major_version, *checkpoint, *alt_quorum))
{
failed_checkpoint_verify = false;
break;
}
}
}
if (failed_checkpoint_verify)
throw std::runtime_error{"Service node checkpoint failed verification for {} {}"_format(block_type, cryptonote::get_block_hash(block))};
}
//
// NOTE: Get Pulse Block Timing Information
//
pulse::timings timings = {};
uint64_t height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
if (block.major_version >= hf::hf16_pulse)
{
uint64_t prev_timestamp = 0;
if (alt_block)
{
cryptonote::block prev_block;
if (!find_block_in_db(m_blockchain.get_db(), block.prev_id, prev_block))
throw std::runtime_error{
"Alt block {} references previous block {} not available in DB."_format(
cryptonote::get_block_hash(block), block.prev_id)};
prev_timestamp = prev_block.timestamp;
}
else
{
uint64_t prev_height = height - 1;
prev_timestamp = m_blockchain.get_db().get_block_timestamp(prev_height);
}
if (!pulse::get_round_timings(m_blockchain, height, prev_timestamp, timings))
throw std::runtime_error{
"Failed to query the block data for Pulse timings to validate incoming {} at height {}"_format(
block_type, height)};
}
//
// NOTE: Load Pulse Quorums
//
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> pulse_quorum;
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<const quorum>> alt_pulse_quorums;
bool pulse_hf = block.major_version >= hf::hf16_pulse;
if (pulse_hf)
{
pulse_quorum = get_quorum(quorum_type::pulse,
height,
false /*include historical quorums*/,
alt_block ? &alt_pulse_quorums : nullptr);
}
if (m_blockchain.nettype() != cryptonote::network_type::FAKECHAIN)
{
// TODO(doyle): Core tests don't generate proper timestamps for detecting
// timeout yet. So we don't do a timeout check and assume all blocks
// incoming from Pulse are valid if they have the correct signatures
// (despite timestamp being potentially wrong).
if (pulse::time_point(std::chrono::seconds(block.timestamp)) >= timings.miner_fallback_timestamp)
pulse_quorum = nullptr;
}
//
// NOTE: Verify Block
//
bool result = false;
if (alt_block)
{
// NOTE: Verify as a pulse block first if possible, then as a miner block.
// This alt block could belong to a chain that is in an arbitrary state.
if (pulse_hf)
result = verify_block_components(m_blockchain.nettype(), block, false /*miner_block*/, true /*alt_block*/, false /*log_errors*/, timings, pulse_quorum, alt_pulse_quorums);
if (!result)
result = verify_block_components(m_blockchain.nettype(), block, true /*miner_block*/, true /*alt_block*/, false /*log_errors*/, timings, pulse_quorum, alt_pulse_quorums);
}
else
{
// NOTE: No pulse quorums are generated when the network has insufficient nodes to generate quorums
// Or, block specifies time after all the rounds have timed out
bool miner_block = !pulse_hf || !pulse_quorum;
result = verify_block_components(m_blockchain.nettype(),
block,
miner_block,
false /*alt_block*/,
true /*log_errors*/,
timings,
pulse_quorum,
alt_pulse_quorums);
}
if (!result)
throw std::runtime_error{"Failed to verify block components for incoming {} at height {}"_format(
block_type, height)};
}
void service_node_list::block_add(const cryptonote::block& block, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs, cryptonote::checkpoint_t const *checkpoint)
{
if (block.major_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return;
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
process_block(block, txs);
verify_block(block, false /*alt_block*/, checkpoint);
if (cryptonote::block_has_pulse_components(block))
{
// NOTE: Only record participation if its a block we recently received.
// Otherwise processing blocks in retrospect/re-loading on restart seeds
// in old-data.
uint64_t const block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
bool newest_block = m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height() == (block_height + 1);
auto now = pulse::clock::now().time_since_epoch();
auto earliest_time = std::chrono::seconds(block.timestamp) - cryptonote::TARGET_BLOCK_TIME;
auto latest_time = std::chrono::seconds(block.timestamp) + cryptonote::TARGET_BLOCK_TIME;
if (newest_block && (now >= earliest_time && now <= latest_time))
{
std::shared_ptr<const quorum> quorum = get_quorum(quorum_type::pulse, block_height, false, nullptr);
if (!quorum)
throw std::runtime_error{"Unexpected Pulse error: quorum was not generated"};
if (quorum->validators.empty())
throw std::runtime_error{"Unexpected Pulse error: quorum was empty"};
for (size_t validator_index = 0; validator_index < service_nodes::PULSE_QUORUM_NUM_VALIDATORS; validator_index++)
{
uint16_t bit = 1 << validator_index;
bool participated = block.pulse.validator_bitset & bit;
record_pulse_participation(quorum->validators[validator_index], block_height, block.pulse.round, participated);
}
}
}
}
bool service_node_list::state_history_exists(uint64_t height)
{
auto it = m_transient.state_history.find(height);
return it != m_transient.state_history.end();
}
bool service_node_list::process_batching_rewards(const cryptonote::block& block)
{
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
if (m_blockchain.nettype() != cryptonote::network_type::FAKECHAIN && block.major_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching && height() != block_height)
{
log::error(logcat, "Service node list out of sync with the batching database, adding block will fail because the service node list is at height: {} and the batching database is at height: {}", height(), m_blockchain.sqlite_db()->height+1);
return false;
}
return m_blockchain.sqlite_db()->add_block(block, m_state);
}
bool service_node_list::pop_batching_rewards_block(const cryptonote::block& block)
{
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
if (m_blockchain.nettype() != cryptonote::network_type::FAKECHAIN && block.major_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching && height() != block_height)
{
if (auto it = m_transient.state_history.find(block_height); it != m_transient.state_history.end())
return m_blockchain.sqlite_db()->pop_block(block, *it);
m_blockchain.sqlite_db()->reset_database();
return false;
}
return m_blockchain.sqlite_db()->pop_block(block, m_state);
}
static std::mt19937_64 quorum_rng(hf hf_version, crypto::hash const &hash, quorum_type type)
{
std::mt19937_64 result;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse)
{
std::array<uint32_t, (sizeof(hash) / sizeof(uint32_t)) + 1> src = {static_cast<uint32_t>(type)};
std::memcpy(&src[1], &hash, sizeof(hash));
for (uint32_t &val : src) oxenc::little_to_host_inplace(val);
std::seed_seq sequence(src.begin(), src.end());
result.seed(sequence);
}
else
{
uint64_t seed = 0;
std::memcpy(&seed, hash.data(), sizeof(seed));
oxenc::little_to_host_inplace(seed);
seed += static_cast<uint64_t>(type);
result.seed(seed);
}
return result;
}
static std::vector<size_t> generate_shuffled_service_node_index_list(
hf hf_version,
size_t list_size,
crypto::hash const &block_hash,
quorum_type type,
size_t sublist_size = 0,
size_t sublist_up_to = 0)
{
std::vector<size_t> result(list_size);
std::iota(result.begin(), result.end(), 0);
std::mt19937_64 rng = quorum_rng(hf_version, block_hash, type);
// Shuffle 2
// |=================================|
// | |
// Shuffle 1 |
// |==============| |
// | | | |
// |sublist_size | |
// | | sublist_up_to |
// 0 N Y Z
// [.......................................]
// If we have a list [0,Z) but we need a shuffled sublist of the first N values that only
// includes values from [0,Y) then we do this using two shuffles: first of the [0,Y) sublist,
// then of the [N,Z) sublist (which is already partially shuffled, but that doesn't matter). We
// reuse the same seed for both partial shuffles, but again, that isn't an issue.
if ((0 < sublist_size && sublist_size < list_size) && (0 < sublist_up_to && sublist_up_to < list_size)) {
assert(sublist_size <= sublist_up_to); // Can't select N random items from M items when M < N
auto rng_copy = rng;
tools::shuffle_portable(result.begin(), result.begin() + sublist_up_to, rng);
tools::shuffle_portable(result.begin() + sublist_size, result.end(), rng_copy);
}
else {
tools::shuffle_portable(result.begin(), result.end(), rng);
}
return result;
}
template <typename It>
static std::vector<crypto::hash> make_pulse_entropy_from_blocks(It begin, It end, uint8_t pulse_round)
{
std::vector<crypto::hash> result;
result.reserve(std::distance(begin, end));
for (auto it = begin; it != end; it++)
{
cryptonote::block const &block = *it;
crypto::hash hash = {};
if (block.major_version >= hf::hf16_pulse &&
cryptonote::block_has_pulse_components(block))
{
std::array<uint8_t, 1 + sizeof(block.pulse.random_value)> src = {pulse_round};
std::copy(std::begin(block.pulse.random_value.data), std::end(block.pulse.random_value.data), src.begin() + 1);
crypto::cn_fast_hash(src.data(), src.size(), hash);
}
else
{
crypto::hash block_hash = cryptonote::get_block_hash(block);
std::array<uint8_t, 1 + sizeof(hash)> src = {pulse_round};
std::copy(std::begin(block_hash), std::end(block_hash), src.begin() + 1);
crypto::cn_fast_hash(src.data(), src.size(), hash);
}
assert(hash);
result.push_back(hash);
}
return result;
}
std::vector<crypto::hash> get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db,
cryptonote::block const &top_block,
uint8_t pulse_round)
{
uint64_t const top_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(top_block);
if (top_height < PULSE_QUORUM_ENTROPY_LAG)
{
log::error(logcat, "Insufficient blocks to get quorum entropy for Pulse, height is {}, we need {} blocks.", top_height, PULSE_QUORUM_ENTROPY_LAG);
return {};
}
uint64_t const start_height = top_height - PULSE_QUORUM_ENTROPY_LAG;
uint64_t const end_height = start_height + PULSE_QUORUM_SIZE;
std::vector<cryptonote::block> blocks;
blocks.reserve(PULSE_QUORUM_SIZE);
// NOTE: Go backwards from the block and retrieve the blocks for entropy.
// We search by block so that this function handles alternatives blocks as
// well as mainchain blocks.
crypto::hash prev_hash = top_block.prev_id;
uint64_t prev_height = top_height;
while (prev_height > start_height)
{
cryptonote::block block;
if (!find_block_in_db(db, prev_hash, block))
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to get quorum entropy for Pulse, block at {}{}", prev_height, prev_hash);
return {};
}
prev_hash = block.prev_id;
if (prev_height >= start_height && prev_height <= end_height)
blocks.push_back(block);
prev_height--;
}
return make_pulse_entropy_from_blocks(blocks.rbegin(), blocks.rend(), pulse_round);
}
std::vector<crypto::hash> get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db,
crypto::hash const &top_hash,
uint8_t pulse_round)
{
cryptonote::block top_block;
if (!find_block_in_db(db, top_hash, top_block))
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to get quorum entropy for Pulse, next block parent {}", top_hash);
return {};
}
return get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(db, top_block, pulse_round);
}
std::vector<crypto::hash> get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db,
uint8_t pulse_round)
{
return get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(db, db.get_top_block(), pulse_round);
}
service_nodes::quorum generate_pulse_quorum(cryptonote::network_type nettype,
crypto::public_key const &block_leader,
hf hf_version,
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> const &active_snode_list,
std::vector<crypto::hash> const &pulse_entropy,
uint8_t pulse_round)
{
service_nodes::quorum result = {};
if (active_snode_list.size() < pulse_min_service_nodes(nettype))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Insufficient active Service Nodes for Pulse: {}", active_snode_list.size());
return result;
}
if (pulse_entropy.size() != PULSE_QUORUM_SIZE)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Blockchain has insufficient blocks to generate Pulse data");
return result;
}
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo const *> pulse_candidates;
pulse_candidates.reserve(active_snode_list.size());
for (auto &node : active_snode_list)
{
if (node.first != block_leader || pulse_round > 0)
pulse_candidates.push_back(&node);
}
// NOTE: Sort ascending in height i.e. sort preferring the longest time since the validator was in a Pulse quorum.
std::sort(
pulse_candidates.begin(), pulse_candidates.end(), [](pubkey_and_sninfo const *a, pubkey_and_sninfo const *b) {
if (a->second->pulse_sorter == b->second->pulse_sorter)
return memcmp(reinterpret_cast<const void *>(&a->first), reinterpret_cast<const void *>(&b->first), sizeof(a->first)) < 0;
return a->second->pulse_sorter < b->second->pulse_sorter;
});
crypto::public_key block_producer;
if (pulse_round == 0)
{
block_producer = block_leader;
}
else
{
std::mt19937_64 rng = quorum_rng(hf_version, pulse_entropy[0], quorum_type::pulse);
size_t producer_index = tools::uniform_distribution_portable(rng, pulse_candidates.size());
block_producer = pulse_candidates[producer_index]->first;
pulse_candidates.erase(pulse_candidates.begin() + producer_index);
}
// NOTE: Order the candidates so the first half nodes in the list is the validators for this round.
// - Divide the list in half, select validators from the first half of the list.
// - Swap the chosen validator into the moving first half of the list.
auto running_it = pulse_candidates.begin();
size_t const partition_index = (pulse_candidates.size() - 1) / 2;
if (partition_index == 0)
{
running_it += service_nodes::PULSE_QUORUM_NUM_VALIDATORS;
}
else
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < service_nodes::PULSE_QUORUM_NUM_VALIDATORS; i++)
{
crypto::hash const &entropy = pulse_entropy[i + 1];
std::mt19937_64 rng = quorum_rng(hf_version, entropy, quorum_type::pulse);
size_t validators_available = std::distance(running_it, pulse_candidates.end());
size_t swap_index = tools::uniform_distribution_portable(rng, std::min(partition_index, validators_available));
std::swap(*running_it, *(running_it + swap_index));
running_it++;
}
}
result.workers.push_back(block_producer);
result.validators.reserve(PULSE_QUORUM_NUM_VALIDATORS);
for (auto it = pulse_candidates.begin(); it != running_it; it++)
{
crypto::public_key const &node_key = (*it)->first;
result.validators.push_back(node_key);
}
return result;
}
static void generate_other_quorums(service_node_list::state_t &state, std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> const &active_snode_list, cryptonote::network_type nettype, hf hf_version)
{
assert(state.block_hash);
// The two quorums here have different selection criteria: the entire checkpoint quorum and the
// state change *validators* want only active service nodes, but the state change *workers*
// (i.e. the nodes to be tested) also include decommissioned service nodes. (Prior to v12 there
// are no decommissioned nodes, so this distinction is irrelevant for network concensus).
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> decomm_snode_list;
if (hf_version >= hf::hf12_checkpointing)
decomm_snode_list = state.decommissioned_service_nodes_infos();
quorum_type const max_quorum_type = max_quorum_type_for_hf(hf_version);
for (int type_int = 0; type_int <= (int)max_quorum_type; type_int++)
{
auto type = static_cast<quorum_type>(type_int);
auto quorum = std::make_shared<service_nodes::quorum>();
std::vector<size_t> pub_keys_indexes;
size_t num_validators = 0;
size_t num_workers = 0;
switch(type)
{
case quorum_type::obligations:
{
size_t total_nodes = active_snode_list.size() + decomm_snode_list.size();
num_validators = std::min(active_snode_list.size(), STATE_CHANGE_QUORUM_SIZE);
pub_keys_indexes = generate_shuffled_service_node_index_list(hf_version, total_nodes, state.block_hash, type, num_validators, active_snode_list.size());
state.quorums.obligations = quorum;
size_t num_remaining_nodes = total_nodes - num_validators;
num_workers = std::min(num_remaining_nodes, std::max(STATE_CHANGE_MIN_NODES_TO_TEST, num_remaining_nodes/STATE_CHANGE_NTH_OF_THE_NETWORK_TO_TEST));
}
break;
case quorum_type::checkpointing:
{
// Checkpoint quorums only exist every CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL blocks, but the height that gets
// used to generate the quorum (i.e. the `height` variable here) is actually `H -
// REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12`, where H is divisible by CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL, but
// REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12 is not (it equals 11). Hence the addition here to
// "undo" the lag before checking to see if we're on an interval multiple:
if ((state.height + REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12) % CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL != 0)
continue; // Not on an interval multiple: no checkpointing quorum is defined.
size_t total_nodes = active_snode_list.size();
// TODO(oxen): Soft fork, remove when testnet gets reset
if (nettype == cryptonote::network_type::TESTNET && state.height < 85357)
total_nodes = active_snode_list.size() + decomm_snode_list.size();
if (total_nodes >= CHECKPOINT_QUORUM_SIZE)
{
pub_keys_indexes = generate_shuffled_service_node_index_list(hf_version, total_nodes, state.block_hash, type);
num_validators = std::min(pub_keys_indexes.size(), CHECKPOINT_QUORUM_SIZE);
}
state.quorums.checkpointing = quorum;
}
break;
case quorum_type::blink:
{
if (state.height % BLINK_QUORUM_INTERVAL != 0)
continue;
// Further filter the active SN list for the blink quorum to only include SNs that are not
// scheduled to finish unlocking between the quorum height and a few blocks after the
// associated blink height.
pub_keys_indexes.reserve(active_snode_list.size());
uint64_t const active_until = state.height + BLINK_EXPIRY_BUFFER;
for (size_t index = 0; index < active_snode_list.size(); index++)
{
pubkey_and_sninfo const &entry = active_snode_list[index];
uint64_t requested_unlock_height = entry.second->requested_unlock_height;
if (requested_unlock_height == KEY_IMAGE_AWAITING_UNLOCK_HEIGHT || requested_unlock_height > active_until)
pub_keys_indexes.push_back(index);
}
if (pub_keys_indexes.size() >= BLINK_MIN_VOTES)
{
std::mt19937_64 rng = quorum_rng(hf_version, state.block_hash, type);
tools::shuffle_portable(pub_keys_indexes.begin(), pub_keys_indexes.end(), rng);
num_validators = std::min<size_t>(pub_keys_indexes.size(), BLINK_SUBQUORUM_SIZE);
}
// Otherwise leave empty to signal that there aren't enough SNs to form a usable quorum (to
// distinguish it from an invalid height, which gets left as a nullptr)
state.quorums.blink = quorum;
}
break;
// NOTE: NOP. Pulse quorums are generated pre-Service Node List changes for the block
case quorum_type::pulse: continue;
default: log::error(logcat, "Unhandled quorum type enum with value: {}", type_int); continue;
}
quorum->validators.reserve(num_validators);
quorum->workers.reserve(num_workers);
size_t i = 0;
for (; i < num_validators; i++)
{
quorum->validators.push_back(active_snode_list[pub_keys_indexes[i]].first);
}
for (; i < num_validators + num_workers; i++)
{
size_t j = pub_keys_indexes[i];
if (j < active_snode_list.size())
quorum->workers.push_back(active_snode_list[j].first);
else
quorum->workers.push_back(decomm_snode_list[j - active_snode_list.size()].first);
}
}
}
void service_node_list::state_t::update_from_block(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db,
cryptonote::network_type nettype,
state_set const &state_history,
state_set const &state_archive,
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, state_t> const &alt_states,
const cryptonote::block &block,
const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction> &txs,
const service_node_keys *my_keys)
{
++height;
bool need_swarm_update = false;
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
assert(height == block_height);
quorums = {};
block_hash = cryptonote::get_block_hash(block);
auto hf_version = block.major_version;
//
// Generate Pulse Quorum before any SN changes are applied to the list because,
// the Leader and Validators for this block generated Pulse Data before any
// TX's included in the block were applied
// i.e. before any deregistrations, registrations, decommissions, recommissions.
//
crypto::public_key winner_pubkey = cryptonote::get_service_node_winner_from_tx_extra(block.miner_tx.extra);
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse)
{
std::vector<crypto::hash> entropy = get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(db, block.prev_id, block.pulse.round);
quorum pulse_quorum = generate_pulse_quorum(nettype, winner_pubkey, hf_version, active_service_nodes_infos(), entropy, block.pulse.round);
if (verify_pulse_quorum_sizes(pulse_quorum))
{
// NOTE: Send candidate to the back of the list
for (size_t quorum_index = 0 ; quorum_index < pulse_quorum.validators.size(); quorum_index++)
{
crypto::public_key const &key = pulse_quorum.validators[quorum_index];
auto &info_ptr = service_nodes_infos[key];
service_node_info &new_info = duplicate_info(info_ptr);
new_info.pulse_sorter.last_height_validating_in_quorum = height;
new_info.pulse_sorter.quorum_index = quorum_index;
}
quorums.pulse = std::make_shared<service_nodes::quorum>(std::move(pulse_quorum));
}
}
//
// Remove expired blacklisted key images
//
if (hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
for (auto entry = key_image_blacklist.begin(); entry != key_image_blacklist.end();)
{
if (block_height >= entry->unlock_height)
entry = key_image_blacklist.erase(entry);
else
entry++;
}
}
//
// Expire Nodes
//
for (const crypto::public_key& pubkey : get_expired_nodes(db, nettype, block.major_version, block_height))
{
auto i = service_nodes_infos.find(pubkey);
if (i != service_nodes_infos.end())
{
if (my_keys && my_keys->pub == pubkey)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::green), "Service node expired (yours): {} at block height: {}", pubkey, block_height);
else
log::info(logcat, "Service node expired: {} at block height: {}", pubkey, block_height);
need_swarm_update += i->second->is_active();
service_nodes_infos.erase(i);
}
}
//
// Advance the list to the next candidate for a reward
//
{
auto it = service_nodes_infos.find(winner_pubkey);
if (it != service_nodes_infos.end())
{
// set the winner as though it was re-registering at transaction index=UINT32_MAX for this block
auto &info = duplicate_info(it->second);
info.last_reward_block_height = block_height;
info.last_reward_transaction_index = UINT32_MAX;
}
}
//
// Process TXs in the Block
//
cryptonote::txtype max_tx_type = cryptonote::transaction::get_max_type_for_hf(hf_version);
cryptonote::txtype staking_tx_type = (max_tx_type < cryptonote::txtype::stake) ? cryptonote::txtype::standard : cryptonote::txtype::stake;
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < txs.size(); ++index)
{
const cryptonote::transaction& tx = txs[index];
if (tx.type == staking_tx_type)
{
process_registration_tx(nettype, block, tx, index, my_keys);
need_swarm_update += process_contribution_tx(nettype, block, tx, index);
}
else if (tx.type == cryptonote::txtype::state_change)
{
need_swarm_update += process_state_change_tx(state_history, state_archive, alt_states, nettype, block, tx, my_keys);
}
else if (tx.type == cryptonote::txtype::key_image_unlock)
{
process_key_image_unlock_tx(nettype, hf_version, block_height, tx);
}
}
// Filtered pubkey-sorted vector of service nodes that are active (fully funded and *not* decommissioned).
std::vector<pubkey_and_sninfo> active_snode_list = sort_and_filter(service_nodes_infos, [](const service_node_info &info) { return info.is_active(); });
if (need_swarm_update)
{
crypto::hash const block_hash = cryptonote::get_block_hash(block);
uint64_t seed = 0;
std::memcpy(&seed, block_hash.data(), sizeof(seed));
/// Gather existing swarms from infos
swarm_snode_map_t existing_swarms;
for (const auto &key_info : active_snode_list)
existing_swarms[key_info.second->swarm_id].push_back(key_info.first);
calc_swarm_changes(existing_swarms, seed);
/// Apply changes
for (const auto& [swarm_id, snodes] : existing_swarms) {
for (const auto& snode : snodes) {
auto& sn_info_ptr = service_nodes_infos.at(snode);
if (sn_info_ptr->swarm_id == swarm_id) continue; /// nothing changed for this snode
duplicate_info(sn_info_ptr).swarm_id = swarm_id;
}
}
}
generate_other_quorums(*this, active_snode_list, nettype, hf_version);
}
void service_node_list::process_block(const cryptonote::block& block, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs)
{
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
auto hf_version = block.major_version;
if (hf_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return;
// Cull old history
uint64_t cull_height = short_term_state_cull_height(hf_version, block_height);
{
auto end_it = m_transient.state_history.upper_bound(cull_height);
for (auto it = m_transient.state_history.begin(); it != end_it; it++)
{
if (m_store_quorum_history)
m_transient.old_quorum_states.emplace_back(it->height, it->quorums);
uint64_t next_long_term_state = ((it->height / STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL) + 1) * STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL;
uint64_t dist_to_next_long_term_state = next_long_term_state - it->height;
bool need_quorum_for_future_states = (dist_to_next_long_term_state <= VOTE_LIFETIME + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER);
if ((it->height % STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL) == 0 || need_quorum_for_future_states)
{
m_transient.state_added_to_archive = true;
if (need_quorum_for_future_states) // Preserve just quorum
{
state_t &state = const_cast<state_t &>(*it); // safe: set order only depends on state_t.height
state.service_nodes_infos = {};
state.key_image_blacklist = {};
state.only_loaded_quorums = true;
}
m_transient.state_archive.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_archive.end(), std::move(*it));
}
}
m_transient.state_history.erase(m_transient.state_history.begin(), end_it);
if (m_transient.old_quorum_states.size() > m_store_quorum_history)
m_transient.old_quorum_states.erase(m_transient.old_quorum_states.begin(), m_transient.old_quorum_states.begin() + (m_transient.old_quorum_states.size() - m_store_quorum_history));
}
// Cull alt state history
for (auto it = m_transient.alt_state.begin(); it != m_transient.alt_state.end(); )
{
state_t const &alt_state = it->second;
if (alt_state.height < cull_height) it = m_transient.alt_state.erase(it);
else it++;
}
cryptonote::network_type nettype = m_blockchain.nettype();
m_transient.state_history.insert(m_transient.state_history.end(), m_state);
m_state.update_from_block(m_blockchain.get_db(), nettype, m_transient.state_history, m_transient.state_archive, {}, block, txs, m_service_node_keys);
}
void service_node_list::blockchain_detached(uint64_t height)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
uint64_t revert_to_height = height - 1;
bool reinitialise = false;
bool using_archive = false;
{
auto it = m_transient.state_history.find(revert_to_height); // Try finding detached height directly
reinitialise = (it == m_transient.state_history.end() || it->only_loaded_quorums);
if (!reinitialise)
m_transient.state_history.erase(std::next(it), m_transient.state_history.end());
}
// TODO(oxen): We should loop through the prev 10k heights for robustness, but avoid for v4.0.5. Already enough changes going in
if (reinitialise) // Try finding the next closest old state at 10k intervals
{
uint64_t prev_interval = revert_to_height - (revert_to_height % STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL);
auto it = m_transient.state_archive.find(prev_interval);
reinitialise = (it == m_transient.state_archive.end() || it->only_loaded_quorums);
if (!reinitialise)
{
m_transient.state_history.clear();
m_transient.state_archive.erase(std::next(it), m_transient.state_archive.end());
using_archive = true;
}
}
if (reinitialise)
{
m_transient.state_history.clear();
m_transient.state_archive.clear();
init();
return;
}
auto &history = (using_archive) ? m_transient.state_archive : m_transient.state_history;
auto it = std::prev(history.end());
m_state = std::move(*it);
history.erase(it);
}
std::vector<crypto::public_key> service_node_list::state_t::get_expired_nodes(cryptonote::BlockchainDB const &db,
cryptonote::network_type nettype,
hf hf_version,
uint64_t block_height) const
{
std::vector<crypto::public_key> expired_nodes;
uint64_t const lock_blocks = staking_num_lock_blocks(nettype);
// TODO(oxen): This should really use the registration height instead of getting the block and expiring nodes.
// But there's something subtly off when using registration height causing syncing problems.
if (hf_version == hf::hf9_service_nodes)
{
if (block_height <= lock_blocks)
return expired_nodes;
const uint64_t expired_nodes_block_height = block_height - lock_blocks;
cryptonote::block block = {};
try
{
block = db.get_block_from_height(expired_nodes_block_height);
}
catch (std::exception const &e)
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to get historical block to find expired nodes in v9: {}", e.what());
return expired_nodes;
}
if (block.major_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return expired_nodes;
for (crypto::hash const &hash : block.tx_hashes)
{
cryptonote::transaction tx;
if (!db.get_tx(hash, tx))
{
log::error(logcat, "Failed to get historical tx to find expired service nodes in v9");
continue;
}
uint32_t index = 0;
crypto::public_key key;
service_node_info info = {};
if (is_registration_tx(nettype, hf::hf9_service_nodes, tx, block.timestamp, expired_nodes_block_height, index, key, info))
expired_nodes.push_back(key);
index++;
}
}
else
{
for (auto it = service_nodes_infos.begin(); it != service_nodes_infos.end(); it++)
{
crypto::public_key const &snode_key = it->first;
const service_node_info &info = *it->second;
if (info.registration_hf_version >= hf::hf11_infinite_staking)
{
if (info.requested_unlock_height != KEY_IMAGE_AWAITING_UNLOCK_HEIGHT && block_height > info.requested_unlock_height)
expired_nodes.push_back(snode_key);
}
else // Version 10 Bulletproofs
{
/// Note: this code exhibits a subtle unintended behaviour: a snode that
/// registered in hardfork 9 and was scheduled for deregistration in hardfork 10
/// will have its life is slightly prolonged by the "grace period", although it might
/// look like we use the registration height to determine the expiry height.
uint64_t node_expiry_height = info.registration_height + lock_blocks + cryptonote::old::STAKING_REQUIREMENT_LOCK_BLOCKS_EXCESS;
if (block_height > node_expiry_height)
expired_nodes.push_back(snode_key);
}
}
}
return expired_nodes;
}
service_nodes::payout service_node_list::state_t::get_block_leader() const
{
crypto::public_key key{};
service_node_info const *info = nullptr;
{
auto oldest_waiting = std::make_tuple(std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(), std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max(), crypto::null<crypto::public_key>);
for (const auto &info_it : service_nodes_infos)
{
const auto &sninfo = *info_it.second;
if (sninfo.is_active())
{
auto waiting_since = std::make_tuple(sninfo.last_reward_block_height, sninfo.last_reward_transaction_index, info_it.first);
if (waiting_since < oldest_waiting)
{
oldest_waiting = waiting_since;
info = &sninfo;
}
}
}
key = std::get<2>(oldest_waiting);
}
if (!key)
return service_nodes::null_payout;
return service_node_payout_portions(key, *info);
}
template <typename T>
static constexpr bool within_one(T a, T b) {
return (a > b ? a - b : b - a) <= T{1};
}
// NOTE: Verify queued service node coinbase or pulse block producer rewards
static void verify_coinbase_tx_output(cryptonote::transaction const &miner_tx,
uint64_t height,
size_t output_index,
cryptonote::account_public_address const &receiver,
uint64_t reward)
{
if (output_index >= miner_tx.vout.size())
throw std::out_of_range{"Output Index: {}, indexes out of bounds in vout array with size: {}"_format(
output_index, miner_tx.vout.size())};
cryptonote::tx_out const &output = miner_tx.vout[output_index];
// Because FP math is involved in reward calculations (and compounded by CPUs, compilers,
// expression contraction, and RandomX fiddling with the rounding modes) we can end up with a
// 1 ULP difference in the reward calculations.
// TODO(oxen): eliminate all FP math from reward calculations
if (!within_one(output.amount, reward))
throw std::runtime_error{"Service node reward amount incorrect. Should be {}, is: {}"_format(cryptonote::print_money(reward), cryptonote::print_money(output.amount))};
if (!std::holds_alternative<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(output.target))
throw std::runtime_error{"Service node output target type should be txout_to_key"};
// NOTE: Loki uses the governance key in the one-time ephemeral key
// derivation for both Pulse Block Producer/Queued Service Node Winner rewards
crypto::key_derivation derivation{};
crypto::public_key out_eph_public_key{};
cryptonote::keypair gov_key = cryptonote::get_deterministic_keypair_from_height(height);
if (!crypto::generate_key_derivation(receiver.m_view_public_key, gov_key.sec, derivation))
throw std::runtime_error{"Failed to generate key derivation"};
if (!crypto::derive_public_key(derivation, output_index, receiver.m_spend_public_key, out_eph_public_key))
throw std::runtime_error{"Failed derive public key"};
if (var::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(output.target).key != out_eph_public_key)
throw std::runtime_error{"Invalid service node reward at output: {}, output key, specifies wrong key"_format(output_index)};
}
void service_node_list::validate_miner_tx(const cryptonote::miner_tx_info& info) const
{
const auto& block = info.block;
const auto& reward_parts = info.reward_parts;
const auto& batched_sn_payments = info.batched_sn_payments;
const auto hf_version = block.major_version;
if (hf_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return;
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
uint64_t const height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
cryptonote::transaction const &miner_tx = block.miner_tx;
// NOTE: Basic queued service node list winner checks
// NOTE(oxen): Service node reward distribution is calculated from the
// original amount, i.e. 50% of the original base reward goes to service
// nodes not 50% of the reward after removing the governance component (the
// adjusted base reward post hardfork 10).
payout const block_leader = m_state.get_block_leader();
{
auto const check_block_leader_pubkey = cryptonote::get_service_node_winner_from_tx_extra(miner_tx.extra);
if (block_leader.key != check_block_leader_pubkey)
throw std::runtime_error{"Service node reward winner is incorrect! Expected {}, block has {}"_format(block_leader.key, check_block_leader_pubkey)};
}
enum struct verify_mode
{
miner,
pulse_block_leader_is_producer,
pulse_different_block_producer,
batched_sn_rewards,
};
verify_mode mode = verify_mode::miner;
crypto::public_key block_producer_key = {};
//
// NOTE: Determine if block leader/producer are different or the same.
//
if (cryptonote::block_has_pulse_components(block))
{
std::vector<crypto::hash> entropy = get_pulse_entropy_for_next_block(m_blockchain.get_db(), block.prev_id, block.pulse.round);
quorum pulse_quorum = generate_pulse_quorum(m_blockchain.nettype(), block_leader.key, hf_version, m_state.active_service_nodes_infos(), entropy, block.pulse.round);
if (!verify_pulse_quorum_sizes(pulse_quorum))
throw std::runtime_error{"Pulse block received but Pulse has insufficient nodes for quorum, block hash {}, height {}"_format(cryptonote::get_block_hash(block), height)};
block_producer_key = pulse_quorum.workers[0];
mode = (block_producer_key == block_leader.key) ? verify_mode::pulse_block_leader_is_producer
: verify_mode::pulse_different_block_producer;
if (block.pulse.round == 0 && (mode == verify_mode::pulse_different_block_producer))
throw std::runtime_error{"The block producer in pulse round 0 should be the same node as the block leader: {}, actual producer: {}"_format(block_leader.key, block_producer_key)};
}
// NOTE: Verify miner tx vout composition
//
// Miner Block
// 1 | Miner
// Up To 4 | Queued Service Node
// Up To 1 | Governance
//
// Pulse Block
// Up to 4 | Block Producer (0-3 for Pooled Service Node)
// Up To 4 | Queued Service Node
// Up To 1 | Governance
//
// NOTE: See cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp construct_miner_tx(...) for payment details.
//
std::shared_ptr<const service_node_info> block_producer = nullptr;
if (block.major_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching)
{
mode = verify_mode::batched_sn_rewards;
log::debug(logcat, "Batched miner reward");
}
size_t expected_vouts_size;
switch (mode) {
case verify_mode::batched_sn_rewards:
expected_vouts_size = batched_sn_payments.size();
break;
case verify_mode::pulse_block_leader_is_producer:
case verify_mode::pulse_different_block_producer:
{
auto info_it = m_state.service_nodes_infos.find(block_producer_key);
if (info_it == m_state.service_nodes_infos.end())
throw std::runtime_error{"The pulse block producer for round {:d} is not current a Service Node: {}"_format(block.pulse.round, block_producer_key)};
block_producer = info_it->second;
expected_vouts_size = mode == verify_mode::pulse_different_block_producer && reward_parts.miner_fee > 0
? block_producer->contributors.size() : 0;
}
break;
case verify_mode::miner:
expected_vouts_size = reward_parts.base_miner + reward_parts.miner_fee > 0 // (HF >= 16) this can be zero, no miner coinbase.
? 1 /* miner */ : 0;
break;
}
if (mode != verify_mode::batched_sn_rewards)
{
expected_vouts_size += block_leader.payouts.size();
bool has_governance_output = cryptonote::height_has_governance_output(m_blockchain.nettype(), hf_version, height);
if (has_governance_output)
expected_vouts_size++;
}
if (miner_tx.vout.size() != expected_vouts_size)
throw std::runtime_error{"Expected {} block, the miner TX specifies a different amount of outputs vs the expected: {}, miner tx outputs: {}"_format(
mode == verify_mode::miner ? "miner"sv :
mode == verify_mode::batched_sn_rewards ? "batch reward"sv :
mode == verify_mode::pulse_block_leader_is_producer ? "pulse"sv :
"pulse alt round"sv,
expected_vouts_size,
miner_tx.vout.size())};
if (hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse && reward_parts.base_miner != 0)
throw std::runtime_error{"Miner reward is incorrect expected 0 reward, block specified {}"_format(
cryptonote::print_money(reward_parts.base_miner))};
// NOTE: Verify Coinbase Amounts
switch(mode)
{
case verify_mode::miner:
{
size_t vout_index = 0 + (reward_parts.base_miner + reward_parts.miner_fee > 0);
// We don't verify the miner reward amount because it is already implied by the overall
// sum of outputs check and because when there are truncation errors on other outputs the
// miner reward ends up with the difference (and so actual miner output amount can be a few
// atoms larger than base_miner+miner_fee).
std::vector<uint64_t> split_rewards = cryptonote::distribute_reward_by_portions(block_leader.payouts,
reward_parts.service_node_total,
hf_version >= hf::hf16_pulse /*distribute_remainder*/);
for (size_t i = 0; i < block_leader.payouts.size(); i++)
{
const auto& payout = block_leader.payouts[i];
if (split_rewards[i])
{
verify_coinbase_tx_output(miner_tx, height, vout_index, payout.address, split_rewards[i]);
vout_index++;
}
}
}
break;
case verify_mode::pulse_block_leader_is_producer:
{
uint64_t total_reward = reward_parts.service_node_total + reward_parts.miner_fee;
std::vector<uint64_t> split_rewards = cryptonote::distribute_reward_by_portions(block_leader.payouts, total_reward, true /*distribute_remainder*/);
assert(total_reward > 0);
size_t vout_index = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < block_leader.payouts.size(); i++)
{
const auto& payout = block_leader.payouts[i];
if (split_rewards[i])
{
verify_coinbase_tx_output(miner_tx, height, vout_index, payout.address, split_rewards[i]);
vout_index++;
}
}
}
break;
case verify_mode::pulse_different_block_producer:
{
size_t vout_index = 0;
{
payout block_producer_payouts = service_node_payout_portions(block_producer_key, *block_producer);
std::vector<uint64_t> split_rewards = cryptonote::distribute_reward_by_portions(block_producer_payouts.payouts, reward_parts.miner_fee, true /*distribute_remainder*/);
for (size_t i = 0; i < block_producer_payouts.payouts.size(); i++)
{
const auto& payout = block_producer_payouts.payouts[i];
if (split_rewards[i])
{
verify_coinbase_tx_output(miner_tx, height, vout_index, payout.address, split_rewards[i]);
vout_index++;
}
}
}
std::vector<uint64_t> split_rewards = cryptonote::distribute_reward_by_portions(block_leader.payouts, reward_parts.service_node_total, true /*distribute_remainder*/);
for (size_t i = 0; i < block_leader.payouts.size(); i++)
{
const auto& payout = block_leader.payouts[i];
if (split_rewards[i])
{
verify_coinbase_tx_output(miner_tx, height, vout_index, payout.address, split_rewards[i]);
vout_index++;
}
}
}
break;
case verify_mode::batched_sn_rewards:
{
// NB: this amount is in milli-atomics, not atomics
uint64_t total_payout_in_our_db = std::accumulate(
batched_sn_payments.begin(),
batched_sn_payments.end(),
uint64_t{0},
[](auto&& a, auto&& b) { return a + b.amount; });
uint64_t total_payout_in_vouts = 0;
const auto deterministic_keypair = cryptonote::get_deterministic_keypair_from_height(height);
for (size_t vout_index = 0; vout_index < block.miner_tx.vout.size(); vout_index++)
{
const auto& vout = block.miner_tx.vout[vout_index];
const auto& batch_payment = batched_sn_payments[vout_index];
if (!std::holds_alternative<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(vout.target))
throw std::runtime_error{"Service node output target type should be txout_to_key"};
constexpr uint64_t max_amount = std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max() / cryptonote::BATCH_REWARD_FACTOR;
if (vout.amount > max_amount)
throw std::runtime_error{"Batched reward payout invalid: exceeds maximum possible payout size"};
auto paid_amount = vout.amount * cryptonote::BATCH_REWARD_FACTOR;
total_payout_in_vouts += paid_amount;
if (paid_amount != batch_payment.amount)
throw std::runtime_error{"Batched reward payout incorrect: expected {}, not {}"_format(batch_payment.amount, paid_amount)};
crypto::public_key out_eph_public_key{};
if (!cryptonote::get_deterministic_output_key(batch_payment.address_info.address, deterministic_keypair, vout_index, out_eph_public_key))
throw std::runtime_error{"Failed to generate output one-time public key"};
const auto& out_to_key = var::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(vout.target);
if (tools::view_guts(out_to_key) != tools::view_guts(out_eph_public_key))
throw std::runtime_error{"Output Ephermeral Public Key does not match (payment to wrong recipient)"};
}
if (total_payout_in_vouts != total_payout_in_our_db)
throw std::runtime_error{"Total service node reward amount incorrect: expected {}, not {}"_format(total_payout_in_our_db, total_payout_in_vouts)};
}
break;
}
}
void service_node_list::alt_block_add(const cryptonote::block_add_info& info)
{
// NOTE: The premise is to search the main list and the alternative list for
// the parent of the block we just received, generate the new Service Node
// state with this alt-block and verify that the block passes all
// the necessary checks.
// On success, this function returns true, signifying the block is valid to
// store into the alt-chain until it gathers enough blocks to cause
// a reorganization (more checkpoints/PoW than the main chain).
auto& block = info.block;
if (block.major_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return;
uint64_t block_height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block);
state_t const *starting_state = nullptr;
crypto::hash const block_hash = get_block_hash(block);
auto it = m_transient.alt_state.find(block_hash);
if (it != m_transient.alt_state.end()) return; // NOTE: Already processed alt-state for this block
// NOTE: Check if alt block forks off some historical state on the canonical chain
if (!starting_state)
{
auto it = m_transient.state_history.find(block_height - 1);
if (it != m_transient.state_history.end())
if (block.prev_id == it->block_hash) starting_state = &(*it);
}
// NOTE: Check if alt block forks off some historical alt state on an alt chain
if (!starting_state)
{
auto it = m_transient.alt_state.find(block.prev_id);
if (it != m_transient.alt_state.end()) starting_state = &it->second;
}
if (!starting_state)
throw std::runtime_error{"Received alt block but couldn't find parent state in historical state"};
if (starting_state->block_hash != block.prev_id)
throw std::runtime_error{"Unexpected state_t's hash: {}, does not match the block prev hash: {}"_format(
starting_state->block_hash, block.prev_id)};
// NOTE: Generate the next Service Node list state from this Alt block.
state_t alt_state = *starting_state;
alt_state.update_from_block(m_blockchain.get_db(), m_blockchain.nettype(), m_transient.state_history, m_transient.state_archive, m_transient.alt_state, block, info.txs, m_service_node_keys);
auto alt_it = m_transient.alt_state.find(block_hash);
if (alt_it != m_transient.alt_state.end())
alt_it->second = std::move(alt_state);
else
m_transient.alt_state.emplace(block_hash, std::move(alt_state));
verify_block(block, true /*alt_block*/, info.checkpoint);
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
static service_node_list::quorum_for_serialization serialize_quorum_state(hf hf_version, uint64_t height, quorum_manager const &quorums)
{
service_node_list::quorum_for_serialization result = {};
result.height = height;
if (quorums.obligations) result.quorums[static_cast<uint8_t>(quorum_type::obligations)] = *quorums.obligations;
if (quorums.checkpointing) result.quorums[static_cast<uint8_t>(quorum_type::checkpointing)] = *quorums.checkpointing;
return result;
}
static service_node_list::state_serialized serialize_service_node_state_object(hf hf_version, service_node_list::state_t const &state, bool only_serialize_quorums = false)
{
service_node_list::state_serialized result = {};
result.version = service_node_list::state_serialized::get_version(hf_version);
result.height = state.height;
result.quorums = serialize_quorum_state(hf_version, state.height, state.quorums);
result.only_stored_quorums = state.only_loaded_quorums || only_serialize_quorums;
if (only_serialize_quorums)
return result;
result.infos.reserve(state.service_nodes_infos.size());
for (const auto &kv_pair : state.service_nodes_infos)
result.infos.emplace_back(kv_pair);
result.key_image_blacklist = state.key_image_blacklist;
result.block_hash = state.block_hash;
return result;
}
bool service_node_list::store()
{
if (!m_blockchain.has_db())
return false; // Haven't been initialized yet
auto hf_version = m_blockchain.get_network_version();
if (hf_version < hf::hf9_service_nodes)
return true;
data_for_serialization *data[] = {&m_transient.cache_long_term_data, &m_transient.cache_short_term_data};
auto const serialize_version = data_for_serialization::get_version(hf_version);
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
for (data_for_serialization *serialize_entry : data)
{
if (serialize_entry->version != serialize_version) m_transient.state_added_to_archive = true;
serialize_entry->version = serialize_version;
serialize_entry->clear();
}
m_transient.cache_short_term_data.quorum_states.reserve(m_transient.old_quorum_states.size());
for (const quorums_by_height &entry : m_transient.old_quorum_states)
m_transient.cache_short_term_data.quorum_states.push_back(serialize_quorum_state(hf_version, entry.height, entry.quorums));
if (m_transient.state_added_to_archive)
{
for (auto const &it : m_transient.state_archive)
m_transient.cache_long_term_data.states.push_back(serialize_service_node_state_object(hf_version, it));
}
// NOTE: A state_t may reference quorums up to (VOTE_LIFETIME
// + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER) blocks back. So in the
// (MAX_SHORT_TERM_STATE_HISTORY | 2nd oldest checkpoint) window of states we store, the
// first (VOTE_LIFETIME + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER) states we only
// store their quorums, such that the following states have quorum
// information preceeding it.
uint64_t const max_short_term_height = short_term_state_cull_height(hf_version, (m_state.height - 1)) + VOTE_LIFETIME + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER;
for (auto it = m_transient.state_history.begin();
it != m_transient.state_history.end() && it->height <= max_short_term_height;
it++)
{
// TODO(oxen): There are 2 places where we convert a state_t to be a serialized state_t without quorums. We should only do this in one location for clarity.
m_transient.cache_short_term_data.states.push_back(serialize_service_node_state_object(hf_version, *it, it->height < max_short_term_height /*only_serialize_quorums*/));
}
m_transient.cache_data_blob.clear();
if (m_transient.state_added_to_archive)
{
serialization::binary_string_archiver ba;
try {
serialization::serialize(ba, m_transient.cache_long_term_data);
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
log::error(logcat, "Failed to store service node info: failed to serialize long term data: {}", e.what());
return false;
}
m_transient.cache_data_blob.append(ba.str());
{
auto &db = m_blockchain.get_db();
cryptonote::db_wtxn_guard txn_guard{db};
db.set_service_node_data(m_transient.cache_data_blob, true /*long_term*/);
}
}
m_transient.cache_data_blob.clear();
{
serialization::binary_string_archiver ba;
try {
serialization::serialize(ba, m_transient.cache_short_term_data);
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
log::error(logcat, "Failed to store service node info: failed to serialize short term data: {}", e.what());
return false;
}
m_transient.cache_data_blob.append(ba.str());
{
auto &db = m_blockchain.get_db();
cryptonote::db_wtxn_guard txn_guard{db};
db.set_service_node_data(m_transient.cache_data_blob, false /*long_term*/);
}
}
m_transient.state_added_to_archive = false;
return true;
}
//TODO: remove after HF18, snode revision 1
crypto::hash service_node_list::hash_uptime_proof(const cryptonote::NOTIFY_UPTIME_PROOF::request &proof) const
{
size_t buf_size;
crypto::hash result;
auto buf = tools::memcpy_le(proof.pubkey, proof.timestamp, proof.public_ip, proof.storage_https_port, proof.pubkey_ed25519, proof.qnet_port, proof.storage_omq_port);
buf_size = buf.size();
crypto::cn_fast_hash(buf.data(), buf_size, result);
return result;
}
cryptonote::NOTIFY_UPTIME_PROOF::request service_node_list::generate_uptime_proof(
uint32_t public_ip, uint16_t storage_https_port, uint16_t storage_omq_port, uint16_t quorumnet_port) const
{
assert(m_service_node_keys);
const auto& keys = *m_service_node_keys;
cryptonote::NOTIFY_UPTIME_PROOF::request result = {};
result.snode_version = OXEN_VERSION;
result.timestamp = time(nullptr);
result.pubkey = keys.pub;
result.public_ip = public_ip;
result.storage_https_port = storage_https_port;
result.storage_omq_port = storage_omq_port;
result.qnet_port = quorumnet_port;
result.pubkey_ed25519 = keys.pub_ed25519;
crypto::hash hash = hash_uptime_proof(result);
crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.pub, keys.key, result.sig);
crypto_sign_detached(result.sig_ed25519.data(), NULL, hash.data(), hash.size(), keys.key_ed25519.data());
return result;
}
uptime_proof::Proof service_node_list::generate_uptime_proof(uint32_t public_ip, uint16_t storage_https_port, uint16_t storage_omq_port, std::array<uint16_t, 3> ss_version, uint16_t quorumnet_port, std::array<uint16_t, 3> lokinet_version) const
{
const auto& keys = *m_service_node_keys;
return uptime_proof::Proof(public_ip, storage_https_port, storage_omq_port, ss_version, quorumnet_port, lokinet_version, keys);
}
#ifdef __cpp_lib_erase_if // # (C++20)
using std::erase_if;
#else
template <typename Container, typename Predicate>
static void erase_if(Container &c, Predicate pred) {
for (auto it = c.begin(), last = c.end(); it != last; ) {
if (pred(*it))
it = c.erase(it);
else
++it;
}
}
#endif
template <typename T>
static bool update_val(T &val, const T &to) {
if (val != to) {
val = to;
return true;
}
return false;
}
proof_info::proof_info()
: proof(std::make_unique<uptime_proof::Proof>()) {};
void proof_info::store(const crypto::public_key &pubkey, cryptonote::Blockchain &blockchain)
{
if (!proof) proof = std::unique_ptr<uptime_proof::Proof>(new uptime_proof::Proof());
std::unique_lock lock{blockchain};
auto &db = blockchain.get_db();
db.set_service_node_proof(pubkey, *this);
}
bool proof_info::update(uint64_t ts, std::unique_ptr<uptime_proof::Proof> new_proof, const crypto::x25519_public_key &pk_x2)
{
bool update_db = false;
if (!proof || *proof != *new_proof) {
update_db = true;
proof = std::move(new_proof);
}
update_db |= update_val(timestamp, ts);
effective_timestamp = timestamp;
pubkey_x25519 = pk_x2;
// Track an IP change (so that the obligations quorum can penalize for IP changes)
// We only keep the two most recent because all we really care about is whether it had more than one
//
// If we already know about the IP, update its timestamp:
auto now = std::time(nullptr);
if (public_ips[0].first && public_ips[0].first == proof->public_ip)
public_ips[0].second = now;
else if (public_ips[1].first && public_ips[1].first == proof->public_ip)
public_ips[1].second = now;
// Otherwise replace whichever IP has the older timestamp
else if (public_ips[0].second > public_ips[1].second)
public_ips[1] = {proof->public_ip, now};
else
public_ips[0] = {proof->public_ip, now};
return update_db;
};
//TODO remove after HF18, snode revision 1
bool proof_info::update(uint64_t ts,
uint32_t ip,
uint16_t s_https_port,
uint16_t s_omq_port,
uint16_t q_port,
std::array<uint16_t, 3> ver,
const crypto::ed25519_public_key& pk_ed,
const crypto::x25519_public_key& pk_x2)
{
bool update_db = false;
if (!proof) proof = std::unique_ptr<uptime_proof::Proof>(new uptime_proof::Proof());
update_db |= update_val(timestamp, ts);
update_db |= update_val(proof->public_ip, ip);
update_db |= update_val(proof->storage_https_port, s_https_port);
update_db |= update_val(proof->storage_omq_port, s_omq_port);
update_db |= update_val(proof->qnet_port, q_port);
update_db |= update_val(proof->version, ver);
update_db |= update_val(proof->pubkey_ed25519, pk_ed);
effective_timestamp = timestamp;
pubkey_x25519 = pk_x2;
// Track an IP change (so that the obligations quorum can penalize for IP changes)
// We only keep the two most recent because all we really care about is whether it had more than one
//
// If we already know about the IP, update its timestamp:
auto now = std::time(nullptr);
if (public_ips[0].first && public_ips[0].first == proof->public_ip)
public_ips[0].second = now;
else if (public_ips[1].first && public_ips[1].first == proof->public_ip)
public_ips[1].second = now;
// Otherwise replace whichever IP has the older timestamp
else if (public_ips[0].second > public_ips[1].second)
public_ips[1] = {proof->public_ip, now};
else
public_ips[0] = {proof->public_ip, now};
return update_db;
};
void proof_info::update_pubkey(const crypto::ed25519_public_key &pk) {
if (pk == proof->pubkey_ed25519)
return;
if (pk && 0 == crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(pubkey_x25519.data(), pk.data())) {
proof->pubkey_ed25519 = pk;
} else {
log::warning(logcat, "Failed to derive x25519 pubkey from ed25519 pubkey {}", proof->pubkey_ed25519);
pubkey_x25519.zero();
proof->pubkey_ed25519.zero();
}
}
//TODO remove after HF18, snode revision 1
bool service_node_list::handle_uptime_proof(cryptonote::NOTIFY_UPTIME_PROOF::request const &proof, bool &my_uptime_proof_confirmation, crypto::x25519_public_key &x25519_pkey)
{
auto vers = get_network_version_revision(m_blockchain.nettype(), m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height());
if (vers >= std::make_pair(hf::hf18, uint8_t{1}))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: Old format (non-bt) proofs are not acceptable from v18+1 onwards", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
auto& netconf = get_config(m_blockchain.nettype());
auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
// Validate proof version, timestamp range,
auto time_deviation = now - std::chrono::system_clock::from_time_t(proof.timestamp);
if (time_deviation > netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_TOLERANCE || time_deviation < -netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_TOLERANCE)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: timestamp is too far from now", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
for (auto const &min : MIN_UPTIME_PROOF_VERSIONS)
if (vers >= min.hardfork_revision && proof.snode_version < min.oxend)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: v{}+ oxend version is required for v{}.{}+ network proofs", proof.pubkey, tools::join(".", min.oxend), static_cast<int>(vers.first), vers.second);
return false;
}
if (!debug_allow_local_ips && !epee::net_utils::is_ip_public(proof.public_ip))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: public_ip is not actually public", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
//
// Validate proof signature
//
crypto::hash hash = hash_uptime_proof(proof);
if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, proof.pubkey, proof.sig))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: signature validation failed", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
crypto::x25519_public_key derived_x25519_pubkey{};
if (!proof.pubkey_ed25519)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: required ed25519 auxiliary pubkey {} not included in proof", proof.pubkey, proof.pubkey_ed25519);
return false;
}
if (0 != crypto_sign_verify_detached(proof.sig_ed25519.data(), hash.data(), hash.size(), proof.pubkey_ed25519.data()))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: ed25519 signature validation failed", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
if (0 != crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(derived_x25519_pubkey.data(), proof.pubkey_ed25519.data()) || !derived_x25519_pubkey)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: invalid ed25519 pubkey included in proof (x25519 derivation failed)", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
if (proof.qnet_port == 0)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: invalid quorumnet port in uptime proof", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
auto locks = tools::unique_locks(m_blockchain, m_sn_mutex, m_x25519_map_mutex);
auto it = m_state.service_nodes_infos.find(proof.pubkey);
if (it == m_state.service_nodes_infos.end())
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: no such service node is currently registered", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
auto &iproof = proofs[proof.pubkey];
if (now <= std::chrono::system_clock::from_time_t(iproof.timestamp) + std::chrono::seconds{netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_FREQUENCY} / 2)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: already received one uptime proof for this node recently", proof.pubkey);
return false;
}
if (m_service_node_keys && proof.pubkey == m_service_node_keys->pub)
{
my_uptime_proof_confirmation = true;
log::info(logcat, "Received uptime-proof confirmation back from network for Service Node (yours): {}", proof.pubkey);
}
else
{
my_uptime_proof_confirmation = false;
log::debug(logcat, "Accepted uptime proof from {}", proof.pubkey);
if (m_service_node_keys && proof.pubkey_ed25519 == m_service_node_keys->pub_ed25519)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::red), "Uptime proof from SN {} is not us, but is using our ed/x25519 keys; this is likely to lead to deregistration of one or both service nodes.", proof.pubkey);
}
auto old_x25519 = iproof.pubkey_x25519;
if (iproof.update(std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now), proof.public_ip, proof.storage_https_port, proof.storage_omq_port, proof.qnet_port, proof.snode_version, proof.pubkey_ed25519, derived_x25519_pubkey))
iproof.store(proof.pubkey, m_blockchain);
if (now - x25519_map_last_pruned >= X25519_MAP_PRUNING_INTERVAL)
{
time_t cutoff = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now - X25519_MAP_PRUNING_LAG);
erase_if(x25519_to_pub, [&cutoff](auto &x) { return x.second.second < cutoff; });
x25519_map_last_pruned = now;
}
if (old_x25519 && old_x25519 != derived_x25519_pubkey)
x25519_to_pub.erase(old_x25519);
if (derived_x25519_pubkey)
x25519_to_pub[derived_x25519_pubkey] = {proof.pubkey, std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now)};
if (derived_x25519_pubkey && (old_x25519 != derived_x25519_pubkey))
x25519_pkey = derived_x25519_pubkey;
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::handle_btencoded_uptime_proof(std::unique_ptr<uptime_proof::Proof> proof, bool &my_uptime_proof_confirmation, crypto::x25519_public_key &x25519_pkey)
{
auto vers = get_network_version_revision(m_blockchain.nettype(), m_blockchain.get_current_blockchain_height());
auto& netconf = get_config(m_blockchain.nettype());
auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
// Validate proof version, timestamp range,
auto time_deviation = now - std::chrono::system_clock::from_time_t(proof->timestamp);
if (time_deviation > netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_TOLERANCE || time_deviation < -netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_TOLERANCE)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: timestamp is too far from now", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
for (auto const &min : MIN_UPTIME_PROOF_VERSIONS) {
if (vers >= min.hardfork_revision && m_blockchain.nettype() != cryptonote::network_type::DEVNET) {
if (proof->version < min.oxend)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: v{}+ oxend version is required for v{}.{}+ network proofs", proof->pubkey, tools::join(".", min.oxend), static_cast<int>(vers.first), vers.second);
return false;
}
if (proof->lokinet_version < min.lokinet)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: v{}+ lokinet version is required for v{}.{}+ network proofs", proof->pubkey, tools::join(".", min.lokinet), static_cast<int>(vers.first), vers.second);
return false;
}
if (proof->storage_server_version < min.storage_server)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: v{}+ storage server version is required for v{}.{}+ network proofs", proof->pubkey, tools::join(".", min.storage_server), static_cast<int>(vers.first), vers.second);
return false;
}
}
}
if (!debug_allow_local_ips && !epee::net_utils::is_ip_public(proof->public_ip))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: public_ip is not actually public", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
//
// Validate proof signature
//
crypto::hash hash = proof->hash_uptime_proof();
if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, proof->pubkey, proof->sig))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: signature validation failed", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
crypto::x25519_public_key derived_x25519_pubkey{};
if (!proof->pubkey_ed25519)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: required ed25519 auxiliary pubkey {} not included in proof", proof->pubkey, proof->pubkey_ed25519);
return false;
}
if (0 != crypto_sign_verify_detached(proof->sig_ed25519.data(), hash.data(), hash.size(), proof->pubkey_ed25519.data()))
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: ed25519 signature validation failed", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
if (0 != crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(derived_x25519_pubkey.data(), proof->pubkey_ed25519.data()) || !derived_x25519_pubkey)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: invalid ed25519 pubkey included in proof (x25519 derivation failed)", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
if (proof->qnet_port == 0)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: invalid quorumnet port in uptime proof", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
auto locks = tools::unique_locks(m_blockchain, m_sn_mutex, m_x25519_map_mutex);
auto it = m_state.service_nodes_infos.find(proof->pubkey);
if (it == m_state.service_nodes_infos.end())
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: no such service node is currently registered", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
auto &iproof = proofs[proof->pubkey];
if (now <= std::chrono::system_clock::from_time_t(iproof.timestamp) + std::chrono::seconds{netconf.UPTIME_PROOF_FREQUENCY} / 2)
{
log::debug(logcat, "Rejecting uptime proof from {}: already received one uptime proof for this node recently", proof->pubkey);
return false;
}
if (m_service_node_keys && proof->pubkey == m_service_node_keys->pub)
{
my_uptime_proof_confirmation = true;
log::info(logcat, "Received uptime-proof confirmation back from network for Service Node (yours): {}", proof->pubkey);
}
else
{
my_uptime_proof_confirmation = false;
log::debug(logcat, "Accepted uptime proof from {}", proof->pubkey);
if (m_service_node_keys && proof->pubkey_ed25519 == m_service_node_keys->pub_ed25519)
log::info(logcat, fg(fmt::terminal_color::red), "Uptime proof from SN {} is not us, but is using our ed/x25519 keys; this is likely to lead to deregistration of one or both service nodes.", proof->pubkey);
}
auto old_x25519 = iproof.pubkey_x25519;
if (iproof.update(std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now), std::move(proof), derived_x25519_pubkey))
{
iproof.store(iproof.proof->pubkey, m_blockchain);
}
if (now - x25519_map_last_pruned >= X25519_MAP_PRUNING_INTERVAL)
{
time_t cutoff = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now - X25519_MAP_PRUNING_LAG);
erase_if(x25519_to_pub, [&cutoff](const decltype(x25519_to_pub)::value_type &x) { return x.second.second < cutoff; });
x25519_map_last_pruned = now;
}
if (old_x25519 && old_x25519 != derived_x25519_pubkey)
x25519_to_pub.erase(old_x25519);
if (derived_x25519_pubkey)
x25519_to_pub[derived_x25519_pubkey] = {iproof.proof->pubkey, std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now)};
if (derived_x25519_pubkey && (old_x25519 != derived_x25519_pubkey))
x25519_pkey = derived_x25519_pubkey;
return true;
}
void service_node_list::cleanup_proofs()
{
log::debug(logcat, "Cleaning up expired SN proofs");
auto locks = tools::unique_locks(m_sn_mutex, m_blockchain);
uint64_t now = std::time(nullptr);
auto& db = m_blockchain.get_db();
cryptonote::db_wtxn_guard guard{db};
for (auto it = proofs.begin(); it != proofs.end(); )
{
auto& pubkey = it->first;
auto& proof = it->second;
// 6h here because there's no harm in leaving proofs around a bit longer (they aren't big, and
// we only store one per SN), and it's possible that we could reorg a few blocks and resurrect
// a service node but don't want to prematurely expire the proof.
if (!m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey) && proof.timestamp + 6*60*60 < now)
{
db.remove_service_node_proof(pubkey);
it = proofs.erase(it);
}
else
++it;
}
}
crypto::public_key service_node_list::get_pubkey_from_x25519(const crypto::x25519_public_key &x25519) const {
std::shared_lock lock{m_x25519_map_mutex};
auto it = x25519_to_pub.find(x25519);
if (it != x25519_to_pub.end())
return it->second.first;
return crypto::null<crypto::public_key>;
}
crypto::public_key service_node_list::get_random_pubkey() {
std::lock_guard lock{m_sn_mutex};
auto it = tools::select_randomly(m_state.service_nodes_infos.begin(), m_state.service_nodes_infos.end());
if(it != m_state.service_nodes_infos.end()) {
return it->first;
} else {
return m_state.service_nodes_infos.begin()->first;
}
}
void service_node_list::initialize_x25519_map() {
auto locks = tools::unique_locks(m_sn_mutex, m_x25519_map_mutex);
auto now = std::time(nullptr);
for (const auto &pk_info : m_state.service_nodes_infos)
{
auto it = proofs.find(pk_info.first);
if (it == proofs.end())
continue;
if (const auto &x2_pk = it->second.pubkey_x25519)
x25519_to_pub.emplace(x2_pk, std::make_pair(pk_info.first, now));
}
}
std::string service_node_list::remote_lookup(std::string_view xpk) {
if (xpk.size() != sizeof(crypto::x25519_public_key))
return "";
crypto::x25519_public_key x25519_pub;
std::memcpy(x25519_pub.data(), xpk.data(), xpk.size());
auto pubkey = get_pubkey_from_x25519(x25519_pub);
if (!pubkey) {
log::debug(logcat, "no connection available: could not find primary pubkey from x25519 pubkey {}", x25519_pub);
return "";
}
bool found = false;
uint32_t ip = 0;
uint16_t port = 0;
for_each_service_node_info_and_proof(&pubkey, &pubkey + 1, [&](auto&, auto&, auto& proof) {
found = true;
ip = proof.proof->public_ip;
port = proof.proof->qnet_port;
});
if (!found) {
log::debug(logcat, "no connection available: primary pubkey {} is not registered", pubkey);
return "";
}
if (!(ip && port)) {
log::debug(logcat, "no connection available: service node {} has no associated ip and/or port", pubkey);
return "";
}
return "tcp://" + epee::string_tools::get_ip_string_from_int32(ip) + ":" + std::to_string(port);
}
void service_node_list::record_checkpoint_participation(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, uint64_t height, bool participated)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
if (m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey))
proofs[pubkey].checkpoint_participation.add({height, participated});
}
void service_node_list::record_pulse_participation(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, uint64_t height, uint8_t round, bool participated)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
if (m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey))
proofs[pubkey].pulse_participation.add({height, round, participated});
}
void service_node_list::record_timestamp_participation(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, bool participated)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
if (m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey))
proofs[pubkey].timestamp_participation.add({participated});
}
void service_node_list::record_timesync_status(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, bool synced)
{
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
if (m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey))
proofs[pubkey].timesync_status.add({synced});
}
std::optional<bool> proof_info::reachable_stats::reachable(const std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point& now) const {
if (last_reachable >= last_unreachable)
return true;
if (last_unreachable > now - cryptonote::config::REACHABLE_MAX_FAILURE_VALIDITY)
return false;
// Last result was a failure, but it was a while ago, so we don't know for sure that it isn't
// reachable now:
return std::nullopt;
}
bool proof_info::reachable_stats::unreachable_for(std::chrono::seconds threshold, const std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point& now) const {
if (auto maybe_reachable = reachable(now); !maybe_reachable /*stale*/ || *maybe_reachable /*good*/)
return false;
if (first_unreachable > now - threshold)
return false; // Unreachable, but for less than the grace time
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::set_peer_reachable(bool storage_server, const crypto::public_key& pubkey, bool reachable) {
// (See .h for overview description)
std::lock_guard lock(m_sn_mutex);
const auto type = storage_server ? "storage server"sv : "lokinet"sv;
if (!m_state.service_nodes_infos.count(pubkey)) {
log::debug(logcat, "Dropping {} reachable report: {} is not a registered SN pubkey", type, pubkey);
return false;
}
log::debug(logcat, "Received {}{} report for SN {}", type, (reachable ? " reachable" : " UNREACHABLE"), pubkey);
const auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
auto& reach = storage_server ? proofs[pubkey].ss_reachable : proofs[pubkey].lokinet_reachable;
if (reachable) {
reach.last_reachable = now;
reach.first_unreachable = NEVER;
} else {
reach.last_unreachable = now;
if (reach.first_unreachable == NEVER)
reach.first_unreachable = now;
}
return true;
}
bool service_node_list::set_storage_server_peer_reachable(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, bool reachable)
{
return set_peer_reachable(true, pubkey, reachable);
}
bool service_node_list::set_lokinet_peer_reachable(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, bool reachable)
{
return set_peer_reachable(false, pubkey, reachable);
}
static quorum_manager quorum_for_serialization_to_quorum_manager(service_node_list::quorum_for_serialization const &source)
{
quorum_manager result = {};
result.obligations = std::make_shared<quorum>(source.quorums[static_cast<uint8_t>(quorum_type::obligations)]);
// Don't load any checkpoints that shouldn't exist (see the comment in generate_quorums as to why the `+BUFFER` term is here).
if ((source.height + REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_BLOCKS_POST_HF12) % CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL == 0)
result.checkpointing = std::make_shared<quorum>(source.quorums[static_cast<uint8_t>(quorum_type::checkpointing)]);
return result;
}
service_node_list::state_t::state_t(service_node_list* snl, state_serialized &&state)
: height{state.height}
, key_image_blacklist{std::move(state.key_image_blacklist)}
, only_loaded_quorums{state.only_stored_quorums}
, block_hash{state.block_hash}
, sn_list{snl}
{
if (!sn_list)
throw std::logic_error("Cannot deserialize a state_t without a service_node_list");
if (state.version == state_serialized::version_t::version_0)
block_hash = sn_list->m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(height);
for (auto &pubkey_info : state.infos)
{
using version_t = service_node_info::version_t;
auto &info = const_cast<service_node_info &>(*pubkey_info.info);
if (info.version < version_t::v1_add_registration_hf_version)
{
info.version = version_t::v1_add_registration_hf_version;
info.registration_hf_version = sn_list->m_blockchain.get_network_version(pubkey_info.info->registration_height);
}
if (info.version < version_t::v4_noproofs)
{
// Nothing to do here (the missing data will be generated in the new proofs db via uptime proofs).
info.version = version_t::v4_noproofs;
}
if (info.version < version_t::v5_pulse_recomm_credit)
{
// If it's an old record then assume it's from before oxen 8, in which case there were only
// two valid values here: initial for a node that has never been recommissioned, or 0 for a recommission.
auto was = info.recommission_credit;
if (info.decommission_count <= info.is_decommissioned()) // Has never been decommissioned (or is currently in the first decommission), so add initial starting credit
info.recommission_credit = DECOMMISSION_INITIAL_CREDIT;
else
info.recommission_credit = 0;
info.pulse_sorter.last_height_validating_in_quorum = info.last_reward_block_height;
info.version = version_t::v5_pulse_recomm_credit;
}
if (info.version < version_t::v6_reassign_sort_keys)
{
info.pulse_sorter = {};
info.version = version_t::v6_reassign_sort_keys;
}
if (info.version < version_t::v7_decommission_reason)
{
// Nothing to do here (leave consensus reasons as 0s)
info.version = version_t::v7_decommission_reason;
}
// Make sure we handled any future state version upgrades:
assert(info.version == tools::enum_top<decltype(info.version)>);
service_nodes_infos.emplace(std::move(pubkey_info.pubkey), std::move(pubkey_info.info));
}
quorums = quorum_for_serialization_to_quorum_manager(state.quorums);
}
bool service_node_list::load(const uint64_t current_height)
{
log::info(logcat, "service_node_list::load()");
reset(false);
if (!m_blockchain.has_db())
{
return false;
}
// NOTE: Deserialize long term state history
uint64_t bytes_loaded = 0;
auto &db = m_blockchain.get_db();
cryptonote::db_rtxn_guard txn_guard{db};
std::string blob;
if (db.get_service_node_data(blob, true /*long_term*/))
{
bytes_loaded += blob.size();
data_for_serialization data_in = {};
bool success = false;
try {
serialization::parse_binary(blob, data_in);
success = true;
} catch (...) {}
if (success && data_in.states.size())
{
// NOTE: Previously the quorum for the next state is derived from the
// state that's been updated from the next block. This is fixed in
// version_1.
// So, copy the quorum from (state.height-1) to (state.height), all
// states need to have their (height-1) which means we're missing the
// 10k-th interval and need to generate it based on the last state.
if (data_in.states[0].version == state_serialized::version_t::version_0)
{
size_t const last_index = data_in.states.size() - 1;
if ((data_in.states.back().height % STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL) != 0)
{
log::warning(logcat, "Last serialised quorum height: {} in archive is unexpectedly not a multiple of: {}, regenerating state", data_in.states.back().height, STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL);
return false;
}
for (size_t i = data_in.states.size() - 1; i >= 1; i--)
{
state_serialized &serialized_entry = data_in.states[i];
state_serialized &prev_serialized_entry = data_in.states[i - 1];
if ((prev_serialized_entry.height % STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL) == 0)
{
// NOTE: drop this entry, we have insufficient data to derive
// sadly, do this as a one off and if we ever need this data we
// need to do a full rescan.
continue;
}
state_t entry{this, std::move(serialized_entry)};
entry.height--;
entry.quorums = quorum_for_serialization_to_quorum_manager(prev_serialized_entry.quorums);
if ((serialized_entry.height % STORE_LONG_TERM_STATE_INTERVAL) == 0)
{
state_t long_term_state = entry;
cryptonote::block const &block = db.get_block_from_height(long_term_state.height + 1);
std::vector<cryptonote::transaction> txs = db.get_tx_list(block.tx_hashes);
long_term_state.update_from_block(db, m_blockchain.nettype(), {} /*state_history*/, {} /*state_archive*/, {} /*alt_states*/, block, txs, nullptr /*my_keys*/);
entry.service_nodes_infos = {};
entry.key_image_blacklist = {};
entry.only_loaded_quorums = true;
m_transient.state_archive.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_archive.begin(), std::move(long_term_state));
}
m_transient.state_archive.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_archive.begin(), std::move(entry));
}
}
else
{
for (state_serialized &entry : data_in.states)
m_transient.state_archive.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_archive.end(), this, std::move(entry));
}
}
}
// NOTE: Deserialize short term state history
if (!db.get_service_node_data(blob, false))
return false;
bytes_loaded += blob.size();
data_for_serialization data_in = {};
try {
serialization::parse_binary(blob, data_in);
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
log::error(logcat, "Failed to parse service node data from blob: {}", e.what());
return false;
}
if (data_in.states.empty())
return false;
{
const uint64_t hist_state_from_height = current_height - m_store_quorum_history;
uint64_t last_loaded_height = 0;
for (auto &states : data_in.quorum_states)
{
if (states.height < hist_state_from_height)
continue;
quorums_by_height entry = {};
entry.height = states.height;
entry.quorums = quorum_for_serialization_to_quorum_manager(states);
if (states.height <= last_loaded_height)
{
log::warning(logcat, "Serialised quorums is not stored in ascending order by height in DB, failed to load from DB");
return false;
}
last_loaded_height = states.height;
m_transient.old_quorum_states.push_back(entry);
}
}
{
assert(data_in.states.size() > 0);
size_t const last_index = data_in.states.size() - 1;
if (data_in.states[last_index].only_stored_quorums)
{
log::warning(logcat, "Unexpected last serialized state only has quorums loaded");
return false;
}
if (data_in.states[0].version == state_serialized::version_t::version_0)
{
for (size_t i = last_index; i >= 1; i--)
{
state_serialized &serialized_entry = data_in.states[i];
state_serialized &prev_serialized_entry = data_in.states[i - 1];
state_t entry{this, std::move(serialized_entry)};
entry.quorums = quorum_for_serialization_to_quorum_manager(prev_serialized_entry.quorums);
entry.height--;
if (i == last_index) m_state = std::move(entry);
else m_transient.state_archive.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_archive.end(), std::move(entry));
}
}
else
{
size_t const last_index = data_in.states.size() - 1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < last_index; i++)
{
state_serialized &entry = data_in.states[i];
if (!entry.block_hash) entry.block_hash = m_blockchain.get_block_id_by_height(entry.height);
m_transient.state_history.emplace_hint(m_transient.state_history.end(), this, std::move(entry));
}
m_state = {this, std::move(data_in.states[last_index])};
}
}
// NOTE: Load uptime proof data
proofs = db.get_all_service_node_proofs();
if (m_service_node_keys)
{
// Reset our own proof timestamp to zero so that we aggressively try to resend proofs on
// startup (in case we are restarting because the last proof that we think went out didn't
// actually make it to the network).
auto &mine = proofs[m_service_node_keys->pub];
mine.timestamp = mine.effective_timestamp = 0;
}
initialize_x25519_map();
log::info(logcat, "Service node data loaded successfully, height: {}", m_state.height);
log::info(logcat, "{} nodes and {} recent states loaded, {} historical states loaded, ({})", m_state.service_nodes_infos.size(), m_transient.state_history.size(), m_transient.state_archive.size(), tools::get_human_readable_bytes(bytes_loaded));
log::info(logcat, "service_node_list::load() returning success");
return true;
}
void service_node_list::reset(bool delete_db_entry)
{
m_transient = {};
m_state = state_t{this};
if (m_blockchain.has_db() && delete_db_entry)
{
cryptonote::db_wtxn_guard txn_guard{m_blockchain.get_db()};
m_blockchain.get_db().clear_service_node_data();
}
m_state.height = hard_fork_begins(m_blockchain.nettype(), hf::hf9_service_nodes).value_or(1) - 1;
}
size_t service_node_info::total_num_locked_contributions() const
{
size_t result = 0;
for (service_node_info::contributor_t const &contributor : this->contributors)
result += contributor.locked_contributions.size();
return result;
}
// Handles the deprecated, pre-HF19 registration parsing where values are portions rather than
// amounts.
// TODO: this can be deleted immediately after HF19, because this code is only used to process new
// registration commands (and after the HF, all registration commands are HF19+ registrations with
// raw amounts rather than portions).
void convert_registration_portions_hf18(
registration_details& result,
const std::vector<std::string>& args,
uint64_t staking_requirement,
std::vector<std::pair<cryptonote::address_parse_info, uint64_t>>& addr_to_portions,
hf hf_version)
{
//
// FIXME(doyle): FIXME(oxen) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
// This is temporary code to redistribute the insufficient portion dust
// amounts between contributors. It should be removed in HF12.
//
std::array<uint64_t, oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1> excess_portions;
std::array<uint64_t, oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1> min_contributions;
{
// NOTE: Calculate excess portions from each contributor
uint64_t oxen_reserved = 0;
for (size_t index = 0; index < addr_to_portions.size(); ++index)
{
const auto& [addr, portion] = addr_to_portions[index];
uint64_t min_contribution_portions = service_nodes::get_min_node_contribution_in_portions(hf_version, staking_requirement, oxen_reserved, index);
uint64_t oxen_amount = service_nodes::portions_to_amount(staking_requirement, portion);
oxen_reserved += oxen_amount;
uint64_t excess = 0;
if (portion > min_contribution_portions)
excess = portion - min_contribution_portions;
min_contributions[index] = min_contribution_portions;
excess_portions[index] = excess;
}
}
uint64_t portions_left = cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS;
uint64_t total_reserved = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < addr_to_portions.size(); ++i)
{
auto& [addr, portion] = addr_to_portions[i];
uint64_t min_portions = get_min_node_contribution_in_portions(hf_version, staking_requirement, total_reserved, i);
uint64_t portions_to_steal = 0;
if (portion < min_portions)
{
// NOTE: Steal dust portions from other contributor if we fall below
// the minimum by a dust amount.
uint64_t needed = min_portions - portion;
const uint64_t FUDGE_FACTOR = 10;
const uint64_t DUST_UNIT = cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS / staking_requirement;
const uint64_t DUST = DUST_UNIT * FUDGE_FACTOR;
if (needed > DUST)
continue;
for (size_t sub_index = 0; sub_index < addr_to_portions.size(); sub_index++)
{
if (i == sub_index) continue;
uint64_t &contributor_excess = excess_portions[sub_index];
if (contributor_excess > 0)
{
portions_to_steal = std::min(needed, contributor_excess);
portion += portions_to_steal;
contributor_excess -= portions_to_steal;
needed -= portions_to_steal;
addr_to_portions[sub_index].second -= portions_to_steal;
if (needed == 0)
break;
}
}
// NOTE: Operator is sending in the minimum amount and it falls below
// the minimum by dust, just increase the portions so it passes
if (needed > 0 && addr_to_portions.size() < oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1)
portion += needed;
}
if (portion < min_portions || portion - portions_to_steal > portions_left)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Invalid amount for contributor: ") + args[i] + tr(", with portion amount: ") +
args[i+1] + tr(". The contributors must each have at least 25%, except for the last contributor which may have the remaining amount")};
if (min_portions == UINT64_MAX)
throw invalid_registration{
tr("Too many contributors specified, you can only split a node with up to: ") + std::to_string(oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1) + tr(" people.")};
portions_left -= portion;
portions_left += portions_to_steal;
result.reserved.emplace_back(addr.address, portion);
total_reserved += service_nodes::portions_to_amount(portion, staking_requirement);
}
}
registration_details convert_registration_args(
cryptonote::network_type nettype,
cryptonote::hf hf_version,
const std::vector<std::string>& args,
uint64_t staking_requirement)
{
registration_details result{};
if (args.size() % 2 == 0 || args.size() < 3)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Usage: <fee-basis-points> <address> <amount> [<address> <amount> [...]]]")};
const size_t max_contributors = hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching ? oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_HF19 : oxen::MAX_CONTRIBUTORS_V1;
if (args.size() > 1 + 2 * max_contributors)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Exceeds the maximum number of contributors") + " ("s + std::to_string(max_contributors) + ")"};
const uint64_t max_fee = hf_version >= hf::hf19_reward_batching ? cryptonote::STAKING_FEE_BASIS : cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS;
if (!tools::parse_int(args[0], result.fee) || result.fee > max_fee)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Invalid operator fee: ") + args[0] + tr(". Must be between 0 and ") + std::to_string(max_fee)};
std::vector<std::pair<cryptonote::address_parse_info, uint64_t>> addr_to_amounts;
constexpr size_t OPERATOR_ARG_INDEX = 1;
for (size_t i = OPERATOR_ARG_INDEX, num_contributions = 0;
i < args.size();
i += 2, ++num_contributions)
{
auto& [info, portion] = addr_to_amounts.emplace_back();
if (!cryptonote::get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype, args[i]))
throw invalid_registration{tr("Failed to parse address: ") + args[i]};
if (info.has_payment_id)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Can't use a payment id for staking tx")};
if (info.is_subaddress)
throw invalid_registration{tr("Can't use a subaddress for staking tx")};
if (!tools::parse_int(args[i+1], portion))
throw invalid_registration{tr("Invalid amount for contributor: ") + args[i] + tr(", with portion amount that could not be converted to a number: ") + args[i+1]};
}
uint64_t now = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(std::chrono::system_clock::now());
if (hf_version < hf::hf19_reward_batching)
{
result.uses_portions = true;
result.hf = now;
convert_registration_portions_hf18(result, args, staking_requirement, addr_to_amounts, hf_version);
}
else
{
result.uses_portions = false;
result.hf = static_cast<uint8_t>(hf_version);
// For HF19+ we just stick in the registration amounts as-is, then validate the registration to
// make sure it looks good.
for (const auto& [addr, amount] : addr_to_amounts)
result.reserved.emplace_back(addr.address, amount);
}
// Will throw if something is invalid:
validate_registration(hf_version, nettype, staking_requirement, now, result);
return result;
}
bool make_registration_cmd(cryptonote::network_type nettype,
hf hf_version,
uint64_t staking_requirement,
const std::vector<std::string>& args,
const service_node_keys &keys,
std::string &cmd,
bool make_friendly)
{
registration_details reg;
try {
reg = convert_registration_args(nettype, hf_version, args, staking_requirement);
} catch (const invalid_registration& e) {
log::error(logcat, "{}{}", tr("Could not parse registration arguments: "), e.what());
return false;
}
reg.service_node_pubkey = keys.pub;
if (reg.uses_portions)
reg.hf = time(nullptr) + tools::to_seconds(cryptonote::old::STAKING_AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRATION_WINDOW);
auto hash = get_registration_hash(reg);
reg.signature = crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.pub, keys.key);
cmd.clear();
if (make_friendly)
cmd += "{} ({}):\n\n"_format(
tr("Run this command in the operator's wallet"),
cryptonote::get_account_address_as_str(nettype, false, reg.reserved[0].first));
cmd += "register_service_node {} {} {} {}"_format(
tools::join(" ", args),
reg.hf,
tools::type_to_hex(reg.service_node_pubkey),
tools::type_to_hex(reg.signature));
return true;
}
bool service_node_info::can_be_voted_on(uint64_t height) const
{
// If the SN expired and was reregistered since the height we'll be voting on it prematurely
if (!is_fully_funded()) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN vote at height {} invalid: not fully funded", height);
return false;
} else if (height <= registration_height) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN vote at height {} invalid: height <= reg height ({})", height, registration_height);
return false;
} else if (is_decommissioned() && height <= last_decommission_height) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN vote at height {} invalid: height <= last decomm height ({})", height, last_decommission_height);
return false;
} else if (is_active()) {
assert(active_since_height >= 0); // should be satisfied whenever is_active() is true
if (height <= static_cast<uint64_t>(active_since_height)) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN vote at height {} invalid: height <= active-since height ({})", height, active_since_height);
return false;
}
}
log::trace(logcat, "SN vote at height {} is valid.", height);
return true;
}
bool service_node_info::can_transition_to_state(hf hf_version, uint64_t height, new_state proposed_state) const
{
if (hf_version >= hf::hf13_enforce_checkpoints) {
if (!can_be_voted_on(height)) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN state transition invalid: {} is not a valid vote height", height);
return false;
}
if (proposed_state == new_state::deregister) {
if (height <= registration_height) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN deregister invalid: vote height ({}) <= registration_height ({})", height, registration_height);
return false;
}
} else if (proposed_state == new_state::ip_change_penalty) {
if (height <= last_ip_change_height) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN ip change penality invalid: vote height ({}) <= last_ip_change_height ({})", height, last_ip_change_height);
return false;
}
}
} else { // pre-HF13
if (proposed_state == new_state::deregister) {
if (height < registration_height) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN deregister invalid: vote height ({}) < registration_height ({})", height, registration_height);
return false;
}
}
}
if (is_decommissioned()) {
if (proposed_state == new_state::decommission) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN decommission invalid: already decommissioned");
return false;
} else if (proposed_state == new_state::ip_change_penalty) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN ip change penalty invalid: currently decommissioned");
return false;
}
return true; // recomm or dereg
} else if (proposed_state == new_state::recommission) {
log::debug(logcat, "SN recommission invalid: not recommissioned");
return false;
}
log::trace(logcat, "SN state change is valid");
return true;
}
payout service_node_payout_portions(const crypto::public_key& key, const service_node_info& info)
{
service_nodes::payout result = {};
result.key = key;
// Add contributors and their portions to winners.
result.payouts.reserve(info.contributors.size());
const uint64_t portions_after_fee = cryptonote::old::STAKING_PORTIONS - info.portions_for_operator;
for (const auto& contributor : info.contributors)
{
uint64_t portion = mul128_div64(contributor.amount, portions_after_fee, info.staking_requirement);
if (contributor.address == info.operator_address)
portion += info.portions_for_operator;
result.payouts.push_back({contributor.address, portion});
}
return result;
}
}
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