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471 lines
23 KiB
C++
471 lines
23 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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//
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// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
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#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
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#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h"
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#include "chaingen.h"
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#include "bulletproofs.h"
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#include "device/device.hpp"
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using namespace epee;
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using namespace crypto;
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using namespace cryptonote;
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//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Tests
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bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events,
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size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const rct::RCTConfig *rct_config,
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const std::function<bool(std::vector<tx_source_entry> &sources, std::vector<tx_destination_entry> &destinations, size_t tx_idx)> &pre_tx,
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const std::function<bool(transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx)> &post_tx) const
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{
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uint64_t ts_start = 1338224400;
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GENERATE_ACCOUNT(miner_account);
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MAKE_GENESIS_BLOCK(events, blk_0, miner_account, ts_start);
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int target_hf = cryptonote::network_version_count - 1;
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// NOTE: Monero tests use multiple null terminated entries in their arrays
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{
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int amounts_paid_len = 0;
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for (int i = 0; amounts_paid[i] != (uint64_t)-1; ++i)
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++amounts_paid_len;
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if (amounts_paid_len == 1) // NOTE: Number of destinations/outputs to generate
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{
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// NOTE: If we want 1 output then, in HF_VERSION_MIN_2_OUTPUTS, we enforce
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// 2 outputs causing the test to fail. For that case, we set the target
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// hardfork to 1 before.
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target_hf = HF_VERSION_MIN_2_OUTPUTS - 1;
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}
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}
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std::vector<std::pair<uint8_t, uint64_t>> hard_forks = {
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std::make_pair(7, 0),
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std::make_pair(8, 1),
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std::make_pair(target_hf, NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS + CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW + 1),
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};
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event_replay_settings settings = {};
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settings.hard_forks = hard_forks;
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events.push_back(settings);
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// create 12 miner accounts, and have them mine the next 48 blocks
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int const NUM_MINERS = 12;
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cryptonote::account_base miner_accounts[NUM_MINERS];
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const cryptonote::block *prev_block = &blk_0;
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cryptonote::block blocks[NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS + CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW];
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for (size_t i = 0; i < NUM_MINERS; ++i)
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miner_accounts[i].generate();
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uint8_t const first_hf = hard_forks[1].first;
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uint8_t const last_hf = hard_forks.back().first;
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generator.m_hf_version = first_hf;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS; ++n) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(
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generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[n],
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*prev_block,
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miner_accounts[n % NUM_MINERS],
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test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
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first_hf,
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first_hf,
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prev_block->timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
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crypto::hash(),
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0,
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transaction(),
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std::vector<crypto::hash>(),
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0),
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false,
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"Failed to generate block");
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events.push_back(blocks[n]);
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prev_block = blocks + n;
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}
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// rewind
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cryptonote::block blk_r, blk_last;
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{
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blk_last = blocks[NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS - 1];
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for (size_t i = 0; i < CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW; ++i)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(
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generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS + i],
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blk_last,
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miner_account,
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test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
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first_hf,
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first_hf,
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blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
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crypto::hash(),
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0,
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transaction(),
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std::vector<crypto::hash>(),
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0),
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false,
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"Failed to generate block");
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events.push_back(blocks[NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS+i]);
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blk_last = blocks[NUM_UNLOCKED_BLOCKS+i];
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}
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blk_r = blk_last;
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}
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// NOTE(loki): Submit one more block. On the fork height, we allow exactly the
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// forking block to contain borromean TX's, due to some clients constructing
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// old style TX's on the fork height. So make sure we create one block so that
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// the block containing bulletproofs txes, which is 1 block after the fork
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// height, is tested with BP logic
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generator.m_hf_version = last_hf;
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{
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block blk;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(
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generator.construct_block_manually(blk,
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blk_last,
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miner_account,
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test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
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generator.m_hf_version,
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generator.m_hf_version,
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blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
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crypto::hash(),
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0,
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transaction(),
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std::vector<crypto::hash>(),
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0),
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false,
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"Failed to generate block");
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events.push_back(blk);
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blk_last = blk;
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}
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std::vector<transaction> rct_txes;
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cryptonote::block blk_txes;
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std::vector<crypto::hash> starting_rct_tx_hashes;
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for (size_t n = 0, block_index = 0; n < n_txes; ++n)
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{
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std::vector<tx_source_entry> sources;
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std::vector<tx_destination_entry> destinations;
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cryptonote::account_base const &from = miner_accounts[n];
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cryptonote::account_base const &to = miner_accounts[n+1];
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assert(n + 1 < NUM_MINERS);
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// NOTE: Monero tests use multiple null terminated entries in their arrays
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int amounts_paid_len = 0;
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for (int i = 0; amounts_paid[i] != (uint64_t)-1; ++i)
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++amounts_paid_len;
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uint64_t change_amount;
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fill_tx_sources_and_multi_destinations(events,
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blk_last,
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from,
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to.get_keys().m_account_address,
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amounts_paid,
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amounts_paid_len,
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TESTS_DEFAULT_FEE,
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CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_MIXIN,
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sources,
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destinations,
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true,
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&change_amount);
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tx_destination_entry change_addr{0, from.get_keys().m_account_address, false /* is subaddr */ };
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// NOTE(loki): Monero tests presume the generated TX doesn't have change so remove it from our output.
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for (auto it = destinations.begin(); it != destinations.end(); ++it)
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{
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if (it->amount != change_amount) continue;
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destinations.erase(it);
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break;
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}
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std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, cryptonote::subaddress_index> subaddresses;
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subaddresses[from.get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key] = {0,0};
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std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
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cryptonote::transaction tx;
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crypto::secret_key private_tx_key;
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if (pre_tx && !pre_tx(sources, destinations, n))
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{
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MDEBUG("pre_tx returned failure");
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return false;
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}
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loki_construct_tx_params tx_params;
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tx_params.hf_version = generator.m_hf_version;
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if (!cryptonote::construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(
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from.get_keys(),
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subaddresses,
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sources,
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destinations,
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change_addr,
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{} /*tx_extra*/,
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tx,
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0 /*unlock_time*/,
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private_tx_key,
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additional_tx_keys,
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rct_config[n],
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nullptr, /*multisig_out*/
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tx_params))
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{
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MDEBUG("construct_tx_and_get_tx_key failure");
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return false;
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}
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rct_txes.push_back(tx);
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if (post_tx && !post_tx(rct_txes.back(), n))
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{
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MDEBUG("post_tx returned failure");
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return false;
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}
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starting_rct_tx_hashes.push_back(get_transaction_hash(rct_txes.back()));
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LOG_PRINT_L0("Test tx: " << obj_to_json_str(rct_txes.back()));
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uint64_t total_amount_encoded = 0;
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for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o)
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{
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crypto::key_derivation derivation;
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bool r = crypto::generate_key_derivation(destinations[o].addr.m_view_public_key, private_tx_key, derivation);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation");
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crypto::secret_key amount_key;
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crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key);
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rct::key rct_tx_mask;
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uint64_t amount = 0;
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const uint8_t type = rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type;
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if (type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof || type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2)
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amount = rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
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else
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amount = rct::decodeRct(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
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total_amount_encoded += amount;
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}
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uint64_t expected_amount_encoded = 0;
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while (amounts_paid[0] != (size_t)-1)
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expected_amount_encoded += *amounts_paid++;
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++amounts_paid;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(expected_amount_encoded == total_amount_encoded, false, "Decoded rct did not match amount to pay");
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}
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if (!valid)
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DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_tx");
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events.push_back(rct_txes);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blk_txes, blk_last, miner_account,
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test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_tx_hashes | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
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generator.m_hf_version, generator.m_hf_version, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
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crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), starting_rct_tx_hashes, 0),
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false, "Failed to generate block");
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if (!valid)
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DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_block");
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events.push_back(blk_txes);
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blk_last = blk_txes;
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return true;
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const
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{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT(context);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.version >= txversion::v2_ringct);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type));
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size_t n_sizes = 0, n_amounts = 0;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_idx; ++n)
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{
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while (sizes[0] != (size_t)-1)
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++sizes;
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++sizes;
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}
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while (sizes[n_sizes] != (size_t)-1)
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n_amounts += sizes[n_sizes++];
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == n_sizes);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_max_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs) == n_amounts);
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for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sizes; ++n)
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_max_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[n]) == sizes[n]);
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return true;
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}
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// TODO(doyle): Revisit this. Is there some rule prohibiting a tx fee greater
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// than the block reward? Monero is unaffected because they have multiple
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// outputs of varying sizes in their miner tx, so the tx fee (inputs-outputs)
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// (because they don't use a change addr in the tests, the remainder from
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// sending can't be greater than the block reward) doesn't eclipse the reward
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// and doesn't trigger the "base reward calculation bug" assert, whereas we do
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// since we only have 1 output. So my fix is to make it so we don't generate
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// a tx that makes too high of a fee from the change amount.
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// - 2018/10/29
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bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(120), (uint64_t)-1};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, (size_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_1_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5, 5, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBulletproof , 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, NULL);
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_valid_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(60), MK_COINS(60), (uint64_t)-1};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_2"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_valid_3::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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// const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {50, 50, 50, (uint64_t)-1};
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(40), MK_COINS(40), MK_COINS(40), (uint64_t)-1};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {4, (size_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof , 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_3"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_valid_16::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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// const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, (uint64_t)-1};
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), MK_COINS(15), (uint64_t)-1};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {16, (size_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof , 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_16"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_4_2_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof , 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, NULL);
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_16_16::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof , 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, NULL);
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}
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bool gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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//const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (size_t)-1, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(60), MK_COINS(60), (size_t)-1, MK_COINS(60), MK_COINS(60), (uint64_t)-1};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1, 2, (size_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0 }, {rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 2, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_txs_invalid_2_and_8_2_and_16_16_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1, 1, (uint64_t)-1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, (uint64_t)-1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = {{rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, 0}, {rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, 0}, {rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, 0}};
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return generate_with(events, 3, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, NULL);
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}
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bool gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_3_and_2_and_4::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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// const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {11111115000, 11111115000, (uint64_t)-1, 11111115000, 11111115000, 11111115001, (uint64_t)-1, 11111115000, 11111115002, (uint64_t)-1, 11111115000, 11111115000, 11111115000, 11111115003, (uint64_t)-1};
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {MK_COINS(60), MK_COINS(60), (uint64_t)-1, MK_COINS(40), MK_COINS(40), MK_COINS(40), (uint64_t)-1, MK_COINS(60), MK_COINS(60), (uint64_t)-1, MK_COINS(30), MK_COINS(30), MK_COINS(30), MK_COINS(30), (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = {{rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0}, {rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0}, {rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0}, {rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 0}};
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const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1, 4, (size_t)-1, 2, (size_t)-1, 4, (size_t)-1};
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return generate_with(events, 4, amounts_paid, true, rct_config, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx) { return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_3_and_2_and_4"); });
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs");
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5, 5, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
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tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.pop_back();
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
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return true;
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});
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_empty_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_empty_proofs");
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {50, 50, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
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tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.clear();
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return true;
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});
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs");
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
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tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.push_back(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back());
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return true;
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});
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount");
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const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBulletproof, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
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CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
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tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back() = rct::bulletproof_PROVE(1000, rct::skGen());
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return true;
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});
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}
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bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_borromean_type::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
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|
{
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DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_borromean_type");
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|
const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5, 5, (uint64_t)-1};
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const rct::RCTConfig rct_config[] = { { rct::RangeProofBorromean, 0 } };
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return generate_with(events, 1, amounts_paid, false, rct_config, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){
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return true;
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|
});
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}
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