mirror of
https://github.com/oxen-io/oxen-core.git
synced 2023-12-14 02:22:56 +01:00
This puts the SN pubkey/privkey into a single struct (which have ed25519/x25519 keys added to it in the future), which simplifies various places to just pass the struct rather than storing and passing the pubkey and privkey separately.
640 lines
24 KiB
C++
640 lines
24 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2018, The Loki Project
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "service_node_voting.h"
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#include "service_node_list.h"
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#include "cryptonote_basic/tx_extra.h"
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#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
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#include "cryptonote_basic/verification_context.h"
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#include "cryptonote_basic/connection_context.h"
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#include "cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_defs.h"
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#include "checkpoints/checkpoints.h"
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#include "misc_log_ex.h"
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#include "string_tools.h"
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#include <random>
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include <boost/endian/conversion.hpp>
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#undef LOKI_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
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#define LOKI_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "service_nodes"
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namespace service_nodes
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{
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static crypto::hash make_state_change_vote_hash(uint64_t block_height, uint32_t service_node_index, new_state state)
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{
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uint16_t state_int = static_cast<uint16_t>(state);
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char buf[sizeof(block_height) + sizeof(service_node_index) + sizeof(state_int)];
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boost::endian::native_to_little_inplace(block_height);
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boost::endian::native_to_little_inplace(service_node_index);
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boost::endian::native_to_little_inplace(state_int);
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memcpy(buf, &block_height, sizeof(block_height));
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memcpy(buf + sizeof(block_height), &service_node_index, sizeof(service_node_index));
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memcpy(buf + sizeof(block_height) + sizeof(service_node_index), &state_int, sizeof(state_int));
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auto size = sizeof(buf);
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if (state == new_state::deregister)
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size -= sizeof(uint16_t); // Don't include state value for deregs (to be backwards compatible with pre-v12 dereg votes)
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crypto::hash result;
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crypto::cn_fast_hash(buf, size, result);
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return result;
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}
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crypto::signature make_signature_from_vote(quorum_vote_t const &vote, const service_node_keys &keys)
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{
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crypto::signature result = {};
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switch(vote.type)
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{
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default:
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Unhandled vote type with value: " << (int)vote.type);
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assert("Unhandled vote type" == 0);
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return result;
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};
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case quorum_type::obligations:
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{
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crypto::hash hash = make_state_change_vote_hash(vote.block_height, vote.state_change.worker_index, vote.state_change.state);
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crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.pub, keys.key, result);
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}
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break;
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case quorum_type::checkpointing:
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{
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crypto::hash hash = vote.checkpoint.block_hash;
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crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.pub, keys.key, result);
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}
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break;
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}
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return result;
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}
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crypto::signature make_signature_from_tx_state_change(cryptonote::tx_extra_service_node_state_change const &state_change, const service_node_keys &keys)
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{
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crypto::signature result;
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crypto::hash hash = make_state_change_vote_hash(state_change.block_height, state_change.service_node_index, state_change.state);
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crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.pub, keys.key, result);
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return result;
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}
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static bool bounds_check_worker_index(service_nodes::testing_quorum const &quorum, uint32_t worker_index, cryptonote::vote_verification_context *vvc)
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{
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if (worker_index >= quorum.workers.size())
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{
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if (vvc) vvc->m_worker_index_out_of_bounds = true;
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Quorum worker index in was out of bounds: " << worker_index << ", expected to be in range of: [0, " << quorum.workers.size() << ")");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool bounds_check_validator_index(service_nodes::testing_quorum const &quorum, uint32_t validator_index, cryptonote::vote_verification_context *vvc)
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{
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if (validator_index >= quorum.validators.size())
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{
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if (vvc) vvc->m_validator_index_out_of_bounds = true;
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Validator's index was out of bounds: " << validator_index << ", expected to be in range of: [0, " << quorum.validators.size() << ")");
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool bad_tx(cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc) {
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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bool verify_tx_state_change(const cryptonote::tx_extra_service_node_state_change &state_change,
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uint64_t latest_height,
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cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc,
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const service_nodes::testing_quorum &quorum,
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const uint8_t hf_version)
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{
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auto &vvc = tvc.m_vote_ctx;
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if (state_change.state != new_state::deregister && hf_version < cryptonote::network_version_12_checkpointing)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Non-deregister state changes are invalid before v12");
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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if (state_change.state >= new_state::_count)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Unknown state change to new state: " << static_cast<uint16_t>(state_change.state));
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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if (state_change.votes.size() < service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_MIN_VOTES_TO_CHANGE_STATE)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Not enough votes");
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vvc.m_not_enough_votes = true;
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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if (state_change.votes.size() > service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_QUORUM_SIZE)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Too many votes");
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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if (!bounds_check_worker_index(quorum, state_change.service_node_index, &vvc))
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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// Check if state_change is too old or too new to hold onto
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{
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if (state_change.block_height >= latest_height)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Received state change tx for height: " << state_change.block_height
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<< " and service node: " << state_change.service_node_index
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<< ", is newer than current height: " << latest_height
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<< " blocks and has been rejected.");
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vvc.m_invalid_block_height = true;
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if (state_change.block_height >= latest_height + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER)
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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if (latest_height >= state_change.block_height + service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_TX_LIFETIME_IN_BLOCKS)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Received state change tx for height: "
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<< state_change.block_height << " and service node: " << state_change.service_node_index
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<< ", is older than: " << service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_TX_LIFETIME_IN_BLOCKS
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<< " (current height: " << latest_height << ") "
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<< "blocks and has been rejected.");
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vvc.m_invalid_block_height = true;
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if (latest_height >= state_change.block_height + (service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_TX_LIFETIME_IN_BLOCKS + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER))
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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}
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crypto::hash const hash = make_state_change_vote_hash(state_change.block_height, state_change.service_node_index, state_change.state);
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std::array<int, service_nodes::STATE_CHANGE_QUORUM_SIZE> validator_set = {};
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int validator_index_tracker = -1;
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for (const auto &vote : state_change.votes)
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{
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if (hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints) // NOTE: After HF13, votes must be stored in ascending order
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{
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if (validator_index_tracker >= static_cast<int>(vote.validator_index))
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{
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vvc.m_votes_not_sorted = true;
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Vote validator index is not stored in ascending order, prev validator index: "
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<< validator_index_tracker << ", curr index: " << vote.validator_index);
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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validator_index_tracker = vote.validator_index;
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}
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if (!bounds_check_validator_index(quorum, vote.validator_index, &vvc))
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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if (++validator_set[vote.validator_index] > 1)
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{
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vvc.m_duplicate_voters = true;
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Voter quorum index is duplicated: " << vote.validator_index);
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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crypto::public_key const &key = quorum.validators[vote.validator_index];
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if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, key, vote.signature))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Invalid signatures for votes");
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vvc.m_signature_not_valid = true;
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return bad_tx(tvc);
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool verify_checkpoint(uint8_t hf_version, cryptonote::checkpoint_t const &checkpoint, service_nodes::testing_quorum const &quorum)
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{
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if (checkpoint.type == cryptonote::checkpoint_type::service_node)
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{
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if ((checkpoint.height % service_nodes::CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL) != 0)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Checkpoint given but not expecting a checkpoint at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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if (checkpoint.signatures.size() < service_nodes::CHECKPOINT_MIN_VOTES)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Checkpoint has insufficient signatures to be considered at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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if (checkpoint.signatures.size() > service_nodes::CHECKPOINT_QUORUM_SIZE)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Checkpoint has too many signatures to be considered at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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std::array<size_t, service_nodes::CHECKPOINT_QUORUM_SIZE> unique_vote_set = {};
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for (size_t i = 0; i < checkpoint.signatures.size(); i++)
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{
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service_nodes::voter_to_signature const &voter_to_signature = checkpoint.signatures[i];
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if (hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints && i < (checkpoint.signatures.size() - 1))
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{
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auto curr = checkpoint.signatures[i].voter_index;
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auto next = checkpoint.signatures[i + 1].voter_index;
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if (curr >= next)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Voters in checkpoints are not given in ascending order, checkpoint failed verification at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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}
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// TODO(loki): Temporary HF13 code, remove when we hit HF13 because we delete all HF12 checkpoints and don't need conditionals for HF12/HF13 checkpointing code
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std::vector<crypto::public_key> const &quorum_keys =
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(hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints) ? quorum.validators : quorum.workers;
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if (hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints)
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{
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if (!bounds_check_validator_index(quorum, voter_to_signature.voter_index, nullptr)) return false;
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}
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else
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{
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if (!bounds_check_worker_index(quorum, voter_to_signature.voter_index, nullptr)) return false;
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}
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crypto::public_key const &key = quorum_keys[voter_to_signature.voter_index];
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if (unique_vote_set[voter_to_signature.voter_index]++)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Voter: " << epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(key) << ", quorum index is duplicated: " << voter_to_signature.voter_index << ", checkpoint failed verification at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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if (!crypto::check_signature(checkpoint.block_hash, key, voter_to_signature.signature))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Invalid signatures for votes, checkpoint failed verification at height: " << checkpoint.height << " for voter: " << epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(key));
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return false;
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}
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}
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}
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else
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{
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if (checkpoint.signatures.size() != 0)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Non service-node checkpoints should have no signatures, checkpoint failed at height: " << checkpoint.height);
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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quorum_vote_t make_state_change_vote(uint64_t block_height, uint16_t validator_index, uint16_t worker_index, new_state state, const service_node_keys &keys)
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{
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quorum_vote_t result = {};
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result.type = quorum_type::obligations;
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result.block_height = block_height;
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result.group = quorum_group::validator;
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result.index_in_group = validator_index;
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result.state_change.worker_index = worker_index;
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result.state_change.state = state;
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result.signature = make_signature_from_vote(result, keys);
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return result;
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}
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quorum_vote_t make_checkpointing_vote(uint8_t hf_version, crypto::hash const &block_hash, uint64_t block_height, uint16_t index_in_quorum, const service_node_keys &keys)
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{
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quorum_vote_t result = {};
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result.type = quorum_type::checkpointing;
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result.checkpoint.block_hash = block_hash;
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result.block_height = block_height;
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// TODO(loki): Temporary HF13 code, remove when we hit HF13 because we delete all HF12 checkpoints and don't need conditionals for HF12/HF13 checkpointing code
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result.group = (hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints) ? quorum_group::validator : quorum_group::worker;
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result.index_in_group = index_in_quorum;
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result.signature = make_signature_from_vote(result, keys);
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return result;
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}
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cryptonote::checkpoint_t make_empty_service_node_checkpoint(crypto::hash const &block_hash, uint64_t height)
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{
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cryptonote::checkpoint_t result = {};
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result.type = cryptonote::checkpoint_type::service_node;
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result.height = height;
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result.block_hash = block_hash;
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return result;
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}
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bool verify_vote_age(const quorum_vote_t& vote, uint64_t latest_height, cryptonote::vote_verification_context &vvc)
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{
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bool result = true;
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bool height_in_buffer = false;
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if (latest_height > vote.block_height + VOTE_LIFETIME)
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{
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height_in_buffer = latest_height <= vote.block_height + (VOTE_LIFETIME + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER);
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Received vote for height: " << vote.block_height << ", is older than: " << VOTE_LIFETIME
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<< " blocks and has been rejected.");
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vvc.m_invalid_block_height = true;
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}
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else if (vote.block_height > latest_height)
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{
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height_in_buffer = vote.block_height <= latest_height + VOTE_OR_TX_VERIFY_HEIGHT_BUFFER;
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Received vote for height: " << vote.block_height << ", is newer than: " << latest_height
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<< " (latest block height) and has been rejected.");
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vvc.m_invalid_block_height = true;
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}
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if (vvc.m_invalid_block_height)
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{
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vvc.m_verification_failed = !height_in_buffer;
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result = false;
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}
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return result;
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}
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bool verify_vote_signature(uint8_t hf_version, const quorum_vote_t &vote, cryptonote::vote_verification_context &vvc, const service_nodes::testing_quorum &quorum)
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{
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bool result = true;
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if (vote.type >= quorum_type::count)
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{
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vvc.m_invalid_vote_type = true;
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result = false;
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}
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if (vote.group > quorum_group::worker || vote.group < quorum_group::validator)
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{
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vvc.m_incorrect_voting_group = true;
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result = false;
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}
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if (!result)
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return result;
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if (vote.group == quorum_group::validator)
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result = bounds_check_validator_index(quorum, vote.index_in_group, &vvc);
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else
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result = bounds_check_worker_index(quorum, vote.index_in_group, &vvc);
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if (!result)
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return result;
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crypto::public_key key = crypto::null_pkey;
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crypto::hash hash = crypto::null_hash;
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switch(vote.type)
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{
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default:
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Unhandled vote type with value: " << (int)vote.type);
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assert("Unhandled vote type" == 0);
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return false;
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};
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case quorum_type::obligations:
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{
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if (vote.group != quorum_group::validator)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Vote received specifies incorrect voting group, expected vote from validator");
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vvc.m_incorrect_voting_group = true;
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result = false;
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}
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else
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{
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key = quorum.validators[vote.index_in_group];
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hash = make_state_change_vote_hash(vote.block_height, vote.state_change.worker_index, vote.state_change.state);
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result = bounds_check_worker_index(quorum, vote.state_change.worker_index, &vvc);
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}
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}
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break;
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case quorum_type::checkpointing:
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{
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// TODO(loki): Temporary HF13 code, remove when we hit HF13 because we delete all HF12 checkpoints and don't need conditionals for HF12/HF13 checkpointing code
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quorum_group expected_group =
|
|
(hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints) ? quorum_group::validator : quorum_group::worker;
|
|
if (vote.group != expected_group)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("Vote received specifies incorrect voting group");
|
|
vvc.m_incorrect_voting_group = true;
|
|
result = false;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
std::vector<crypto::public_key> const &quorum_keys = (hf_version >= cryptonote::network_version_13_enforce_checkpoints) ? quorum.validators : quorum.workers;
|
|
key = quorum_keys[vote.index_in_group];
|
|
hash = vote.checkpoint.block_hash;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
result = crypto::check_signature(hash, key, vote.signature);
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
vvc.m_signature_not_valid = true;
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
template <typename T>
|
|
static std::vector<pool_vote_entry> *find_vote_in_pool(std::vector<T> &pool, const quorum_vote_t &vote, bool create) {
|
|
T typed_vote{vote};
|
|
auto it = std::find(pool.begin(), pool.end(), typed_vote);
|
|
if (it != pool.end())
|
|
return &it->votes;
|
|
if (!create)
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
pool.push_back(std::move(typed_vote));
|
|
return &pool.back().votes;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<pool_vote_entry> *voting_pool::find_vote_pool(const quorum_vote_t &find_vote, bool create_if_not_found) {
|
|
switch(find_vote.type)
|
|
{
|
|
default:
|
|
LOG_PRINT_L1("Unhandled find_vote type with value: " << (int)find_vote.type);
|
|
assert("Unhandled find_vote type" == 0);
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
|
|
case quorum_type::obligations:
|
|
return find_vote_in_pool(m_obligations_pool, find_vote, create_if_not_found);
|
|
|
|
case quorum_type::checkpointing:
|
|
return find_vote_in_pool(m_checkpoint_pool, find_vote, create_if_not_found);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void voting_pool::set_relayed(const std::vector<quorum_vote_t>& votes)
|
|
{
|
|
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock);
|
|
const time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
for (const quorum_vote_t &find_vote : votes)
|
|
{
|
|
std::vector<pool_vote_entry> *vote_pool = find_vote_pool(find_vote);
|
|
|
|
if (vote_pool) // We found the group that this vote belongs to
|
|
{
|
|
auto vote = std::find_if(vote_pool->begin(), vote_pool->end(), [&find_vote](pool_vote_entry const &entry) {
|
|
return (find_vote.index_in_group == entry.vote.index_in_group);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (vote != vote_pool->end())
|
|
{
|
|
vote->time_last_sent_p2p = now;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
template <typename T>
|
|
static void append_relayable_votes(std::vector<quorum_vote_t> &result, const T &pool, const uint64_t max_last_sent, uint64_t min_height) {
|
|
for (const auto &pool_entry : pool)
|
|
for (const auto &vote_entry : pool_entry.votes)
|
|
if (vote_entry.vote.block_height >= min_height && vote_entry.time_last_sent_p2p <= max_last_sent)
|
|
result.push_back(vote_entry.vote);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<quorum_vote_t> voting_pool::get_relayable_votes(uint64_t height) const
|
|
{
|
|
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock);
|
|
|
|
// TODO(doyle): Rate-limiting: A better threshold value that follows suite with transaction relay time back-off
|
|
#if defined(LOKI_ENABLE_INTEGRATION_TEST_HOOKS)
|
|
constexpr uint64_t TIME_BETWEEN_RELAY = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
constexpr uint64_t TIME_BETWEEN_RELAY = 60 * 2;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
const uint64_t max_last_sent = static_cast<uint64_t>(time(nullptr)) - TIME_BETWEEN_RELAY;
|
|
const uint64_t min_height = height > VOTE_LIFETIME ? height - VOTE_LIFETIME : 0;
|
|
|
|
std::vector<quorum_vote_t> result;
|
|
append_relayable_votes(result, m_obligations_pool, max_last_sent, min_height);
|
|
append_relayable_votes(result, m_checkpoint_pool, max_last_sent, min_height);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// return: True if the vote was unique
|
|
static bool add_vote_to_pool_if_unique(std::vector<pool_vote_entry> &votes, quorum_vote_t const &vote)
|
|
{
|
|
auto vote_it = std::lower_bound(
|
|
votes.begin(), votes.end(), vote, [](pool_vote_entry const &pool_entry, quorum_vote_t const &vote) {
|
|
assert(pool_entry.vote.group == vote.group);
|
|
return pool_entry.vote.index_in_group < vote.index_in_group;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (vote_it == votes.end() || vote_it->vote.index_in_group != vote.index_in_group)
|
|
{
|
|
votes.insert(vote_it, {vote});
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<pool_vote_entry> voting_pool::add_pool_vote_if_unique(const quorum_vote_t& vote, cryptonote::vote_verification_context& vvc)
|
|
{
|
|
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock);
|
|
auto *votes = find_vote_pool(vote, /*create_if_not_found=*/ true);
|
|
if (!votes)
|
|
return {};
|
|
|
|
vvc.m_added_to_pool = add_vote_to_pool_if_unique(*votes, vote);
|
|
return *votes;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void voting_pool::remove_used_votes(std::vector<cryptonote::transaction> const &txs, uint8_t hard_fork_version)
|
|
{
|
|
// TODO(doyle): Cull checkpoint votes
|
|
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock);
|
|
if (m_obligations_pool.empty())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &tx : txs)
|
|
{
|
|
if (tx.type != cryptonote::txtype::state_change)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
cryptonote::tx_extra_service_node_state_change state_change;
|
|
if (!get_service_node_state_change_from_tx_extra(tx.extra, state_change, hard_fork_version))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_ERROR("Could not get state change from tx, possibly corrupt tx");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto it = std::find(m_obligations_pool.begin(), m_obligations_pool.end(), state_change);
|
|
|
|
if (it != m_obligations_pool.end())
|
|
m_obligations_pool.erase(it);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
template <typename T>
|
|
static void cull_votes(std::vector<T> &vote_pool, uint64_t min_height, uint64_t max_height)
|
|
{
|
|
for (auto it = vote_pool.begin(); it != vote_pool.end(); )
|
|
{
|
|
const T &pool_entry = *it;
|
|
if (pool_entry.height < min_height || pool_entry.height > max_height)
|
|
it = vote_pool.erase(it);
|
|
else
|
|
++it;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void voting_pool::remove_expired_votes(uint64_t height)
|
|
{
|
|
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock);
|
|
uint64_t min_height = (height < VOTE_LIFETIME) ? 0 : height - VOTE_LIFETIME;
|
|
cull_votes(m_obligations_pool, min_height, height);
|
|
cull_votes(m_checkpoint_pool, min_height, height);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool voting_pool::received_checkpoint_vote(uint64_t height, size_t index_in_quorum) const
|
|
{
|
|
auto pool_it = std::find_if(m_checkpoint_pool.begin(),
|
|
m_checkpoint_pool.end(),
|
|
[height](checkpoint_pool_entry const &entry) { return entry.height == height; });
|
|
|
|
if (pool_it == m_checkpoint_pool.end())
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
for (auto it = pool_it->votes.begin(); it != pool_it->votes.end(); it++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (it->vote.index_in_group == index_in_quorum)
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}; // namespace service_nodes
|
|
|