78 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
78 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
# HTTP Connection Contamination
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ HackTricks LIVE Twitch</strong></a> <strong>Wednesdays 5.30pm (UTC) 🎙️ -</strong> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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**The content of this post was taken from** [**https://portswigger.net/research/http-3-connection-contamination**](https://portswigger.net/research/http-3-connection-contamination)\*\*\*\*
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Web browsers use [**HTTP connection coalescing**](https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2016/08/18/http2-connection-coalescing), which lets them **reuse** a single **HTTP/2+** **connection** for requests going to **different websites**, provided that the sites **resolve to the same IP** address and use a TLS certificate valid for both hostnames.
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**First-request routing** is a dangerous reverse-proxy behaviour where the **proxy analyses the first request** on a connection to work out **which back-end end** to route it to, and then **sends** all **subsequent requests** on that connection to the **same back-end**.
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**Connection coalescing and first-request routing do not play well together**. For example, imagine secure.example.com and wordpress.example.com are both sat behind a reverse proxy using a certificate valid for \*.example.com:
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```shell-session
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$ nslookup wordpress.example.com
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52.16.179.7 // reverse proxy that supports HTTP/2 and does first-request routing
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$ nslookup secure.example.com
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52.16.179.7 // same reverse proxy
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$ openssl s_client -connect x.portswigger-labs.net:443
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subject=/CN=*.example.com // wildcard TLS certificate
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```
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If a browser tries to send a **request to wordpress.example.com** **followed by secure.example.com**, browser connection coalescing will force **both requests down a single connection** to the front-end. First-request routing will result in the **request to secure.example.com incorrectly being routed to the WordPress back-end**. This means that if you find [XSS](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting) on wordpress.example.com, you can use it to compromise secure.example.com!
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```javascript
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// create HTTP/2+ connection
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fetch('https://wordpress.example.com/', {credentials: 'include'})
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// connection coalescing will force this down the same connection...
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// ...leading to the front-end misrouting it to WordPress
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// the browser thinks our injected JS is coming from secure.example.com
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// exposing saved passwords, cookies, etc.
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location='https://secure.example.com/plugin/x?q=<script>stealPasswords()'
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```
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You can **explore connection coalescing for yourself** by using the **Timing graph under the Network tab in Chrome's developer tools** (or using WireShark if you're a masochist). Issue request pairs using fetch() and see if the graph shows time spent on 'Initial connection' for the second request, and if the Connection ID column matches:
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{% code overflow="wrap" %}
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```javascript
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fetch('//sub1.hackxor.net/', {mode: 'no-cors', credentials: 'include'}).then(()=>{ fetch('//sub2.hackxor.net/', {mode: 'no-cors', credentials: 'include'}) })
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```
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{% endcode %}
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<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (3).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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I haven't invested the time required to explore this threat in depth or scan for it in the wild as I believe it's currently rare for two reasons. Firstly, first-request routing is relatively uncommon and HTTP/2's implementation complexity means there's only a small pool of unique HTTP/2 servers relative to HTTP/1.1. Secondly, connection coalescing means HTTP/2 servers performing first-request routing may intermittently break for genuine visitors, so the owners may end up fixing the vulnerability without attacker encouragement.
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That said, it's not all bad news for attackers. **HTTP/3 proposes** [**removing the requirement for an IP address match**](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9114.html#name-connection-reuse)**, which will expose everyone with a front-end that uses first-request routing and has a certificate valid for multiple hosts**.
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This also creates a second risk which isn't related to first-request routing - it means a **compromised server with a wildcard certificate no longer requires an MITM to exploit**. In effect, this greatly increases the pool of malicious actors who could profit from it.
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To avoid these risks before they become a reality, ensure your reverse proxies don't perform first-request routing. You can test for this manually in Repeater by enabling HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 connection reuse, and also scan for it using the 'Connection-State' attack in [HTTP Request Smuggler](https://github.com/PortSwigger/http-request-smuggler). Also, be aware that while wildcard TLS certificates have never been ideal, HTTP/3 means a compromised server with a wildcard certificate can now be used to attack sibling domains without an active MITM.
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These new threats continue the ongoing trend of web infrastructure descending into a heavily intertwined mess where a weakness in any individual site has numerous non-obvious knock-on effects on the security of the overall system. It'll be interesting to see how these risks play out in practice.
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ HackTricks LIVE Twitch</strong></a> <strong>Wednesdays 5.30pm (UTC) 🎙️ -</strong> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
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* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
|
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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