9 KiB
Anonymity Networks with Monero
Currently only Tor and I2P have been integrated into Monero. The usage of these networks is still considered experimental - there are a few pessimistic cases where privacy is leaked. The design is intended to maximize privacy of the source of a transaction by broadcasting it over an anonymity network, while relying on IPv4 for the remainder of messages to make surrounding node attacks (via sybil) more difficult.
Behavior
If any anonymity network is enabled, transactions being broadcast that lack
a valid "context" (i.e. the transaction did not come from a p2p connection),
will only be sent to peers on anonymity networks. If an anonymity network is
enabled but no peers over an anonymity network are available, an error is
logged and the transaction is kept for future broadcasting over an anonymity
network. The transaction will not be broadcast unless an anonymity connection
is made or until monerod is shutdown and restarted with only public
connections enabled.
Anonymity networks can also be used with monero-wallet-cli and
monero-wallet-rpc - the wallets will connect to a daemon through a proxy. The
daemon must provide a hidden service for the RPC itself, which is separate from
the hidden service for P2P connections.
P2P Commands
Only handshakes, peer timed syncs and transaction broadcast messages are
supported over anonymity networks. If one --add-exclusive-node p2p address
is specified, then no syncing will take place and only transaction broadcasting
can occur. It is therefore recommended that --add-exclusive-node be combined
with additional exclusive IPv4 address(es).
Usage
Anonymity networks have no seed nodes (the feature is still considered experimental), so a user must specify an address. If configured properly, additional peers can be found through typical p2p peerlist sharing.
Outbound Connections
Connecting to an anonymous address requires the command line option
--proxy which tells monerod the ip/port of a socks proxy provided by a
separate process. On most systems the configuration will look like:
--proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10--proxy i2p,127.0.0.1:9000
which tells monerod that ".onion" p2p addresses can be forwarded to a socks
proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port 9050 with a max of 10 outgoing connections and
".b32.i2p" p2p addresses can be forwarded to a socks proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port
9000 with the default max outgoing connections. Since there are no seed nodes
for anonymity connections, peers must be manually specified:
--add-exclusive-node rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083--add-peer rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083
Either option can be listed multiple times, and can specify any mix of Tor,
I2P, and IPv4 addresses. Using --add-exclusive-node will prevent the usage of
seed nodes on ALL networks, which will typically be undesireable.
Inbound Connections
Receiving anonymity connections is done through the option
--anonymous-inbound. This option tells monerod the inbound address, network
type, and max connections:
--anonymous-inbound rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083,127.0.0.1:28083,25--anonymous-inbound cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000,127.0.0.1:30000
which tells monerod that a max of 25 inbound Tor connections are being
received at address "rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083" and forwarded to monerod
localhost port 28083, and a default max I2P connections are being received at
address "cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000" and
forwarded to monerod localhost port 30000.
These addresses will be shared with outgoing peers, over the same network type,
otherwise the peer will not be notified of the peer address by the proxy.
Wallet RPC
An anonymity network can be configured to forward incoming connections to a
monerod RPC port - which is independent from the configuration for incoming
P2P anonymity connections. The anonymity network (Tor/i2p) is
configured in the same manner, except the localhost port
must be the RPC port (typically 18081 for mainnet) instead of the p2p port:
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero HiddenServicePort 18081 127.0.0.1:18081
Then the wallet will be configured to use a Tor/i2p address:
--proxy 127.0.0.1:9050--daemon-address rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion
The proxy must match the address type - a Tor proxy will not work properly with i2p addresses, etc.
i2p and onion addresses provide the information necessary to authenticate and
encrypt the connection from end-to-end. If desired, SSL can also be applied to
the connection with --daemon-address https://rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion which
requires a server certificate that is signed by a "root" certificate on the
machine running the wallet. Alternatively, --daemon-cert-file can be used to
specify a certificate to authenticate the server.
Proxies can also be used to connect to "clearnet" (ipv4 addresses or ICANN
domains), but --daemon-cert-file must be used for authentication and
encryption.
Network Types
Tor & I2P
Options --add-exclusive-node and --add-peer recognize ".onion" and
".b32.i2p" addresses, and will properly forward those addresses to the proxy
provided with --proxy tor,... or --proxy i2p,....
Option --anonymous-inbound also recognizes ".onion" and ".b32.i2p" addresses,
and will automatically be sent out to outgoing Tor/I2P connections so the peer
can distribute the address to its other peers.
Configuration
Tor must be configured for hidden services. An example configuration ("torrc") might look like:
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero HiddenServicePort 28083 127.0.0.1:28083
This will store key information in /var/lib/tor/data/monero and will forward
"Tor port" 28083 to port 28083 of ip 127.0.0.1. The file
/usr/lib/tor/data/monero/hostname will contain the ".onion" address for use
with --anonymous-inbound.
I2P must be configured with a standard server tunnel. Configuration differs by I2P implementation.
Privacy Limitations
There are currently some techniques that could be used to possibly identify the machine that broadcast a transaction over an anonymity network.
Timestamps
The peer timed sync command sends the current time in the message. This value can be used to link an onion address to an IPv4/IPv6 address. If a peer first sees a transaction over Tor, it could assume (possibly incorrectly) that the transaction originated from the peer. If both the Tor connection and an IPv4/IPv6 connection have timestamps that are approximately close in value they could be used to link the two connections. This is less likely to happen if the system clock is fairly accurate - many peers on the Monero network should have similar timestamps.
Mitigation
Keep the system clock accurate so that fingerprinting is more difficult. In the future a random offset might be applied to anonymity networks so that if the system clock is noticeably off (and therefore more fingerprintable), linking the public IPv4/IPv6 connections with the anonymity networks will be more difficult.
Bandwidth Usage
An ISP can passively monitor monerod connections from a node and observe when
a transaction is sent over a Tor/I2P connection via timing analysis + size of
data sent during that timeframe. I2P should provide better protection against
this attack - its connections are not circuit based. However, if a node is
only using I2P for broadcasting Monero transactions, the total aggregate of
I2P data would also leak information.
Mitigation
There is no current mitigation for the user right now. This attack is fairly sophisticated, and likely requires support from the internet host of a Monero user.
In the near future, "whitening" the amount of data sent over anonymity network connections will be performed. An attempt will be made to make a transaction broadcast indistinguishable from a peer timed sync command.
Intermittent Monero Syncing
If a user only runs monerod to send a transaction then quit, this can also
be used by an ISP to link a user to a transaction.
Mitigation
Run monerod as often as possible to conceal when transactions are being sent.
Future versions will also have peers that first receive a transaction over an
anonymity network delay the broadcast to public peers by a randomized amount.
This will not completetely mitigate a user who syncs up sends then quits, in
part because this rule is not enforceable, so this mitigation strategy is
simply a best effort attempt.
Active Bandwidth Shaping
An attacker could attempt to bandwidth shape traffic in an attempt to determine the source of a Tor/I2P connection. There isn't great mitigation against this, but I2P should provide better protection against this attack since the connections are not circuit based.
Mitigation
The best mitigiation is to use I2P instead of Tor. However, I2P has a smaller set of users (less cover traffic) and academic reviews, so there is a tradeoff in potential isses. Also, anyone attempting this strategy really wants to uncover a user, it seems unlikely that this would be performed against every Tor/I2P user.