Changes:
- Use libtiff>3.8.
- bit order is different from byte order. So don't messup endianness
with LSBfirst in bitmaps.
- Added support for Lab up to 3x16bits and RGB/RGBA up to 4x32bits.
* Avoid hardcoding paths with sed when using the preprocessor is much nicer.
* We don't need to explicitly add ${LIBOSSAUDIO} to LIBS since the
configure script already knows to search for -lossaudio.
* Directly list the info files in the PLIST.
Bump PKGREVISION to 2.
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/834865
Bump to nb2.
This will change the internal version of sendmail to 8.12.11.20060308.
> SECURITY: Replace unsafe use of setjmp(3)/longjmp(3) in the server
> and client side of sendmail with timeouts in the libsm I/O
> layer and fix problems in that code. Also fix handling of
> a buffer in sm_syslog() which could have been used as an
> attack vector to exploit the unsafe handling of
> setjmp(3)/longjmp(3) in combination with signals.
> Problem detected by Mark Dowd of ISS X-Force.
> Handle theoretical integer overflows that could triggered if
> the server accepted headers larger than the maximum
> (signed) integer value. This is prevented in the default
> configuration by restricting the size of a header, and on
> most machines memory allocations would fail before reaching
> those values. Problems found by Phil Brass of ISS.
for libtool archives, remove the .a and .so entries. Bump revision.
Add DragonFly detection for shared libraries. Always try to find -lssl
with -lcrypto, unbreaking the test at least on DragonFly, but should
not harm elsewhere.
Bump to nb2
This will change the internal version of sendmail to 8.13.5.20060308
> SECURITY: Replace unsafe use of setjmp(3)/longjmp(3) in the server
> and client side of sendmail with timeouts in the libsm I/O
> layer and fix problems in that code. Also fix handling of
> a buffer in sm_syslog() which could have been used as an
> attack vector to exploit the unsafe handling of
> setjmp(3)/longjmp(3) in combination with signals.
> Problem detected by Mark Dowd of ISS X-Force.
> Handle theoretical integer overflows that could triggered if
> the server accepted headers larger than the maximum
> (signed) integer value. This is prevented in the default
> configuration by restricting the size of a header, and on
> most machines memory allocations would fail before reaching
> those values. Problems found by Phil Brass of ISS.
